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A LICENSE TO BET:
LIFE INSURANCE AND THE GAMBLING ACT IN THE
BRITISH COURTS
Timothy Alborn
More directly than any other enterprise apart from slavery, life
insurance set a price on human life. As it evolved in Britain during the
nineteenth century, the insurance industry introduced a dizzying number of
variations on this theme. For the individual purchasing an insurance
policy, the value of life was translated into the sum required to care for
dependents, loss of access to a wife's inheritance should she die before her
father, the sum lost to a creditor in the event of death occurring prior to
repayment, and the loss of livelihood suffered by a tenant whose lease
ended with the life of a third party. All these reasons for buying insurance
established an equivalence between mortality and monetary value—a
"death nexus" that precisely and morbidly expressed the "cash nexus"
derided by Thomas Carlyle as the moral failing of British society.
Insurance companies were fond of reminding people that this sort of
commodification was often productive of much social and even moral
good, and it indisputably met a growing economic demand. But since
nobody knew for certain when they would die, a life insurance policy was
also, by definition, a wager. And since wagers occupied a quite different
category—"intensely selfish in [their] action, and therefore anti-social and
anti-christian," as one insurance writer called them in 1891—there was
always at least the potential for the life office to take on the darker colors of
the gambling den.1
Lawmakers first became concerned about the slippery slope between
life insurance and gambling during the third quarter of the eighteenth
century, when the industry still catered to a relatively small, mostly
aristocratic market.2 Their concern grew out of a rash of cases in which
people had taken out policies on the lives of perfect strangers, often
celebrities, on the morbid chance that they would die prematurely.3 As
Geoffrey Clark has noted, the Hanoverian gentry preferred this form of
1. C. Little, Fire Insurance: Is It a Species of Gambling?, NORWICH UNION
MAGAZINE, 1891, at 2-3.
2. See GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN
ENGLAND 1965-1775, 49 (Manchester University Press 1999).
3. Id. at 49-53.
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gambling over nearly all other varieties; a quarter of all bets in one
gentleman's club in the 1770s was on the death of a third party, compared
to only 2.5% on horse races.4 Prior to 1750 gambling on human life was
only condemned on account of accompanying criminal acts, such as
poisoning a man to collect on his life policy; after that time the wager itself
Clark has plausibly linked this
came under increased scrutiny.5
development to growing unease over slavery, since both "threatened to
shatter the emerging free-market ethos that individuals should have the
liberty to engage in a commerce of things, but not of each other."6 In the
event, Parliament intervened much earlier in the former case, with the
passage of the Gambling Act of 1774.7
The Gambling Act worked by requiring claimants to have a legitimate
financial interest in the life of the insured.8 To prevent the "mischievous
kind of gaming" that had arisen in the previous half-century, it declared all
other insurances on human life "null and void, to all intents and purposes
whatsoever."9 After 1774, it was only legal to collect on an insurance
policy if a person (typically a wife or child) relied on the insured for
income or was a creditor who stood to lose if the insured died before
repaying the loan.10 Clark has argued that although the Act "was fairly
successful at suppressing outright wagers, it could not uniformly segregate
the prudential motives prompting proper, indemnifying insurance from the
uninterested passions fueling speculation."11 Even so, this statute remained
on the books as the official dividing line between life insurance and
gambling for the next 135 years, leaving judges, customers and life offices
to make do with its uncertain provisions as best they could.12
The Gambling Act's ambiguity recurrently threatened to impede the
expansion of life insurance throughout the nineteenth century. As Clark
indicates, the chief problem in this case lay in life insurance's dangerous
commingling of things and people.13 The challenge for judges and
insurance companies alike was to keep those two categories as separate as
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
below.
13.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 62-63.
See id. at 9.
Id.
DERMOT MORRAH, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL LIFE ASSURANCE 74 (1955).
See Clark, supra note 2, at 9.
Id. at 26.
It was modified in the 1909 Life Assurance Companies Act, which is discussed
CLARK, supra note 2, at 53.
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possible without overly hindering the growth of the industry. Their efforts
were tolerably successful in the case of upper-class life insurance.14 The
increasingly impersonal and standardized nature of these transactions
allowed judges to come to terms with the fact that many life policies,
though formally instruments of gambling, were largely irrelevant to the
moral issues raised by the specter of betting on human life. The result was
that judges followed companies in adopting a set of principles which
rendered the Act all but a dead letter after mid-century.
The case was far different once life insurance spread from the upperclass market to working-class customers after 1850. For one thing, the
primary reason working people bought life insurance—to pay for a
relative's funeral costs—did not formally qualify as an "insurable interest"
under the Gambling Act; hence at least half of the tens of millions of such
policies issued between 1850 and 1909 were technically illegal.15 Adding
to the problem, judges doubted the companies' ability to deter their
customers' alleged passion for gambling; company directors doubted their
ability to prevent salesmen from attracting business by taking bets on
neighborhood fatalities; and customers soon realized that the formal
illegality of their policies entitled them to a refund if the life insured failed
to die soon enough to "pay."16 The result was that companies sporadically
appealed to the Gambling Act to quash what they saw as egregious cases of
black-market wagering, while customers increasingly sued for back
premiums.17 In response, late-Victorian judges wavered between punishing
working-class "gamblers" for their depravity in treating neighbors like race
horses, and punishing the companies for encouraging (through their agents)
such allegedly immoral behavior.18
This article begins by recounting the relative ease with which
companies and judges stabilized the meaning of "insurable interest" in the
case of upper-class insurance, by examining the two leading cases of
Godsall v. Boldero19 and Dalby v. India and London Life.20 It then turns to
the more complex case of working-class life insurance, by sampling a
14. I use the term "upper-class" in this chapter to connote the aristocrats,
professionals, and merchants who comprised the primary market for life insurance up to the
1850s, as distinct from the working-class or "industrial" customers discussed below.
15. See MORRAH, supra note 9, at 75.
16. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
19. (1807) 103 Eng. Rep. 500 (K.B.).
20. (1854) 139 Eng. Rep. 465 (C.P.).
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succession of trials which exhibited a variety of appeals to the Gambling
Act. Finally, it briefly discusses efforts by companies to clarify the Act in
1909 by lobbying legislators to revise the meaning of "insurable interest"
for working-class customers, by increasing supervision over agents and
customers, and by introducing new forms of marketing which sought to
teach their customers to associate insurance with financial security rather
than gaming. What was at stake in each of these cases was the
determination of a boundary between legitimate and illegitimate insurance,
in an insurance market which appealed to all social classes because of—not
in spite of—the fact that it often shaded imperceptibly into gambling.
I. GAMBLING AND LIFE INSURANCE, 1807-1854
The branch of upper-class life insurance that did most to expose the
Gambling Act's ambiguous language concerned policies taken out by
creditors against the contingency of debtors dying before they could repay
the loan. To guarantee the legality of such policies, life offices routinely
ascertained the fact of the loan; as long as the insurance did not exceed the
sum of money that was lent, the lender could not be said to be speculating
on the death of the debtor. Once such policies had been in force a few
years, however, their legal status became more difficult to determine.
What happened if a creditor continued to keep up the insurance policy after
the debt had been repaid? Or what if the debt was repaid in installments,
but the creditor kept up the original level of coverage? Such questions
raised the distinct possibility that many, perhaps the majority, of such
policies were technically illegal when the claim was actually paid. And the
legality of third-party policies was a major issue in the early nineteenth
century, when roughly a third of all policies, and probably half of the sums
assured, were of this variety.21
Lord Ellenborough clarified these legal questions at King's Bench in
1807, although he did so in a way that would create intolerable levels of

21. Between 30% and 47% of clerical, medical & general policies issued between
1824 and 1895 were on third parties, as were 34.4% of legal and general policies in force in
1870.
Renewal Ledgers, Clerical, Medical and General Life Assurance Society
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Clerical Medical Group Archives, Edinburgh); Life
Policy Registers, Legal and General Life Assurance Society (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Guildhall Library, MS 18,473, London).
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unpredictability for prospective third-party insurers.22 The decisive case,
Godsall v. Boldero, concerned a seven-year term policy for £500 on the life
of William Pitt, which was taken out from the Pelican life office as security
against a debt.23 The Pelican had resisted the claim on the grounds that by
the time it was ready to pay, the debt had already been canceled by means
of a special Parliamentary grant which cleared the former Prime Minister's
outstanding commitments.24 When Godsall sued for his £500, the
company's lawyer invoked the Gambling Act, arguing that "if this policy
may be enforced... every creditor may gamble upon the life of his debtor by
way of insurance, ... and upon his death he would be entitled to double
satisfaction of his debt."25 He also compared the case to that of a marine
policyholder who claimed a total loss even though he had already been
indemnified by means of salvage.26 Godsall's lawyer countered that the
Pelican should pay the claim since they had been fairly compensated for
the risk, urging that in such contracts "the premium is not calculated upon
the risk of the insolvency of the person whose life is insured, but solely on
the probability of the duration of the life."27 Ellenborough sided with the
Pelican, ruling that the policy was "in its nature a contract of indemnity, as
distinguished from a contract by way of gaming or wagering."28
By restricting third-party life policies to the indemnification of
remaining sums owed by insured debtors after they died, Ellenborough
endowed life offices with blanket deniability in the event of such policies
falling due. Companies soon discovered that such power was doubleedged, since they threatened to dissuade creditors from taking out policies
for fear that a company would postpone payment until other means of
securing the debt had been exhausted. After the Asylum Life Assurance
Company successfully appealed to the Gambling Act to dispute a child
endowment policy in 1830, insurers "received applications for written
acknowledgments that the Directors will not avail themselves of any such
advantage, in cases which bear a great analogy to that which has just been
decided against the public."29 A typical company response to this sort of
22. This was in keeping with Ellenborough's wider pattern of decisions which "barred
the way repeatedly to attempts to modernize the law." P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 422 (1979).
23. (1807) 103 Eng. Rep. 500 (K.B.).
24. Id. at 500-02.
25. Id. at 503.
26. Id. at 502-03.
27. Id. at 502.
28. Id. at 504.
29. H.B. & Co., To our Subscribers, 94 CIRCULAR TO BANKERS 329, 330 (1830).
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fear was by the Alliance, which spent a decade pondering the proper course
to take when "the Assured has a shifting interest in the Life" after first
learning in 1827 that it could challenge any policy that failed
Ellenborough's strict standard.30 Eventually its board decided that it was
not worth the trouble to determine the technical legality of the insurance
beyond its initial issue.31 Other offices followed a similar trajectory, first
disputing claims in isolated cases, then eventually guaranteeing customers
that Godsall would have no impact on their decision to meet an initial
obligation.
In Dalby v. India and London Life Assurance Company (1854), the
Court of Common Pleas caught up with the life offices' practice, deciding
(in the words of Justice Parke) that a "much more reasonable construction"
of the Gambling Act was "that, if there is an interest at the time of the
policy, it is not a wagering policy, and that the true value of that interest
may be recovered, in exact conformity with the words of the contract
itself."32 The case involved an attempt by the India and London to deny
payment on a policy which it had originally accepted as a reinsurance from
the Anchor life office, but which had subsequently been taken over by an
Anchor director who kept the policy in force.33 In ordering the India and
London to pay, Parke appealed both the customer's right to know the exact
value of his purchase and to the fact that Godsall had been "universally
disregarded" by nearly all life offices.34 The lawyer who argued the
Anchor's case, George Bramwell, repeated the earlier claim in Godsall's
defense that a life policy was "a simple and absolute contract to pay a given
sum of money on the death of the life," and hence did not qualify as an
indemnity.35 He added that Ellenborough had bestowed powers on life
offices that they had, in practice, been unwilling to exercise: for instance,
the right "to demand the money back, if the debtor's executors,—say, ten
years after his death,—become possessed of funds wherewith to pay the
debt."36
30. Id.
31. Alliance Assurance Company board minutes (May 23, 1827, Feb 22, 1837 and
July 10, 1839), unpublished manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 12, 162,
London).
32. (1854) 139 Eng. Rep. 465, 476 (C.P).
33. Id. at 466-69.
34. Id. at 473-76.
35. Id. at 469. Bramwell went on to be a leading architect of "freedom of contract"
doctrine in English law. See ATIYAH, supra note 22, at 374-80.
36. Dalby, 139 Eng. Rep. at 469-70.

2008]

A LICENSE TO BET

7

Parke's decision in Dalby, closely following Bramwell's arguments,
firmly established that the payment of a life claim was not the same as an
indemnification for a loss. To this extent, his reasoning was sound.37 What
his ruling overlooked, however, was the fact that any insurance policy that
professed to do more than indemnify against a contingent loss is, by
definition, equivalent to a wager. This had been Ellenborough's point when
he implied that life insurance was either "a contract of indemnity" or "a
contract by way of gaming or wagering."38 Judges in the Dalby case
claimed that their decision left the Gambling Act intact as a secure
protection against "colourable insurances" such as when a "man might lend
another 5l., to enable him to insure for 10,000l."39 But this example was no
different from lending a man £10,000 for a few weeks, then keeping all but
£5 of that sum in force as a life policy—which is exactly what
Dalby legalized. Parke's contrary claim notwithstanding, it was illogical to
assert that an insurable interest at the outset necessarily meant that it was
"not a wagering policy."40
The fact of the matter was that few people by the mid-nineteenth
century were concerned about the possibility that life insurance might
qualify as a subset of "wagering." Hence the mathematician Augustus De
Morgan, in an 1838 critique of Godsall, argued that "the contract of
insurance, be it gambling, or be it not, rests entirely upon the permission
given by the law to consider a high chance of a small sum as good
consideration for a low chance of a large sum."41 A half-century later,
industry spokesmen were even more brazen in their identification of life
insurance and gambling, as when the Law Union's medical officer urged
that his line of work was "a very moral thing, and is very charitable; but
there is no doubt it is a form of gambling... and we all go to the office, and

37. See VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 71-72 (1979) (describing the influence of the
insurable interest doctrine on the relationship between pecuniary loss and emotional loss).
38. Godsall v. Boldero, (1807) 103 Eng. Rep. 500, 504 (K.B.).
39. Dalby,139 Eng. Rep. at 473.
40. On the Godsall and Dalby cases, and their impact on American life insurance
practice. See Sharon Ann Murphy, "Security in an Uncertain World: Life Insurance and the
Emergence of Modern America" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia), 145-159
(2005).
41. AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN, AN ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES, AND ON THEIR APPLICATION
TO LIFE CONTINGENCIES AND INSURANCE OFFICES 247 (London: Longman, Orme, Brown,
Green, and Longmans, 1838).
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back lives instead of horses."42 One reason for this departure from earlier
efforts to segregate insurance and gambling into two distinct categories is
that late-Victorians had started to distinguish between different sorts of
gambling, some of which were apparently good for society. Viviana
Zelizer's comments regarding American life insurance in the latenineteenth century are just as relevant to British opinion at the time: "as
risk increasingly became an integral part of the... economic system, certain
forms of risk taking and speculation assumed new respectability. Rational
speculation that dealt with already existent risks was differentiated from
pure gambling which created artificial risk."43
Alongside such shifts in perception had evolved changes in the practice
of life insurance, which erased many of its earlier overlaps with "pure
gambling." One of these was a new willingness by most offices after 1850
to offer standardized "surrender values" to parties who wanted to drop their
policies—a category of people which included many creditors whose debts
had been repaid.44 This practice superseded the previous course taken by
customers in such cases, which was to auction off the policy to the highest
bidder, who would continue to pay the premiums then collect the claim
when the insured party died.45 Hence a precisely calculable, private and
wholly impersonal transaction took the place of an unseemly public
spectacle, one which the insurance reformer Elizur Wright pointedly
compared to slavery.46 Once such changes were underway, upper-class
customers and companies benefited equally from the predictable playing
field which was achieved by pretending that the Gambling Act did not
apply to them, and neither side had an incentive to take the other to court as
a means of resolving their grievances.

42. R. Hingston Fox, "The Assurance of Impaired Lives, Chiefly with Reference to
Special Forms of Assurance," Clinical Journal 6 (1895), 258.
43. Zelizer, supra note 3, 86. See also G.R. SEARLE, MORALITY AND THE MARKET IN
VICTORIAN BRITAIN 78-86 (1998).
44. ECONOMIST, June 18, 1892 at 789.
45. Until the Insurance Policies Act of 1867 officially legalized such purchases
(assuming the title to the policy was properly assigned to the purchaser), such auctions were
technically illegal under the Gambling Act. But, as in the case of creditors collecting claims
despite the cancellation of the debt, the Act was seldom applied to them. See CORNELIUS
WALFORD, INSURANCE CYCLOPEDIA 203 (London, Layton) (1871).
46. William Clendenin, A Brief Sketch of the Life and Works of Elizur Wright, in THE
BIBLE OF LIFE INSURANCE 66, 67 (1932).
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II. THE GRAY MARKET IN WORKING-CLASS LIFE
INSURANCE
When companies started to extend life insurance to a working-class
market after 1860, they opened the way for a whole new crop of technically
illegal third-party policies. The main contingency which these "industrial"
offices guarded against, in exchange for weekly premiums of several
pence, was the cost associated with providing a "proper" burial for a family
member.47 Unlike third-party policies involving loans, however, which
were at least legal at the outset of the contract, the Gambling Act did not
recognise liability to pay funeral expenses as an "insurable interest" in
another person's life. The only exception was when the family member
was an adult male who took out the policy in his own name, since the
benefit (usually between £10 and £50) could be said to be used to support
the man's dependents. No such "interest" existed in the millions of cases in
which husbands wanted to take policies out on their wives, parents on their
children, and on through the family tree to grandchildren, cousins and inlaws.48 Most of these people could usually find a company willing to sell
them a policy on someone else's life, but until 1909 they could not find a
statute declaring its legality.49
Beyond buying policies that were merely technically illegal, many
working-class policyholders broke the spirit as well as the letter of the
Gambling Act—although the extent to which this happened is difficult to
determine. At the very least, reported cases indicate that conditions existed
for this sort of street betting to flourish.50 When a Bradford poor law
guardian told of a man suffering from "cancer in the mouth" who died with
twelve policies on his life, the guardian observed that "[t]he agent insured
the man without ever seeing him, but his friends knowing that it was
cancer, knew it would be fatal in the end."51 Many court cases similarly
told of people dying prematurely with several policies on their lives,
implying that customers took advantage of their superior knowledge of
47. LAURIE DENNETT, A SENSE OF SECURITY: 150 YEARS OF PRUDENTIAL 5-9 (1998).
48. MORRAH, supra note 9, at 74-76. Partial legal recognition of the widespread
practice of insuring children’s lives was achieved in the 1875 Friendly Society Act. This
Act allowed families to insure up to £6 per child. While this formally extended only to
mutual “collecting societies,” the courts soon extended this provision to joint-stock
companies under common law. See Sidney Webb, The Working of the Insurance Act, NEW
STATESMAN 2 (1914 & Supp.).
49. See MORRAH, supra note 9, at 74-75.
50. Id. at 74.
51. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN’S LIFE INSURANCE BILL, REPORT, 1890, H.L. 70.
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sickly neighbors to profit at the distant office's expense. The agents who
sold such policies were either assumed to be overly lax (as in the Bradford
case) or complicitous.52 Companies were usually willing to fight such
claims in court, often with a successful outcome, although even here they
needed to keep one eye fixed on the tender subject of public relations.
Hence when Sophie Haberschitz of the East End was found burned to death
in 1909 with ten policies on her life, the implicated offices decided to pay
the claims on the grounds that "it was undesirable lest the world know that
such a thing was possible."53
If industrial life offices were sometimes reluctant to challenge claims
that they assumed to be guilty of criminal intent, they were even less likely
to resist "legitimate" claims on third-party policies just because the
Gambling Act said they could. Although any office might, in theory, cart
out the Act whenever a claim by a nephew or grand-daughter involved it in
a loss, they did no such thing, for the same reason that upper-class offices
ignored Godsall: it would have driven away half their business.
Unfortunately for the companies, the same reasoning did not work in
reverse. The Gambling Act enabled people who held "legitimate" but
illegal policies to exercise an especially brutal form of selection against
industrial offices, by suing for a refund when their premiums had exceeded
the value of the claim. The associated legal costs were enough to restrict
the number of such cases until around 1900, but after this time lawyers
started to appear on the scene who were willing to try them on a
contingency basis.54 These lawyers, Edwardian cousins of the ambulance
chaser, naturally earned the wrath of industrial insurance managers, as
when Alfred Henri of the Liverpool Victoria railed against, "solicitors of a
certain type . . . who were willing to take up these cases for what they
might get out of them."55 Their reputation was substantially higher among
the large number of working-class policyholders who were stuck in what
had become an unprofitable contract. Yet even customers who won their
suits learned that illegal insurance economics came with troubling fine
52. See, e.g., 19 ASSURANCE AGENT’S REVIEW 42-43 (1906).
53. Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book (July 13, 1909) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).
54. Officially, Edwardian lawyers were barred from charging contingency fees. The
legal challenges described below, however, would only have been feasible on such a basis;
hence it seems likely that lawyers informally accomplished this, for instance by voluntarily
foregoing their fee in the event of a negative verdict. I am grateful to Joshua Getzler for
pointing out this problem.
55. Industrial Life Offices Association Minutes Book (unpublished manuscript on file
with Guildhall Library, London) MS 29,802.
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print: legal fees could run nearly as high as the claim, once lawyers
averaged in their time from cases they lost.56
As Dalby demonstrates, the prevalence of business-friendly, judgemade law often allowed Victorian markets to operate quite efficiently
despite statutory obstacles.57 Yet no judge delivered a Dalby-style ruling in
the late-nineteenth century which clearly stated that working-class "life-ofanother" policies were not equivalent to wagers. There are several reasons
for this, relating to distinctive traits of industrial insurance, popular
assumptions about working-class gambling, and conflicting views held by
different judges. First, the large scale and unpopular reputation of
industrial insurance companies, affected both sides of the blurry line
separating "pure gambling" from "rational speculation." The three largest
industrial offices, the Prudential, Refuge, and Pearl, dominated their
competitors, and each were writing millions of new policies a year by
1910.58 The companies' size and central organization rendered them
vulnerable to losses to parties whose local knowledge was an advantage in
insurance wagers; but it also made them more capable of surviving an
expensive court battle if they chose to resist payment. The companies'
unpopular reputation, especially that of their salesmen, gave customers a
fighting chance to convince a judge that they had been hoodwinked into
buying an illegal policy and deserved to get a refund. Part of this
reputation was derived from the assumption that burial insurance qualified
as illicit "gambling" on the deaths of neighbors and relatives; but much of it
also stemmed from the assumption that even the "bona fide" service offered
by the companies—financial security against the cost of burial—
encouraged needlessly lavish funerals among the poor.59
Assuming that burial insurance did qualify as gambling, people who
bought it, and companies that sold it, were far more likely than upper-class
customers to be viewed by the rest of society to be practicing "pure
gambling" instead of "rational speculation." Gambling of any variety
appeared darker to Victorians whenever the gamblers were poor people.60
56. DENNETT, supra note 47, at 403 n.15.
57. See Dalby v. India & London Life Assurance Co., 15 C.B. 365 (1854).
58. Timothy Alborn, Senses of Belonging: The Politics of Working-Class Insurance in
Britain, 1880-1914, 73 J. MOD. HIST. 561, 576 (2001).
59. Alborn, supra note 58, at 579.
60. This may very well be due to the fact that "already existent risks"—for instance, a
joint-stock company's financial future—were off limits to working-class gamblers, who
lacked the requisite capital to become shareholders. They did, in contrast, have access to
"artificial risks" such as the outcome of card games, lotteries, or horseraces. See SEARLE,
supra note 43, at 232.
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The Gaming Act of 1845, as distinct from the Gambling Act which only
applied to insurance, was mainly enforced among the poor.61 Hence,
private clubs and racetracks remained effectively legal, while off-course
betting did not.62 This double standard reflected the middle classes'
"paternalistic care for the poor who might be led astray by the machinations
of bookmakers;" a sentiment that stood in clear tension with the contrary
middle-class, "drive to cash in on the demand for gambling."63 The result
was that working-class gambling "inhabited a twilight world" in lateVictorian legal and moral discourse, not unlike that which enveloped
industrial insurance at the same time.64
The scale and reputation of industrial insurance helps to explain why
companies and their customers took so many cases to court between 1880
and 1909.65 But, it does not explain why judges had so much trouble
discovering a "reasonable construction" of the Gambling Act that would
settle the cases.66 The problem was not that judges lacked opinions where
industrial insurance was concerned; law’s " hortatory aspect " was as much
on display in this realm of insurance law as in any other.67 The problem
was that judges could not decide exactly what or whom they should be
exhorting. To add to the confusion, a clear split developed after 1900
between the higher courts and the county courts. The higher courts became
increasingly concerned with establishing "principles" that would allow the
companies to get on with their business, and the county courts tended to
ignore the higher courts rulings in order to "get at the agents" by forcing

61. See SEARLE, supra note 43, at 232 (mentioning the “widely held view that the
operation of the law was being grossley distorted by class bias”). See also CLARK, supra
note 2, at 22 (explaining that “The Gambling Act . . . introduced the first appreciable
regulation of life insurance . . . ”).
62. See Roger Munting, Betting and Business; the Commercialisation of Gambling in
Britain, 31 Bus. Hist. 67, 68 (1989). See also SEARLE supra note 43, at 232.
63. See Munting, supra note 62, at 68.
64. SEARLE, supra note 43, at 232. See also MORRAH, supra note 9, at 27-29
(discussing industrial insurance of the same time period, and comparing the advances made
in mathematical and psychological analysis to the difficulties of the early companies).
65. See MORRAH, supra note 9 at 31 (talking about the difficulties with industrial
insurance during this time period, and the increase in contracts issued).
66. See CLARK, supra note 2 at 26 (noting the “intractable problems that courts
encountered in meaningfully distinguishing a legitimate insurable interest from an
illegitimate gamble . . . ”).
67. ATIYAH, supra note 22, at 395 (talking about the “hortatory aspect” of law); see
also MORRAH, supra note 9 at 24 (discussing the Select Committee being favorable towards
industrial insurance).
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companies to pay.68 The result was a patently uncertain legal framework,
which industrial life offices ultimately found to be intolerable.
III.

THE GAMBLING ACT ON TRIAL

In their respective battles to stack the deck in their favor, working-class
customers and companies told stories at trial in order to convince judges
that the Gambling Act entitled them to gain at the other's expense. When
policyholders sued for a return of premiums, they presented themselves as
victims of the insurance agent's misleading claim that such policies were
legal. In their defense, depending on the circumstances of the case, life
offices tried to shift blame back onto the policyholder or the agent. The
insurance agent, who received so much of the blame in these trials, was the
least likely to be asked to testify, lest he refute the other parties' professions
of innocence.
When a Liverpool woman sued the Refuge in 1903 after paying £82 on
two policies worth £72, she argued that the agent had told her "'it would be
all right—she could draw the money'."69 The judge agreed that this was
tantamount to fraud on the company's part, and awarded her £34—ruling
that the rest of the payment lay outside the statute of limitations.70 Alice
Crosty used the same argument to win £53 back from the Scottish
Temperance life office in 1909, on a policy she had taken out on her aunt's
life.71 With less success, Johanna Butt of Swansea tried to claim that
"people came and asked her to pay premiums" in a case where she was
accused of taking out fifteen policies on the same man's life.72 For the most
part, the fact that all these allegations of misrepresentation were made by
women simply reflects the economic reality that buying insurance—like
pawning, food shopping, and rent payment—qualified as "women's work"

68. See PATRICK POLDEN, A HISTORY OF THE COUNTY COURT, 1846-1971, 68-69, 94
(1999) (discussing the difference in treatment of creditors and debtors between the two
courts, and how the county court judges sought to “impose a paternalist regime on the
improvident and incompetent”). This work also discusses the relationship between county
courts and high courts in the late nineteenth century.
69. Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London). In this and subsequent cases, monetary sums
are rounded to the nearest pound.
70. Id.
71. 47 Ins. Rec. pg. #, 529 (1909).
72. Id. at 336.
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in the working-class division of household labor.73 Yet probably it also
indicated a conscious strategy by such women and their lawyers to
capitalize on the middle-class assumption, shared by many working men,
that insurance salesmen habitually took advantage of their female
customers' naiveté as they made their way from the doorstep into the front
room.74
Life offices tried to counter such claims by insisting that their
customers, far from being innocent victims, were seasoned veterans at the
"game" of demanding back premiums when the life they had "gambled" on
refused to die in a timely fashion. When two Walworth women sued the
Liverpool Victoria in 1909 for £26 in back premiums after their father died,
claiming "misrepresentation of one of their agents," the society's lawyer
countered that it had offered the women the £10 due at the death, "but it
had been refused by them because their father lived longer than they
expected, and the transaction had been unprofitable to them."75 Although
successful in the Liverpool Victoria case, such reasoning proved to be a
risky legal strategy since companies could all too easily incriminate
themselves along with their customers. Hence, a judge found against the
Royal Liver in 1903 when it refused to refund Mary Wilson of Padiham
£36 in premiums paid on a policy on her father-in-law's life, despite its
lawyer's argument that she "had been speculating in insurance for a
considerable time, and... was prepared to take the risk." The judge was not
impressed by the society's efforts to counter Wilson's charge of
misrepresentation with the claim that "many insurance companies took and
honoured those wagering policies, as the Royal Liver was prepared to do in
the case."76
In responding to these stories, late-Victorian judges sent a decidedly
mixed set of messages to customers and companies alike. Some, especially
at the county level, blamed the companies for making a mockery of the
Gambling Act and punished them by requiring them to return the premiums
paid for illegal policies.77 Others did not accuse the directors of
73. See ELLEN ROSS, LOVE AND TOIL: MOTHERHOOD IN OUTCAST LONDON, 1870-1918
193(1993).
74. See, e.g., the Trades Union Congressional resolution from 1909 which states that
"[u]nfair advantage is often taken [by insurance salesmen] of the womankind when the
husband is away": reprinted in Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).
75. 47 INS. REC. 25 (1909).
76. 41 INS. REC., 509 (1903).
77. 8 ASSURANCE AGENTS’ REV. 147 (1895); 9 ASSURANCE AGENTS’ REV. 62 (1896).
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encouraging gambling, but did fault their agents. For example, a Swansea
judge forced the Royal Counties Friendly Society to refund a collier's
premiums with costs in 1902. Although the judge claimed that he "would
not think of blaming the directors," he did feel the need to "warn people
about this, so that they will not enter into these contracts," and he
concluded: "These agents behave so badly. I should like to hit some of
these societies through their agents."78 Another judge allowed the
Liverpool Victoria to deny five claims on the short life of a girl who died of
tuberculosis in 1906, but required it to pay £20 in costs, arguing that "[s]o
long as there are agents who lend themselves to this trafficking... there will
always be found people weak enough or greedy enough to listen to the
tempters."79 A third set of judges similarly blamed the agents, but had
ample suspicion left over for the policyholders as well. Hence the judge in
the Walworth case admitted that "canvassers for insurance companies were
apt to misstate things," but also offered this taunt to the allegedly
victimized sisters: "The whole mischief is that your father lived too long.
Is that not it?"80 A Bristol judge similarly denied £25 in back premiums
for a £19 policy against the death of "an elderly man called Mark Barnes,"
appending to his ruling the wry observation that "[o]wing to Mr. Barnes's
perversity in continuing to live, poor Mr. Tilley had overpaid."81
Harse v. Pearl (1904) held that policyholders should be assumed to be
parties to illegal insurances unless fraud on the part of the agent could be
proven.82 In that case, the Court of Appeals did make some strides towards
stabilizing the meaning of the Gambling Act in application to workingclass insurance.83 Lord Mathew, expressly grounded his ruling in Harse on
the principle that life offices were, "entitled to the administration of the law
on fixed principles."84 The Court arrived at these "fixed principles" in
Harse by invoking the legal fiction that insurance salesmen could not be
expected to understand how the Gambling Act had defined insurable
interest; and hence could not be guilty of misrepresentation.85 That case
78. 40 INS. REC. 174 (1902).
79. 19 ASSURANCE AGENTS’ REV. 42-43 (1906).
80. 47 INS. REC. 25 (1909); 70 POST MAG. 53 (1909).
81. 47 INS. REC. 593 (1909).
82. Harse v. Pearl, (1904) 1 Eng. Rep. 558, 560-61 (K.B.).
83. See id. at 560, 564. See also 70 Post Mag. 207 (1909). In a second ruling,
Griffiths v. Fleming, the court was able to accomplish greater levels of certainty for the
narrower category of husbands taking out policies on their wives. See Griffiths v. Fleming,
(1909) I Eng. Rep. 805, 808 (K.B.).
84. 70 POST MAG. 207 (1909).
85. Harse, 1 Eng. Rep. at 560-61.
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was a typical one: Harse had taken out policies on his parents' lives and
then demanded back premiums from the Pearl once his payments had
exceeded his claim.86 The trial jury had found for the Pearl on the grounds
that the Agent represented that the Policy would be valid and did not know
that what he was saying was untrue.87 The Court of Appeals confirmed this
verdict, on the assumption that salesmen's claims regarding the validity of
third-party policies were statements of the general law of the land in
relation to insurance, which were made innocently to a person who was
most desirous of entering into an illegal Contract.88
In reaching its verdict, the judges offered a unique twist on the usual
brand of moralizing about dodgy agents preying on innocent, or even notso-innocent, working-class victims.89 The court argued that most industrial
insurance salesmen were cut from the same cloth as their customers, and
hence were unlikely to be in a position to lead their customers too far
astray.90 This corresponded with the socioeconomic reality of most
insurance salesmen at the time, and it certainly corresponded with the
agents' self-ascribed mission to put themselves, "on a level with all the
policy-holders, no matter how humble their position in life may be."91
From this premise, the judges concluded that customers and agents were
similarly ignorant of the Gambling Act—hence relieving insurance
salesmen of any "greater obligation to know the law than the persons they
approach for the purpose of effecting policies." Since the Pearl was not "in
any way bound to appoint Agents with some special knowledge of law," it
stood to reason that caveat emptor, not the Gambling Act, was the relevant
"general principle" in such cases.92
Unfortunately for the life offices, Harse was only partially successful
at putting an end to the rising tide of litigation that had been such a problem
since 1900. This was especially the case in county courts,93 where judges
were often determined to punish the industrial offices by assuming fraud on
86. See id. at 558.
87. See id. at 559.
88. See id. at 563-64. See also Industrial Life Offices Association Minutes Book, Law
Reports (unpublished manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).
89. Industrial Life Offices Association Minutes Book, Law Reports (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).
90. Harse, 1 Eng. Rep. at 564.
91. FREDERICK H. GISBOURNE, HOW TO CONDUCT AN AGENCY 5 (1895).
92. Industrial Life Offices Association Munutes Book, Law Reports (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London).
93. See POLDEN, supra note 68, at 94 (stating that cases heard by judges in the county
court rose from 1,046 in 1900 to 5,289 in 1913).
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the part of their agents. Hence when Hannah Brown sued the Britannic life
office in 1907 in the Preston County Court to recover premiums for a
policy on her mother's life, the office failed in its attempt "to prove that
both the Company and the assured were in pari delicto, as in the Harse
case."94 Instead, the judge sternly insisted that the Britannic was
responsible for its agents' actions: "The policy was signed by five officials,
including two directors, yet not a single one thought it incumbent upon him
to consider whether the insurable interest was valid under an Act 125 years
old."95 Although Brown was subsequently reversed on appeal, as were a
number of similar lower court rulings, the trickle of such rulings grew to a
flood in 1909.96 A November 1909 editorial in the Insurance Record
entitled "Trouble in the Industrial Assurance World" cited the case of a
Welsh district in which "one company alone has had no fewer than one
hundred and forty County Court actions brought against it in about two
months, for the return of premiums on alleged illegal assurances."97 It was
the Edwardian equivalent of a class-action suit: "In several districts during
the past six weeks circulars confidently believed to emanate from a firm of
solicitors, have been distributed, inviting policyholders to take proceedings
for the recovery of premiums; and in Lancashire certain solicitors, have
called and addressed public meetings with the same object."98 As with
many modern class-action suits, new legislation soon followed to prevent
the recurrence of such alarming disruptions to business as usual.
After 1909: From Judgment to Surveillance
The new law in question was the Assurance Companies Act of 190999,
most of which had to do with upper-class life insurance business.100 As the
Act was making its way through Parliament, the industrial offices lobbied
strenuously to include a provision that would prevent customers from being
able to cite "the old Act of George III" in order to recover their premiums.
94. Industrial Life Offices Association Munites Book, Law Reports (unpublished
manuscript on file with Guidhall Library, MS 29,802, London).
95. 45 INS. REC. 564 (1907).
96. 70 POST MAG. 53-54 (1909).
97. INS. REC. (1909).
98. 47 INS. REC. 567 (1909).
99. 9 Edw. 7, c. 49 (Eng.).
100. MORRAH, supra note 9, at 73 (1955) (emphasizing that “[t]he main purpose of the
Act was to strengthen the statutory guarantees for the security of the insuring public” and
similarly to “the Act of 1870 life assurance did not begin until the insurers had deposited
£20,000 … with no power of withdrawal,”).
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Their preferred solution, endorsed in section 37 of the Act, was to legalize
retroactively all existing "bona fide" third-party policies, "having regard to
the change in the social condition of the people, and to the obligation which
the law has placed upon the children and grandchildren since 1774."101 A
different clause dealt with future insurances by legalizing "life of another"
policies on parents, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters.102
These modifications left some legal uncertainty intact, mainly because they
defined the amount of a "bona fide" policy (whether issued before or after
1909) as the sum which "the relative reasonably might expect" to pay for a
funeral. "Reasonable" funeral expenses remained a bone of contention,
with some trial judges setting the bar as low as £10 and companies issuing
policies up to £25, and nobody was too sure what to do about people who
took out several policies from different offices.103 Furthermore, the new
law's extended definition of legitimate kinship still excluded thousands of
step-children, half-siblings, and cousins who continued to buy third-party
policies after 1909, and hence continued to provide fodder which
enterprising attorneys could use to initiate new litigation.104
To prevent these remaining issues from becoming a commercial
liability, life insurance offices began to pay more attention to their agents'
methods of attracting business. Sidney Webb reported in 1915 that they
had started to "scrutinize closely all policies purporting to be on the 'life of
another,'" to require signatures from lives insured, and to fine agents who
exceeded the cap on policy size although he doubted that this was enough
to rein in agents' bad behavior.105 More significant than these partial
concessions to the spirit of the 1909 Act was the increasing tendency after
1918 to extend middle-class marketing devices to their customers.106
Although "surrender values" for such policies continued to be rare, owing
to the fees involved, companies like the Prudential began awarding "free
policies" and bonuses to customers after several years.107 They also started
101. Industrial Life Offices Association Minute Book, unpublished manuscript, on
file with Guildhall Library, MS 29,802, London.
102. The Assurance Companies Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 49, § 36 (Eng.).
103. Webb, supra note 48, at 28. See, e.g., Tofts v. Pearl Life Assurance Co. (1913)
110 LT 190; aff’d [1915] 1 KB 189 (rejecting Pearl's claim that £40 covering the deaths of
Tofts' mother and father constituted, "an unreasonable amount for mourning.").
104. MORRAH, supra note 9, at 75-76.
105. Webb, supra note 48.
106. PAUL JOHNSON, SAVINGS AND SPENDING: THE WORKING-CLASS ECONOMY IN
BRITAIN, 1870 – 1939 39-43 (1985).
107. ARNOLD WILSON & HERMANN LEVY, INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE: AN HISTORICAL
AND CRITICAL STUDY 191-93 (1937).
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to offer endowment insurances, which had already replaced whole-life
coverage as the most popular middle-class policy around 1900.108
Endowment insurance provided term coverage for ten to twenty years, then
converted to an annuity if the policyholder was still alive to collect.109
Industrial offices went from issuing 3.5 million endowment policies in
1912 to thirteen million in 1931, comprising a quarter of their sales.110 By
offering free policies, and by combining life insurance with an old age
pension, the companies gave customers a reason to hold onto their policies
even after they survived their predicted time of death.
Legislative and administrative reforms solved most of the strictly
economic problems that the Gambling Act had once put in the way of
industrial insurance. The 1909 revisions greatly reduced the number of
people who could claim that their policy was illegal, and the companies'
new marketing methods greatly reduced their customers' incentive to sue.111
Hence from the industrial insurance industry's perspective, it made sense to
pretend, as their upper-class counterparts had been doing for a century, that
"gambling" no longer had anything to do with their business. As J.A.
Jefferson of the Britannic confidently assured Sir Benjamin Cohen's
parliamentary committee on industrial insurance in 1931, "[t]he British
working classes of to-day are not gambling and thinking only of having a
bit on the old man";112 the fact that nearly 80% of his company's business
was comprised of "life of another" policies—all of which would have been
technically illegal under the Gambling Act—was "all part and parcel of the
assurance."113
Many social critics were not as willing to let the matter rest. In his
1915 Fabian Society report on industrial insurance, Webb scolded the
companies for having gotten Section 37, "smuggled into the Life Assurance
Companies Act almost without discussion," and called the companies' high
caps on funeral expenses, "an abuse which calls for a remedy."114 Cohen
accused the 1909 Act of giving “‘a right . . . to the poor man and not to the
rich’" and the Cohen Committee berated the companies for encouraging, if
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 41.
ROBERT T. GREEN, LIFE INSURANCE BLINDNESS 132 (1929).
JOHNSON, supra note 106, at 41.
See DENNETT, supra note 47, at 173-74.
DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO
INDUSTRIAL ASSURANCE, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1931, H.M.S.O. 233, 249.
113. Id.
114. Sidney Webb, The Special Supplement on The Working of the Insurance Act,
THE NEW STATESMAN, Mar. 1914, at 27-28.
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not gambling per se, "‘economic waste on expenses of every kind in
connection with death in working-class homes.’"115 Once Parliament had
solved the "gambling" problem to their own satisfaction, however, the
industrial offices were just as successful at keeping these continuing
"collectivist" criticisms at bay. Two interwar inquiries produced no
significant new laws, and a further attempt to nationalize industrial
insurance in 1950 came to nothing.116 One reason why companies were
able to resist such reforms for as long as they did was because they had
figured out when to move their problem out of the courts and back into the
market, where "collectivist" judges could rarely touch them.

115.
116.

Wilson & Levy, supra note 107, at 141-42.
See Dennett, supra note 47, at 260-62, 294-99.
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INTRODUCTION

The typical, and traditional, model of professional responsibility
assumes one client and one lawyer. Within this binary model, which is
largely governed by notions of agency law,1 the lawyer’s course of conduct
is governed by a basic duty of loyalty.2 Because there is only a single focus
or object of the duty, the lawyer’s ability to be loyal is usually not
complicated. Indeed, the concerns here are more frequently directed
toward excessive zeal rather than misdirected zeal.3
Many legal relationships do not, however, fit nicely into this binary
model. Consider, for example, a scenario that is replayed hundreds if not
thousands of times a day in the United States. A policyholder is involved
in an automobile accident and is sued by the other driver (“claimant”) for
personal injuries. The policyholder is insured under a standard automobile
liability insurance policy issued by an insurer. The policyholder requests
that the insurer provide a defense as promised by the terms of the policy.4
1. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th
Cir. 1978). See generally L. RAY PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY §2.01 (1989). See infra note 30, which states that under the law of agency,
the lawyer may be characterized as either an agent or an independent contractor depending
on the situation. Neither the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers nor Agency Law
identifies the lawyer-client relationship as specifically one of agency or independent
contracting. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §14 (2000); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY LAW §1.01 (2006).
2. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODEL LEGAL ETHICS §4.1 (1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §16 cmts. b, e (2000); Flatt v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 950,
957 (Cal. 1994) (describing lawyer’s duty of loyalty to an existing client as “inviolate”).
3. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM.
RTS Q.1 (1975) (noting that lawyer’s professional independence and the adversary culture
encourages a “zealous” advocacy that is often socially disruptive). Wasserstrom’s paper is
enormously controversial, but nonetheless, the increased attention given to sanctions rules,
such as Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and civility codes supports a general
agreement that advocacy can be, and often is, excessive. See WOLFRAM, MODEL LEGAL
ETHICS §10.3, supra note 2, at 578-82.
4. Under the standard liability insurance policy, the insurer promises:
We will pay damages for “bodily injury” or “property
damage” for which any “insured” becomes legally
responsible because of an auto accident. Damages include
pre-judgment interest awarded against the “insured.” We
will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim
or suit asking for these damages. In addition to our limit of
liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our duty
to settle or defend ends when. our limit of liability for this
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The insurer agrees and retains “defense counsel” to represent the
policyholder in the litigation with the claimant.
The insurance model does not fit into the traditional binary model. The
insurance model creates a multilateral relationship between the involved
parties and this is reflected in the use of terms to describe it, such as
triangular, tripartite, trilateral, or three cornered.5 The following schematic
is frequently used to illustrate the parties’ relationship:
coverage has been exhausted. We have no duty to defend
any suit or settle any claim for “bodily injury” or “property
damage” not covered under this policy.
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES, 1216 (Practitioner’s ed.
1988). Similar obligations are found in other forms of liability insurance coverage, such as
commercial general liability insurance, Id. at 1243, and homeowner’s insurance, Id. at 1227.
5. Articles and papers on the insurance model are legion. See Aviva Abramovsky, The
Enterprise Model of Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Tripartite Insurance Defense
Relationship, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 193 (2005); Charles Silver and Kent Syverud, The
Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995);
Symposium: Liability Insurance Conflicts and Professional Responsibilities, 4 CONN. INS.
L. J. 1 (1997). See also John Larkin, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ATTORNEYS ACTING AS
INSURANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL, 518 PLI/Lit. 381 (Feb.-March 1995); Michael A. Berch &
Rebecca White Berch, Will the Real Counsel for the Insured Please Rise? 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
27 (1987); Karen O. Bowdre, Conflict of Interest Between Insurer and Insured: Ethical
Traps for The Unsuspecting Defense Counsel, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 101 (1993); John A.
Edginton, Ethics at Sea: Ethics Issues for Maritime Lawyers and Insurers, 70 TUL. L. REV.
415 (1995); Robert B. Gilbreath, Caught in a Crossfire Preventing and Handling Conflicts
of Interest: Guidelines for Texas Insurance Defense Counsel, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 139
(1996); Eric Mills Holmes, A Conflict-of-Interest Roadmap for Insurance Defense Counsel:
Walking an Ethical Tightrope Without a Net, 26 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 1 (1989); Ronald
Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 1986 INS. COUNS. J. 108; John K.
Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed
Solution, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 457 (1981); Thomas V. Murray & Diane M. Bringus,
Insurance Defense Counsel: Conflicts of Interest, FED’N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 283
(1991); Richard L. Neumeier, Serving Two Masters: Problems Facing Insurance Defense
Counsel and Some Proposed Solutions, 77 MASS. L. REV. 66 (1992); Robert E. O’Malley,
Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle
Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511 (1991); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle
of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996); Mark Saxson, Conflicts of
Interest: Insurers Expanding Duty to Defend and the Impact of “Cumis Counsel,” 23 IDAHO
L. REV. 351 (1987); Debra A. Winiarski, Walking the Fine Line: A Defense Counsel’s
Perspective, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 596 (1993); Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal Triangle:
Standards of Ethical Representation by the Insurance Defense Lawyer, For the Def., Feb.
1989.
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Defense Counsel
A

B
Policyholder

C
Insurer

The relationship illustrated by line BC is created by the insurance contract;
the relationships AB and AC arise out of the insurance contract but are not
created by it. The insurance contract is necessary to the formation of the
subsequent professional relationships because it creates the legal obligation
on the insurer’s part to defend and indemnify the policyholder from claims
within the coverage promised by the policy. Pursuant to the insurance
contract the insurer will retain defense counsel to represent the
policyholder. However, before a client-lawyer relationship in fact exists
the policyholder will have to request a defense, the insurer will have to
accede to the request, and counsel will have to agree to represent the
policyholder. The relationships AB and AC involve a lawyer whose
relationships also implicate professional codes and the rules and principles
that govern a lawyer’s relationship with a client. Problems arise when the
binary model of the professional codes must be integrated into the
multilateral world created by the insurance contract. There is a tendency to
see the problem in terms that suggests a zero-sum bargaining process, i.e.,
gains for one of the parties at one point of the triangle must necessarily
result in a loss to one of the other parties at another point of the triangle.6
Not surprisingly lawyers tend to see the proper resolution of the
conflict through the lens of professional duty to the client while insurers
see it through the rights conveyed to the insurer by the insurance contract.
These polar opposites are usually advanced with a “take no prisoners”
6. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory
Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987); see also John Leubsdorf, PLURALIZING THE
LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1992). Both articles address the
complications introduced to the bipolar relationship assumed by professional codes when
third parties with whom the client also has a relationship affect the lawyer’s relationship
with the client.
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approach.7 Perhaps no issue so animates the legal profession today as the
prospect of non-lawyers intruding into the domain and rules of lawyer
professional conduct and deportment. As a consequence, the use of harsh
terms to characterize the relationship is not unknown.8 Much of the
decisional law dealing with the triangular relationship is written against a
backdrop that evidences significant mistrust that defense counsel will act in
a professionally proper manner.9 That attitude becomes dominant and

7. See Tennessee Supreme Court Board of Prof. Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-F-143
(June 14, 1999) (concluding that an insurer may not control a policyholder’s defense to the
extent it would undermine the lawyer’s professional duties to the client-policyholder);
Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals of Lawyer’s Ethics to Insurance Defense
Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 51 (1997) (arguing that the preferred model is that defense
counsel’s duties are owed exclusively to the policyholder).
8. See Longo v. Am. Policyholder’s Ins. Co., 436 A.2d 577, 579-80 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1981) (noting that the relationship is “fraught with real and potential conflicts of
interest,” that the relationship is “delicate,” and that problems that inhere in the relationship
are “particularly acute”); Rose Med. Ctr. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 15, 17
(Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the “inherent tension” in the relationship). Analysis here
tends towards metaphor. Thus the triangular relationship is analogized to “The Bermuda
Triangle” or is characterized as a “tightrope”, “crossfire”, etc. See supra note 5.
9. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1116-17
(Alaska 1993): Where there is a conflict between insurer and insured, appointed counsel
may tend to favor the interests of the insurer primarily because of the prospect of future
employment. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938
n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize
that an attorney employed by an insurance company will slant his efforts, perhaps
unconsciously, in the interest of his real client—the one who is paying his fee and from
whom he hopes to receive future business—the insurance company.”); San Diego Navy Fed.
Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 162 Cal. App.3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498
(1984) (“A lawyer who does not look out for the insurer’s best interest may soon find
himself out of work.” (quoting the trial court); Michael A. Berch & Rebecca W. Berch, Will
the Real Counsel for the Insured Please Rise?, 19 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 27, 29-30 (1987). (A[T]he
attorney’s economic interests weigh heavily in favor of the insurer, which, after all, may
retain his services in other cases; yet the rules of professional responsibility tip the scales
toward the insured.”); Arthur P. Berg, Losing Control of the Defense – The Insured’s Right
to Select His Own Counsel, 26 FOR THE DEFENSE 10, 15 (July 1984) (“Although [some]
courts seems to trust the insurer and the attorney to act in the best interests of the insured,
the more common view is that the longstanding ties that defense counsel has with the
insurer will inevitably influence his conduct of the case.”); Sampson A. Brown and John L.
Romaker, Cumis, Conflicts and the Civil Code: Section 2860 Changes Little, 25 CAL. W. L.
REV. 45, 54 (1988) (“The attorney, wishing to maintain the insurer’s business, does not want
to aggravate the company.”); Mark A. Saxon, Conflicts of Interest: Insurers’ Expanding
Duty to Defend and the Impact of “Cumis” Counsel, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 353 (1987)
(“Insurance counsel’s relationship with the insurer is contractual, usually ongoing,
supported by strong financial interests, and often strengthened by sincere friendships.”).
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controlling if the tendency is indulged in, as it often is, to focus upon
relationships in isolation or to argue that one of the legs of the triangle
should be preferred.10 The approach suggested in this paper is more
contextual. Identifying a lawyer’s duties within the triangular relationship
requires that the whole “triangular” relationship be considered, not just in
terms of the obligation imposed by the bilateral, professional model or by
the insurance contract. This paper’s central theme is that the basic,
underlying relationships intended by the parties to the insurance contract is
improperly devalued and as a consequence too much emphasis is placed
upon the professional code’s binary model to determine how defense
counsel should identify her duties and responsibilities within the triangular
relationship. By the same token, the insurance contract cannot be seen as
the sole, conclusive determiner of the lawyer-client relationship. The
insurer, having contracted to provide the policyholder with a lawyer, must
accept that its promise may be subject to the rules that govern the lawyer’s
behavior. The task is to find a workable reconciliation of the two themes.
I shall concede at the outset that many of the approaches I suggest in
this paper are counter to the law as it now is, or at least as it is interpreted
to be. But this paper’s approach, which places greater emphasis on the
allocation of responsibility encompassed by the parties’ relationship and
joint goals, is preferable to a model which looks exclusively to the
professional codes or to the insurance contract to resolve issues arising out
of the triangular relationship.
The approach urged in this paper is that the law should, in a pragmatic,
functional manner, integrate the insurance contract and professional
obligations to enable counsel to interact with the insurer and the
policyholder in a way consistent with the rights, duties, goals and
obligations the parties envisioned and accepted in all the agreements that
define their relationship. The current, most widely accepted model holds
Id. This mistrust is shared by some of the commentators. See Abramovsky, supra note
5, at 199 (comparing retained defense counsel to “house counsel” for criminal organizations
and suggesting that the strict scrutiny applied to lawyer representation of members of the
latter for conflicts of interest should be likewise applied to lawyer representation provided
by insurers because in both cases the lawyer’s financial interest are aligned with the fees
payer rather than the client).
10. See Pepper, supra note 7, 27, 28-29 (1997) (criticizing commentators who argue
that the policyholder-insurer leg of the triangle is dominant and arguing that policyholderdefense counsel leg is dominant). I do not mean to diminish by exclusion the insurerdefense counsel leg of the triangle; however, the focus of attention on this leg has been the
relationship between these parties, i.e., is the insurer a client of defense counsel. See infra
Part IV A-B.

2008]

ALLOCATION OF POWER

27

that in the face of counsel’s inability ex post to achieve an informed,
consensual reconciliation of conflicting interests, as between all of the
parties to the triangular relationship, defense counsel, policyholder, and
insurer, defense counsel should withdraw from the relationship.11
Conflicting interests can be broadly construed to involve any situation
when defense counsel’s general duty of loyalty to the client (the
policyholder) may be compromised by counsel’s wish to please the insurer,
which is the party who selected counsel, pays the counsel’s fees, and may
be the source of future business for the counsel.12 As a result, defense
counsel is regularly confronted with situations, which, under the
professional codes, are deemed to give rise to conflicts of interest pitting
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty against the lawyer’s financial self-interest.13
The withdrawal approach has largely captured the attention of
academics and practitioners but it is not a realistic option when the conflict
is inherent to the relationship and reflects a recurrent problem that affects a
significant number of the total cases. One practitioner observed the current
approach has, “a ton of baggage associated with it,” and should be replaced
by an approach that identifies and spells out defense counsel’s duties.14
“The fundamental question is who is entitled to what and why.”15 That is a
fair question. The short answer is that the lawyer, in representing the
policyholder, should, as the policy holder’s designee accept direction from
the insurer, for the claim’s defense to the extent the insurer is responsible
for the consequences, such as when the claim is likely to be resolved within
the policy’s limits.16 While I do not argue that counsel owes a duty of
11. ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW §
114 at 892-93 (4th ed. 2007) (However, the section goes on to note that there is some
“disagreement among courts and commentators” as to the level of withdrawal necessary).
12. See CHI of Alaska, Inc. 844 P.2d at 1116-17 (explaining these concepts through
citation of various cases and sources).
13. Pepper, supra note 7, at 46 (giving the general example of the attorney being
pulled between the economic dependence on “much larger insurance companies” and the
“unsophisticated insured,” and explaining the relation to Rules 1.7, 1.4(b), and 1.2(c)).
14. See Keeping an Eye on ALI, 3 INS. LITIG. REP. (BNA) at 19 (July 5, 1996).
15. Id.
16. See Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 927, 931, 933 (5th Cir.
1992) (noting that standard policy language gives the insurer the right to control the defense
to the exclusion of the policyholder and that this right includes the selection of defense
counsel); Crist v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 529 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D. Utah 1982) (“The insurer’s
duty to defend corresponds to the insured’s duty to relinquish control of the defense, and
one cannot arise without the other”); see N. Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738
F.2d 61, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the court will recognize the right of insurers to
select defense counsel as necessarily incident to the right to control the defense); cf. In re
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loyalty to the insurer, counsel’s duty of loyalty to the policyholder-client
must be measured by three considerations: the policyholder’s gain and
surrender of rights by entering into the contract with the insurer; the
contract with the insurer; and the policyholder’s request that the insurer
provide a defense as required by the insurance contract. The longer answer
follows.
One important limit on the scope of this paper is the assumption that
the insurer has accepted the tender of the defense by the policyholder
“without reservation.” This means that the insurer accepts that the claim is
covered by the insurance contract. I do not address in this paper the rights
of the parties when the insurer indicates that it is contesting overage, i.e.,
accepts the tender of the defense under a “reservation of rights.”
I also do not address whether an excess of limits exposure creates a
conflict of interest.17 I assume for purposes of this paper that the claim will
be resolved within policy limits.
II. THE STANDARD POSITION REGARDING THE
TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP
The standard position regarding the insurer’s defense obligations under
standard liability insurance policies is well known. Insurers contractually
have the right to control the litigation, and this includes the selection of
defense counsel to represent the policyholder.18 When the rights of the
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York, 78 NYS.2d 674, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (by
tendering claim, policyholders impliedly authorized the insurer to select counsel to defend
the policyholders in the action involving the tendered claim); see generally 7C JOHN ALAN
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE WITH FORMS ' 4681 (WALTER F. BERDAL rev.
vol. 1979).
17. The general view appears to be that it does not. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
v. Foster, 528 So.2d 255, 269-70 (Miss. 1986). Yet, a damage claim beyond policy limits in
and of itself presents no ethical problem to the lawyer employed to defend the case, because
his employment is for one of two purposes: either win the case outright, or keep the
damages as low as possible. Everything he does in fulfillment of either objective must of
necessity benefit both clients. The lawsuit must be defended forthwith, professional
decisions and actions must be timely made.
Id. (citation omitted). See generally Dale E. Hausman, Conflict Issues in the Tripartite
Relationship, in H-741 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, INSURANCE LAW 2006: UNDERSTANDING
THE ABC’S 197, 207-08 (2006).
18. See Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 978 F2d 927, 931-32 (5th Cir.
1992) (discussing the right of the insurer “to assume control of the defense of an action
against the insured to the exclusion of the latter” and “the same right that an insurer
exercises in its settlement negotiations is exercisable by it in its choice of counsel.”).
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policyholder and insurer are in conflict, the courts consistently hold that
counsel’s duties to the policyholder trump counsel’s obligations or desire to
accommodate the insurer.19 Trumping occurs even when both the insurer
and policyholder are deemed to be “clients” of defense counsel.20
One difficulty with the “standard position” is that courts have not
carefully distinguished cases where the “rights” of the insurer and the
policyholder are in conflict from cases where only their “interests”
diverge.21 What does it mean to say that the policyholder’s interests should
be preferred or deemed primary? If the policyholder is the sole client, then
the statement states the obvious; if the policyholder and the insurer are both
clients, the statement is inconsistent with the normal rules of joint
representation.22 Courts have been unwilling to confront the issue directly.
19. See John A. Edginton, Ethics At Sea: Ethical Issues For Maritime Lawyers and
Insurers, 70 TUL. L. REV. 415, 439-40 (1995): There is little doubt under any of the ethical
systems in place in the United States that the lawyer’s primary duty is to the insured in the
tripartite relationship. In a typical insurance defense relationship the lawyer’s ties with the
insurer often are longer-standing and closer than the relationship with the insurer client.
The lawyer most often relies on the insurer rather than the insured client for future work.
Whether under such circumstances the lawyer realistically can respect the primary duty
concept as well as the absolute loyalty requirement is more than questionable.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Prevratil v. Mohr, 678 A.2d 243, 250 (N.J. 1996)
(“Plainly stated, in any litigation, counsel for an insurer must put the insured’s interests
ahead of the insurer’s.”); Purdy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533-34 (noting
that lawyer retained by insurer for policyholder has primary duty to, “further the best
interests of the insured”); see JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 11, at 892 (noting view that
when conflict is such that counsel can equally represent interests of both the policyholder
and insurer, counsel, “assumes a duty of undivided loyalty to the [policyholder].”).
20. Purdy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. App. 1984): In the case at
bench, however, there were in fact two clients, the insurance carrier and the insured. We
recognize that traditionally, where an insurance carrier is called upon to defend its insured,
the attorney retained by the carrier for this purpose owes the same fiduciary duty to the
insured as he or she would had the insured made the selection of counsel. The attorney’s
primary duty has been said to be to further the best interests of the insured. Id. at 533
(citations omitted).
21. See, e.g., id. at 534 (stating that, “[i]t has long been the law in [California] that
when a conflict [of interest] develops, the insurer cannot compel the insured to surrender
control of the litigation, and must, if necessary, secure independent counsel for the insured”)
(emphasis in original).
22. The third restatement’s drafters debated the point and ultimately decided to note
the unique role of the tripartite relationship in American law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §134 cmt.f (2006) (stating that the triangular relationship is
special, and therefore practices permissible in that relationship may not travel well to other
practice settings).
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Another concern with the “standard position” is a fundamental one.
Emphasis on professional codes and the lawyer’s duty of loyalty has caused
courts to give undue emphasis to “interests” at the expense of “rights”
which are set forth in the insurance contract.23 A party’s interests may
diverge from the rights he retains to vindicate that interest.24 A proper
approach to assessing defense counsel’s role within the triangular
relationship should emphasize the rights retained and transferred by the
parties to the insurance contract. The current emphasis on “interests” is
unduly disruptive of the bargain struck.25
In assessing the “standard position” we cannot lose sight of the difficult
environment in which the triangular relationship operates.
This
environment results from both the myriad demands placed on the
participants in the triangular relationship by their own diverging interests
and the fact that the relationship is subject to influence by persons outside
the relationship, particularly claimants.26 These outsiders may deem it to
be in their best interests to exploit tensions and exacerbate disruptive,
centrifugal tendencies within the triangular relationship. Therefore, not
only must the triangular relationship maintain its own equilibrium, it must
occasionally do so in the teeth of efforts by outsiders to destabilize the
relationship in order to obtain the benefits of a divide and conquer
strategy.27 For example, a claimant may plead a claim solely to force the
23. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 84 N.J. 325, 338 (1980),
(holding that when there is an actual conflict of interest between insurer and insured,
defense counsel should not continue to represent both clients because of the duty of loyalty
to the latter).
24. See William T. Barker, Laying the Foundation for Staff Counsel Representation of
Insureds, 39 TORT & INS. L.J. 897, 904 (2004).
25. Professor Pepper criticizes the idea that the insurance contract should control the
professional relationship between the policyholder and the retained defense counsel.
Pepper, supra note 7, at 38, 62. I am not arguing that the insurance contract controls, but I
do not concede that it is irrelevant; rather, I contend that all the relevant legal documents
(insurance contract, retainer) and the legal rules they import (insurance law, professional
responsibility) must be evaluated in determining defense counsel’s role and responsibilities
within the triangular relationship.
26. See Gregor J. Schwinghammer, Jr., Insurance Litigation in Florida: Declaratory
Judgments and the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 945, 945-46, 970-75 (1996). The
article features a discussion of Allstate v. Conde, a case where a shooter’s victim filed a
claim for recovery from insurer even though intentional acts were precluded from recovery.
Allstate v. Conde, 595 So.2d 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
27. I do not want to lay all of the problems presented by the triangular relationship at
the foot of third party claimants. Many difficulties, and many of the most significant cases
in this area, have involved disagreement between the parties to the insurance contract as to
how the claim should be handled. Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 546 (Cal.
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defendant’s insurer to assume the defense claims in the hope that the
insurer may prefer to settle a non-covered claim rather than incur the
defense costs.28
The path taken here is to examine and identify the nature of the
occasionally opposing interests that are parts of the triangular relationship.
This descriptive approach will identify the triangular relationship as it is
generally understood; critically evaluate the relationship’s strengths and
weaknesses ; and provide instructive suggestions on how lawyers should
approach recurrent problem areas if she finds herself in the middle of a
policyholder-insurer disagreement. The approach taken here rejects the alltoo-easily invoked tendency to characterize the occasional opposing
interests of the insurer and the policyholder as “conflicts of interests.”29 It
Ct. App. 1984) (finding that insurer and defense counsel acted improperly in placing
interests of insurer ahead of policyholder by resisting settlement and advising policyholder
to file for bankruptcy if judgment exceeded policy limits); Parsons v. Continental Nat’l Am.
Group, 550 P.2d 94, 99 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that insurer was precluded from contesting
judgment against policyholder when facts underlying coverage defense were disclosed by
retained defense counsel to insurer and constituted policyholder-client’s confidential
information).
28. See Schwinghammer, supra note 26. This tactic occasionally works because the
insurer’s obligation to defend its policyholders is defined more broadly under the law than
its duty to indemnify them. Id. at 948 Insurers are frequently required to defend claims that
pose only a remote possibility the insurer will be obligated to indemnify the policyholder for
the liability loss. Id. at 949-50. A claimant may also plead a claim solely to create a conflict
that will disqualify the insurer from controlling the defense. Such a loss may increase the
insurer’s short term financial exposure because the insurer will now be required to pay for
counsel selected by the policyholder and this cost is frequently greater than the cost incurred
when the insurer selects counsel because (1) the policyholder, unlike the insurer, cannot
promise volume in exchange for discounted rates, and (2) the policyholder is paying counsel
with the insurer’s money and thus lacks the incentive to purchase services economically.
29. The professional bar has consistently treated conflicts that arise within the
triangular relationship as subject to resolution as if the problem were a traditional,
professional conflicts of interest problem, disruptive of a binary relationship. ABA
Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-403 (1996) (“Whatever
the rights and duties of the insurer and insured under the insurance contract, that contract
does not define the ethical responsibilities of the lawyer to his client”) (footnote omitted);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 282 (1950) (noting that lawyer retained
by insurer to defend policyholder shall defend latter as his client with undivided loyalty);
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Informal Op. 1402 (1977)
(noting that lawyer who is a salaried employee of insurer may represent the policyholder
but, ”it is important that the lawyer fully disclose to the client the lawyer’s relationship to
the insurer, and remain sensitive to any divergence of interests between the [two], and at all
times act in a fashion that the insured has no basis to believe his interests are not fully and
fairly represented”“) (emphasis added). Under the professional model, the judiciary’s
concerns over public confidence in the legal system are frequently relied on as a relevant
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is important to distinguish between the interests which are subsumed within
the insurance contract and bargained out in favor of either the insurer or the
policyholder and the conduct by the policyholder or insurer that
compromises defense counsel’s ability to represent competently and loyally
the interests of a client as they are framed by the insurance contract. Not
every occasion of policyholder-insurer disagreement should be treated as
controlling how retained defense counsel discharges his professional
obligations under the retention.
The standard position has not escaped prolonged and probing criticism.
Charles Silver and Kent Syverud have criticized the preferred treatment
afforded policyholders within the triangular relationship.30 They contend
that the triangular relationship should not be deemed unique but should be
dealt with in a manner consistent with the legal system’s general handling
of joint representation questions.31 I substantially agree with many of the
positions taken by Silver and Syverud. Following their path, I believe that
refinement of the standard position is preferable to the current approach of
resolving insurer-policyholder conflicts, which affect retained defense
counsel, solely by reference to professional codes.
One should address questions involving defense counsel’s role within
the triangular relationship from a perspective that emphasizes practical,
functional solutions.32 Viewed from such a perspective, judicial decisions
making should be focused so that the benefits both parties sought from the
insurance contract are preserved. The courts should not be guided by a
desire to force the insurer and policyholder to accept a form of
representation that is outside that contemplated by the insurance contract.
factor in deciding whether counsels continued representation of a client should be
terminated due to the perception of a conflict of interest. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Co., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that court must decide
the issue of counsel’s ability to represent a client loyally in a manner that does not violate to
the administration of justice and simultaneously maintains in the public mind a high regard
for the legal profession).
30. Charles Silver and Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insurance
Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 335-389 (1995).
31. Id.
32. See Simon by Simon v. Van Steenlandt, 664, N.E.2d 231, 233-34 (Ill. Ct. App.
1996) (noting the fact that parent-insured was named as defendant in personal injury action
did not create conflict of interest because parent and child were only “nominally adverse,”
and the “lawyer in this case was only retained to defend the parent’s interest under the
policy” (emphasis added); cf. Buehler v. Sbardellati, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 104 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (approving jury instruction that lawyer who was asked by clients to represent a
partnership to be formed by them did not have a conflict of interest when clients had a
common plan and engaged lawyer’s services to implement their joint plan).

2008]

ALLOCATION OF POWER

33

If there is any inequality between the policyholder and insurer insofar as
defense counsel is concerned, it is often addressed by the insurance
contract and thus implicitly accepted by the insurer and the policyholder.33
Consequently, if defense counsel finds that her duty of loyalty is subjected
to conflicting pulls from the policyholder and the insurer, she may find,
after reflective analysis, that the parties to the insurance contract implicitly
accepted that some conflicts may be resolved by defense counsel in favor
of either the policyholder or the insurer in order that both the lawyer-client
relationship between defense counsel and the policyholder and the
continuation of the defense may be preserved. This is a method of interest
resolution that courts should respect. Rather than focusing so intently on
the individual constituents of the relationship, it would be more helpful to
conceive of defense counsel as the lawyer for the “common defense” and
evaluate her duties in that context. I appreciate that this is controversial, but
as I hope to demonstrate in this paper, this approach avoids the current
tendency to see the dilemma as a Hobsen choice and to align counsel with
the interests of the policyholder as, in effect, the lesser of two evils.
One last point before the main discussion Is that it is not unusual for
the professional responsibility issue to be encased in another controlling
legal rule. For example, in the context of representing a defendant in a
civil commitment proceeding, the issue of lawyer-client authority issue
may be encased within the question whether the client’s right to due
process of law was violated by the lawyer’s assertion of unilateral decision
making in an area the rules of professional responsibility assign to the
client or jointly to the lawyer and the client.34 In this context, the
33. For example, most liability insurance policies contain deductibles, which
effectively transfer to the policyholder the first dollar costs of an indemnification. If a
policy has a $100,000 policy limit with a $5,000 deductible and the matter settles for
$15,000, the loss will be allocated $10,000 to the insurer and $5,000 to the policyholder.
The policyholder’s substantial financial interest in settlements due to deductible obligations,
does not deprive the insurer its right to control the defense and to settle, even to settle
entirely within the deductible. See Jon Epstein, Annotation, Liability of Insurer to Insured
for Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits Resulting in Detriment to Insured, 18
A.L.R. 5TH 474, 487-88 (1994) (noting that majority of jurisdictions do not permit
policyholder to escape the obligation to reimburse the insurer for deductibles after the
insurer has settled a claim against the policyholder).
34. See People v. Allen, 50 Cal. Rptr.3d 913, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
lawyer’s decision not to honor defendant’s express wish to testify in civil commitment
proceeding did not violate defendant’s right to due process because proceedings were civil,
defendant did not have a right to testify, and allowing him to testify would interfere with
counsel’s ability to control defense and provide best defense possible); cf. Taylor v. Illinois,
484 U.S. 400, 415-18 (1988) (holding that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective
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professional rule may not be referenced, but if it is referenced it may be
criticized as outside the scope of matters properly to be considered.35 It is
interesting that the negation of professional obligations in the due process
context have generated no consternation among commentators; the
integration of professional duties within a larger body of legal rights is
accepted.36 I argue that the same approach should be taken here.
This article discusses the role of retained defense counsel from the
vantage point of two hypotheticals. The hypotheticals each use an
automobile liability insurance problem to frame the issue; however, the
problems discussed are generic and would arise and be resolved similarly
under other forms of liability coverage, such as Homeowners Liability or
Commercial General Liability. The hypotheticals will hopefully provide a
context for ideas and solutions to the difficult representation issues that
arise out of the triangular relationship.
III.WHO CONTROLS DEFENSE COUNSEL REGARDING
LITIGATION TACTICS
Policyholder is involved in a two vehicle collision and is sued by
the driver of the other vehicle’s driver for personal injuries.
Policyholder tenders the claim to the insurer which
unconditionally accepts the defense and appoints Lawyer to
represent the policyholder.
Lawyer reasonably believes that the best trial strategy is to
concede liability and only contest damages and communicates this
opinion to Policyholder and Insurer. Policyholder is adamant that
he is not responsible for the accident despite the consistency in the
evidence that he was negligent, perhaps even grossly negligent.
assistance of counsel was not infringed when defense counsel withheld from defendant
counsel’s intent to employ the tactic of violating a discovery order to spring a “surprise”
witness even though the tactic resulted in an evidence sanction imposed on the defense). See
generally Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness:
Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763 (2000).
35. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176-77 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(criticizing majority for extended discussion of Model Rule 3.3 dealing with candor to the
court, in Sixth Amendment challenge to lawyer’s threat to inform the court if defendant
provided false testimony in a criminal trial). ABA Model Rule 3.3 then permitted, but did
not require disclosure. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (1983).
36. See Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest
in the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 125-26, 128, 151 (2003).
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Insurer informs Lawyer that it agrees with Lawyer's assessment.
May Lawyer concede liability and try only the issue of damages?
May Lawyer present no defense to the liability proof and contest
only damages?
Control of the defense by the insurer is the hallmark of the triangular
relationship,37 but what is specifically included in this notion of "control"
receives little attention.38 It is expected that defense counsel is normally
given substantial discretion simply because counsel is knowledgeable and
37. See Ronald E. Mallen, Looking to the Millennium: Will the Tripartite Relationship
Survive?, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 481, 481 (1999).
38. Some attention has been given, however, to the related problem of devoting too
little resources by the insurer to the defense of the claim. See Bevevino v. Saydjari, 76
F.R.D. 88, 93-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (refusing to set aside verdict due to defense counsel’s
ineptitude when counsel’s conduct was result of insurer’s deliberate underfunding of the
defense), aff’d 574 F.2d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 1978). See Thomas Cooney, The Perils of
Defense Counsel’s Relinquishment of Control Over Preparation of the Defense to the
Insurer, 52 INS. COUNS. J. 259 (1985) (discussing problems raised by insurer litigation
related cost containment efforts). Insurer-imposed litigation guidelines have received
significant judicial and academic attention as to whether the guidelines themselves
improperly interfere with retained defense counsel’s independent professional judgment.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’s Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001) (“[A] lawyer
must not permit compliance with ‘guidelines’ and other directives of an insurer relating to
the lawyer’s services to impair materially the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in
representing an insured.”) But the larger issue is cost containment and payment, not
independent judgment: who decides how much the contracted defense will cost the defense
counsel or the insurer? A lawyer may be professionally obligated to do more than the
insurer wishes to pay. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728-29 n.14 (1986) (“Generally
speaking, a lawyer is under an ethical obligation to exercise independent professional
judgment on behalf of his client; he must not allow his own interests, financial or otherwise,
to influence his professional advice.”) Should the lawyer’s professional obligations, as
defined by the lawyer and the professional bar, determine the insurer’s contractual
obligation to provide a defense? Compare Michael D. Morrison and James R. Old, Jr.,
Economic, Exigencies and Ethics: Whose Choice? Emerging Trends and Issues in Texas
Insurance Defense Practice, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 349 (2001) (lawyers and professional bar
determine); with Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in
the Continuing Battle Over the Law Governing Insurance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS.
L.J. 205 (1997-1998) (arguing that insurer imposed litigation guidelines and costcontainment strategies do not per se improperly interfere with retained defense counsel’s
professional obligations to the client-policyholder). See generally Claire Hamner Matturro,
Ethical and Legal Snares Waiting for Attorneys Subject to Legal Fee Audits and Billing
Guidelines, 24 J. LEGAL PROF. 111 (2000) (discussing legal audits and billing audits
throughout article); Susan Randall, Managed Litigation and the Professional Obligations of
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2001) (collecting and discussing case
and commentary on the topic).

36

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

experienced in the matter. In most cases the matter is resolved through
default; the insurer instructs retained defense counsel and the policyholder,
if she is even informed ex ante about the decision, either (1) acquiesces, (2)
agrees after a half-hearted opposition, or, (3) in the most common of cases,
acts simply as a passive spectator. Much of this soft underbelly of the law
defies exposure because of the lawyer’s ability to “control” the client. A
lawyer persuades and, to a larger extent, the client accepts that the lawyer's
analysis and legal recommendations should be followed. It would, after all,
be somewhat surprising if the client consistently disregarded the lawyer’s
advice and recommendations as to matters germane to the representation.
A client desires to be represented by a lawyer because lawyers possess the
knowledge, experience, and expertise that clients lack. Occasionally
however, the lawyer’s recommendations and advice will conflict with the
client’s personal agenda and the client will resist following the lawyer’s
recommendations. That is the situation assumed in this hypothetical.
Thus, the question is poised as to how counsel should resolve the dilemma
of conflicting instructions received from the policyholder and the insurer.
Before we address the issue who, policyholder or insurer, may instruct
counsel, we should first address whether a client has a say in the matter.
Are litigation and trial tactics some things that are left to the lawyer’s
professional competence and the lawyer’s unfettered discretion? The
professional codes are somewhat opaque on this point. The American Bar
Association’s Model Rules, Rule 1.2 provides in pertinent part, “a lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning objectives of representation .
. . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued.39 The distinction between the objectives or ends of the litigation
and the means by which they are to be achieved is frequently stated in the
law and just as frequently conceded to be relatively imprecise. "[A] clear
distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and
in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint
undertaking."40 Nonetheless, the black letter rule suggests that the client
controls the identification and defining of representation “objectives”, i.e.,
the lawyer must “abide” by the client's decision on those points;41 but the
term "consults" suggests more lawyer discretion for the means to achieve
the client’s objectives. This distinction is also supported by the comment
to Rule 1.2, that states, “[c]lients normally defer to the special knowledge
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) (emphasis added).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (1992).
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007).
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and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish
their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical
matters.”42 Rule 1.2 seems to support, within the context of the
hypothetical, that it is counsel’s initial decision to litigate only the damages
issues on the theory that evaluating evidence and case presentation are
technical and legal tactical issues, and tactical decisions will not result in
any direct expense to the policyholder. Direct expense here refers to
immediate “out of pocket” outlays such as expert witness fees, deposition
costs, etc. There is always the prospect that the lawyer’s tactical choices
will fail and the client will end up paying more because of it, but this type
of cost is inherent in any representational relationship.
The problem is that almost any issue in a litigated matter can be
defined as an end or as a means to achieve an end. In the above
hypothetical, is the "end" minimization of economic exposure, or
vindication of self and one's sense of self-worth? It is difficult to treat the
decision to litigate only damages as a "means" decision under the
vindication of self-worth “end.” We may expect that the insurer and the
policyholder will often define ends differently, and this may be intensified
when a claim is presented and the insurer assumes control of the defense.
Insurers may be expected to be more oriented towards loss minimization;
policyholders may be expected to be more inclined than insurers to see the
litigation process as a forum for vindication and self-validation. But even
this viewpoint may be inverted. A policyholder may be tremendously risk
averse to any prospect of a financial loss arising out of the litigation and
may see loss minimization as the primary objective. The insurer, as the
prototypical "repeat player,"43 may evaluate a particular lawsuit as one in
which the larger objective is the signal a steadfast defense will send to
plaintiff's counsel in the particular case and/or the plaintiff trial bar in
general. Either the insurer or the policyholder may see a particular claim as
a self-contained event or as part of a process. The insurer may be
concerned about the case’s precedental value because it is a repeat player
and is similarly situated across a number of claims. The policyholder will
not share this concern, but may be concerned about the impact that
litigation will have when the claimant has a business or family relationship
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2007).
43. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-101 (1974) (noting that parties that
have substantial experience with the legal system may be expected to be better able to use
the system to their advantage and will be less risk adverse regarding the uncertainty of
litigation than parties who only occasionally encounter the legal system).
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with the policyholder. That relationship will color the viewpoints of both
policyholder and insurer, but often in different ways. The policyholder will
often desire that the claim be resolved in a fashion that preserves the
relationship. This suggests action short of litigation and the loss of
negotiation leverage. The insurer may be concerned that the relationship
has fostered the claim. This attitude is so strong on the insurer’s part that
they frequently seek to exclude coverage for claims against the
policyholder by related family members.44
Even when the lawyer has initial discretion, that discretion may be
subject to overriding by client instruction, at least to the extent the
instruction would not require the lawyer to violate a professional code.45
Lawyers are interchangeably characterized as both agents and independent
contractors with respect to clients.46 The label seems to follow the result
44. See Keeton & Widiss, supra note 4, at §4.9(c)(1) (noting prevalence of household
and family member exclusion clauses in automobile liability insurance policies).
45. See Wisconsin v. Divanovic, 546 N.W.2d 501, 506 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (noting
that court appointed counsel must abide by the client’s instructions concerning the
objectives of the representation, but that the lawyer, in so doing, may not engage in action
that would “constitute a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law”).
Some decisions, particularly in the context of the criminal justice system, are deemed so
fundamental that the court must directly obtain the defendant-client’s assent. Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (listing “fundamental” choices). In other cases, a court
may assume that counsel speaks for the defendant-client. There is, admittedly, a fine line
between a case which holds that counsel must abide by the client’s instruction as to
objectives, see id. at 753-54, and a case which holds that a decision is technically complex
and therefore appropriately assigned to counsel to make rather than being deemed personal
or fundamental and thus belonging to the client, see United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 724
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that decision whether to challenge juror is tactical decision
committed to counsel). No objection to counsel’s decision was made at trial and the Boyd
court’s decision was influenced by an unwillingness to allow a defendant to “game the
system” by feigning acquiescence but thereafter objecting if the strategy failed. Id. at 72223; see also Gonzalez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1765, 1771 (2008) (holding that decision
to conduct voir dire before Article 1 Magistrate Judge could be made by counsel). The
Court expressly noted that it did not address the question of the client’s objection to
counsel’s tactical choice. Id. at 1772. ABA Model Rule 1.2 takes no position how
disagreements over means-based decisions should be resolved, other than to advise
consultation and the option of termination of the relationship by either the lawyer or the
client if the matter cannot be resolved. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2
(2007).
46. See McCarthy v. Recordex Service, Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 853 (3d Cir. 1996); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 1, cmt.(e) (1958) (noting that attorneys are agents of
their clients, although as to physical activities, they are independent contractors). In some
cases defense counsel is characterized as a co-agent of the policyholder and the insurer.
Marten Transport Ltd. v. Hartford Speciality Co., 533 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Wis. 1995) (noting
that co-agency was proper identification of relationship when the policyholder selected
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rather than assist in determining the result. While courts sometimes
characterize lawyers as independent contractors, and therefore outside
client control as to the manner of performing their legal work, the fact is
that those statements are made in contexts where the client has not
specifically instructed the lawyer.47 The more accurate view is that client
instruction trumps lawyer professional discretion as long as the instruction
does not require the lawyer to act illegally or unprofessionally.48 Thus,
while we may expect that the client will defer to the lawyer’s expertise, the
client is not legally obligated to do so; rather, it is the lawyer who must
defer to the client’s call. Even on the issue of trial tactics, while the
lawyer proposes, the client disposes.49 Consequently, we must confront the
issue of from whom retained defense counsel must take instruction, the
counsel and distinguishing such a case from the A relationship between an insurer and a
defense counsel fostered by a classic tripartite insurance scheme).
47. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers adopts this view, noting that
while the lawyer may usually exercise any lawful means to advance a client’s objectives,
that discretion is limited by client instruction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS 21(3) (2000). The client’s authority to instruct the lawyers is, on the other hand,
only limited by the lawyer’s obligation not to engage in unlawful conduct or disobedience of
an order of a tribunal. Id. at 23; see Foothills Dev. Co. v. Clark County Bd. Of County
Comm’rs, 730 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that lawyer was obliged to
follow client’s specific instructions).
48. As noted earlier, instances do occasionally arise when courts approve of lawyers
refusing or failing to follow a client’s direct instructions, but these appear limited to
representation in criminal or quasi-criminal matters when the issue is raised in the context of
the defendant’s right to a fair trial. See supra note 30. See Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666,
668, 671 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that as to non-fundamental issues appointed appellate
defense counsel may, after consultation, override client’s wishes as to which issues to raise
in the Brief); People v. Penrod, 169 Cal. Rptr. 533, 537-540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (stating
that ordinarily decision as to which witnesses to call is tactical decision within attorney’s
control). In Penrod, the client objections were framed in terms of a mid trial effort to
substitute new counsel for court-appointed counsel and a complaint that he was not
personally permitted to interview witnesses so as to play a larger role in witness designation
for trial. Id. at 540; see generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL, THE LAW AND ETHICS
OF LAWYERING, 826-28 (4th ed. 2005) (collecting cases).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 22, cmt. d (2000). For an
interesting application of this principle, see Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 463 S.E.2d 397, 400
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (finding error when the trial court permitted defense counsel, retained
by the insurer to represent the policyholder without the policyholder’s consent, to set aside a
default judgment against the policy-holder); but cf. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 100
Cal. Rptr.2d 807, 810-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that insurer could intervene in
litigation commenced against its policyholder when the policyholder, a corporation, was
unable to appear because its corporate status was suspended due to non-payment of taxes;
the insurer had a direct interest in preventing the entry of a default judgment that it might be
required to satisfy).
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policyholder or the insurer?50 Is the matter controlled by the professional
rules or does the tripartite relationship warrant a different approach?
Pursuant to the insurance contract the policyholder has ceded control
over the litigation to the insurer. Does that fact control counsel's
relationship with the policyholder-client?
In the context of this
hypothetical, the central issue is control over litigation tactics. The
policyholder wishes to contest liability, perhaps to avoid the stigma of
responsibility or the economic consequences of a finding of fault.51 A
defense limited to the issue of damages may be perceived by the
policyholder as an acknowledgment of legal responsibility. For some
individuals such an admission may be difficult to make even in the face of
clear evidence of fault. Some individuals can live with the vagaries of life.
They will accept the decision to focus the litigation on minimizing the loss
even though it means admitting, or being understood as admitting,
responsibility for conduct they do not actually believe was legally
wrongful.
Other individuals will find such conduct morally and
emotionally repugnant. These individuals have, of course, an option. They
can defend at their own expense or they can bargain for “consent to settle”
provisions.52 Should policyholders be allowed to tender the defense of the

50. While regulation of the legal profession has found support and criticism in a
number of models, see John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 1021 (1982) (noting and comparing market, regulatory, and personal responsibility
approaches), courts have consistently emphasize the overarching duties of the lawyer
against a backdrop of client vulnerability; see WOLFRAM, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 2, at
146-47 (noting that courts consistently treat lawyer-client relationship as involving highest
trust and confidence). These judicial sentiments are also expressed, albeit with somewhat
lessened vigor, to the preliminary conduct leading to the formation of the relationship. See
Id. at 495-504, 553-556 (noting that courts retain broad power to regulate fee disputes even
though the traditional view is that a lawyer does not act in a fiduciary capacity when
negotiating the initial retainer agreement with the client).
51. The policyholder’s interest in avoiding reputation stigma is consistently
subordinated to the insurer’s financial interest. See Caplan v. Fellheimer, Eichen,
Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 837-38 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that policyholder’s
concern over harm to reputation would not support Abad faith” action against insurer for
settlement within policy limits of claim against policyholder); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v.
Color Converting Indus. Co., 45 F.3d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that majority view
is that the insurer does not have duty to handle the claim in a manner that would protect the
policyholder from losing its best customer); W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38
Cal. Rptr. 2d 78, 84-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that insurer could settle claim without
consent of policyholder even though settlement allegedly injured policyholder’s reputation).
52. Caplan v. Fellheimer, Eichen, Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 837-38 (3d
Cir. 1995) (noting that a “consent-to-settle provision protects the professional . . . who is

2008]

ALLOCATION OF POWER

41

claim to their liability insurers, by which they surrender control of the
defense to the insurer, yet still insist upon and expect the same ability to
control defense counsel retained by the insurer as if the policyholder had
retained counsel directly and independently for its own account?
The difficulty with a solution to the above questions lies in the legal
system’s adherence to a professional imperative that binds the lawyer by
ties of loyalty to the client.53 The professional codes are largely silent as to
whether, and if so to what extent, the client can delegate control to another,
such as an answer. The Restatement recognizes that the client may broadly
delegate authority to the lawyer,54 however, that delegation is revocable.55
The problem is the Restatement addresses the problem as a binary
relationship between lawyer and client in which the parties allocate and
distribute authority between themselves. The Reinstatement does not
address the problem from a multilateral perspective when the parties enter
into separate, but integrated relationships that require some accommodation
from strict insistence on rights expressed at one part of the relationship in
order for the entire relationship to be successful.
The notion of loyalty is fundamentally expressed by the ideal that the
lawyer must not permit her independent professional judgment -- which is
to be devoted to the achievement of the client's lawful objectives -- to be
corrupted by the lawyer's devotion to the interests of others. In the context
of the triangular relationship this ideal has been captured by the idea that
the lawyer may not permit the interests of the insurer to deflect the lawyer
from her duty of loyalty to the policyholder-client. Yet, it is somewhat
surprising that an ideal that is supposedly based on client interest cannot be
subordinated to the wishes of the client. If the client authorizes another to
exercise all or some of the prerogatives of a "client", why should a lawyer
be precluded from functioning as a lawyer under such an arrangement?
And if a lawyer is retained as a result of an arrangement whereby one
person authorizes another person to control and direct the lawyer, should
the first person be permitted to abrogate that agreement yet retain the
benefits derived from the arrangement -- the services of the lawyer?

concerned about his or her reputation”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 801(d) (requiring the
consent of health care professionals for settlement of health care malpractice claims).
53. Loyalty to the client is an integral aspect of the lawyer-client relationship. Rule
1.7 cmt.1: “Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s
relationship to a client”; see, supra, note 2.
54. RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra note 1, § 22(1).
55. Id. at § 22(3).
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The allocation of the right to control the lawyer, as between joint
clients, can be compared to the allocation between constituents of a
represented entity of the right to control the lawyer for the entity.56 Owners
of an entity may contract amongst themselves with respect to how a lawyer
for that entity will be instructed and delegate the power to instruct and
control the lawyer to specific constituents of an entity client.57 Transfer of
56. Rule 1.13(a) (adopting rule that lawyer represents entity as client); cf. American
Mut. Liab. Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974):
In the insured-insurer relationship, the attorney
characteristically is engaged and paid by the insurer to
defend the insured. The insured and the insurer have
certain obligations each to the other, as previously noted,
arising from the insurance contract. Both the insured and
the insurer have a common interest in defeating or settling
the third party’s claim. If the matter reaches litigation, the
attorney appears of record for the insured and at all times
represents him in terms measured by the extent of his
employment.
In such a situation, the attorney has two clients whose
primary, overlapping and common interest is the speedy
and successful resolution of the claim and litigation.
Conceptually, each member of the trio, attorney, clientinsured, and client-insurer has corresponding rights and
obligations founded largely on contract, and as to the
attorney, by the Rules of Professional Conduct as well.
The three parties may be viewed as a loose partnership,
coalition or alliance directed toward a. common
goal,
sharing a common purpose which lasts during the pendency
of the claim or litigation against the insured.
Communications are routinely exchanged between them
relating to the joint and common purpose – the successful
defense and resolution of the claim. Insured, insurer, and
attorney, together form an entity – the defense team –
arising from the obligations to defend and to co-operate,
imposed by contract and professional duty. This entity may
be conceived as comprising a unitary whole with intramural
relationships and reciprocal obligations and duties each to
the other quite separate and apart from the extramural
relations with third parties or with the world at large.
Together, the team occupies one side of the litigating arena.
Id.
57. See RESTATEMENT, LAWYERS, supra note 1, 14, cmt. f: When the client is a
corporation or other organization, the organization’s organic law determines whether a
particular agent has authority to retain and direct the lawyer. In Formal Opinion 1994-137

2008]

ALLOCATION OF POWER

43

the power to control counsel by consent of the owners of an entity does not
appear to be objectionable.58 The lawyer retained by the entity would
rightfully look for instruction to the constituents with the delegated power
to control the lawyer.59 Professional codes have historically prevented the
owners of the entity from having any direct control over the lawyer for the
entity to the extent that the lawyer could not report entity misfeasance to
the owners. In this context, the legal profession exhibited no unease with
the view that the owners of the entity (shareholders) could irrevocably
delegate to their agent (Board of Directors) the power to control the entity’s
lawyer. Until recently, professional codes expressly ordered the lawyer for
the entity to report no further than the Board. Here delegation of authority
is enshrined as necessary to permit the proper functioning and advising of
the entity. Although the current version of Model Rule 1.13 relaxes the
strict requirement of no outside disclosure absent consent, the relaxation is

the California State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility and Competence
emphasized the desirability of a partnership agreement defining how and by whom the
lawyer for the partnership would be instructed. Although the Committee did not expressly
address how the agreement would control counsel, its comments carry the inference that the
agreement could control counsel. Similarly, in Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 840 (D.C.
App. 1994), the court held that a unanimous consent provision in partnership agreement
made individual partners functional clients of the partnership’s lawyers. The inference
again from the opinion is that the partnership agreement may control not only who is
counsel’s client but who instructs counsel. For example, if the agreement specified that
partner A should instruct counsel, this would indicate that partners B and C were not
functional clients and that as between A, B, and C, the three have delegated authority to A to
speak for the partnership when dealing with counsel. See generally WOLFRAM, LEGAL
ETHICS, supra note 2, at 8.3, pp.426-27 (noting that issue has been ducked by most courts
because of judicial disinclination to become involved in client selection while at the same
time the court is hesitant to vest one faction with the sole right to select and control counsel
for the entity).
58. The professional codes expressly address decision-making between corporate
client and lawyer (see ABA Rules, Rule 1.13(b) and comment) but do not expressly address
the issue as to non-corporate entities. See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
ANNOTATED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 206-207 (6th ed. 2007) (noting split among
authorities whether non-corporate entities should be treated as entities or as aggregation of
individual constituents of non-corporate entity). The position taken in the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers that the entity’s organic law determines which entity
constituents directs and instructs counsel, see, supra, note 57, was not accompanied with
any authorities in the Reporter’s Note to comment f.
59. This is the accepted model in the corporate context. WOLFRAM, LEGAL ETHICS,
supra note 2, at §13.7.2, p.734 (noting that lawyer should accept direction from person(s)
within corporation who is lawfully entitled to give direction to counsel and that person is
defined by the internal structure of the corporation).
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slight and reserves discretion to the lawyer on whether to disclose outside
the entity.60
The entity model adopts nicely to the triangular relationship. The
insurer and policyholder have, in function and effect, created a defacto joint
venture to defeat or resolve the claim brought against the policyholder that
affects their shared, mutual interests. Admittedly, there are some
differences between the traditional entity representation and the defacto
joint venture that is the triangular relationship. In the triangular
relationship, a lawyer-client relationship exists between the lawyer and the
person (policyholder) who has surrendered the right to control the lawyer to
another (insurer).61 In the entity representation case, no lawyer-client
relationship necessarily exists between the lawyer and the constituent who
has been assigned the right to instruct and control the lawyer.62
Concededly, in the entity context, the lawyer formally represents the entity,
whereas in the triangular relationship, the lawyer formally represents the
individual policyholder.63 But, the formal presence of a lawyer-client

60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2007); see also HAZARD, supra
note 48, at 367 (discussing revision of Model Rule 1.13(c) to permit attorney disclosure of
entity wrongdoing when entity’s highest authorities refuse to address and rectify the
problem and the wrongdoing will likely result in substantial injury to the entity). The ABA
initially rejected a draft of the Model Rules that would have permitted the lawyer in limited
circumstances to disclose corporate wrongdoing to shareholders or others as necessary in the
best interests of the organization in favor of the previous version of Rule 1.13 that did not
allow for disclosure except as authorized by the entity client’s highest authority. See Evan
A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1284,
1287-88 (2003). The current rule version permits disclosure outside the entity in limited
circumstances. See HAZARD, supra note 48, at 367.
61. Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest on
the Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 87, 120 (2003).
62. James M. Fischer, Representing Partnerships: Who is/Are the Client(s)?, 26 PAC.
L.J. 961, 963 (1995).
63. Compare Shapiro, supra note 61, at 120 with Fischer, supra note 62, at 963.
However, the concession is broader than the law requires:
There are two competing theories that apply to the
issue of client identification when the lawyer represents an
artificial legal contract, such as a corporation of
partnership. The “group” or “aggregate” theory holds that
the lawyer represents both the legal entity and leading
individuals who control or manage the entity. The “entity
theory” holds that the lawyer represents the entity alone.
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relationship on this point should not be determinative; functionally, the
situations are similar.64 In both situations, the retention of the lawyer is
designed to achieve a common goal. The insurer and the policyholder have
contractually identified a common goal, defense of the claim, just as the
constituents of the entity have identified a common goal, the success of the
entity. In both situations, the interested parties have decided, as between
themselves, that control over the lawyer should not be shared but should be
delegated to one of the parties. In both situations, the decision to delegate
control can be assumed to be generally beneficial to the interested parties.
Neither the decisional law nor the professional codes prohibit joint
representation, except in limited situations.65 The ways in which conflicts
of interest issues are raised—for example, lawyer discipline, motion to
disqualify, legal malpractice, etc.–tend to emphasize the negative aspects of
joint representation.66 Yet, the very persistence of joint representation is
evidence of its value to clients.67 If insurer control of the defense was an
Fischer, supra note 62, at 963 (footnotes omitted). The “entity” theory dominates
in the context of corporate representation, but is less entrenched in other areas, such as the
representation of partnerships, associations, ventures, etc. Id. at 965-68.
64. But see Pepper, supra note 7, at 29-31 (arguing that in forming a partnership or
venture the lawyer is often confronted with conflicts among the promoters of the venture).
That is correct, but besides the point here. The issue here is not forming a relationship
among potentially or actually conflicted persons, but addressing how decision making
authority has been allocated within relationships formed independently of one another, but
with an awareness of and dependence on the other relationships. The legs of the triangular
relationships do not act in isolation; they act together. In assigning rights and duties within
the triangular relationship that fact should not be ignored.
65. See WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 349-50.
66. Id. at 349.
67. Id. Wolfram notes that:
[T]here are good reasons for clients to wish a lawyer
to undertake a joint representation. The net fee charged to
the clients can be less than for separate representations.
Two or more clients may so trust or otherwise value the
same lawyer that they are willing to overlook relatively
minor differences in their positions. The clients might find
it better for tactical reasons to band together behind a
common champion rather than to hang separately. Among
other things, clients may deliberately choose joint
representation in order to minimize mutual recrimination.
Id.(footnote omitted). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, An
Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IOWA L. REV. 965 (1997) (arguing
that the conflicts of interest rules found in modern professional codes are efficient rules,
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ineffective and inefficient allocation of resources, it would not command
the usage that it does. Indeed, there is little question but that the economies
of scale, litigation experience, and risk neutrality that insurers bring to
claim adjustment and litigation reduce both the aggregate costs of defense
and the amount expended to satisfy claims against policyholders.68
Both course of practice and intuition support the cost effectiveness of
insurer control.69 If policyholder control were more efficient, one assumes
that one or more insurers would have stumbled upon it by now and it would
have come to dominate the market. The fact that the market does support
insurer control is evidence of the superior efficiency of insurer control. In
Galanter’s study of litigation involving repeat and episodic players, he
observed that the repeat players’ ability to control their lawyers was central
to their success.70 Galanter’s observations were anecdotal; they are,
nonetheless, consistent with informed intuition regarding litigation.
The limits to my model need to be recognized. Defense counsel is
permitted to look to a person for instruction who is authorized to control
the defense in the policyholder’s place consistent with the insurance
contract. But the model does not permit counsel to engage in conduct
inconsistent with the policyholder's legitimate expectations regarding
representation. Defense counsel may not make tactical decisions for the
purpose of benefiting the insurer but prejudicing the policyholder.71 The
model does hold that the policyholder-client, having surrendered control of
the defense of the claim to the insurer, does not have a reasonable
consistent with economic theory, and operate in the public interest); but cf. Benjamin Hoorn
Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for
Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 467 (2001) (arguing that professional
conflict of interest rules often operate to the primary benefit of the professional bar rather
than clients).
68. See Galanter, supra note 43, at 97, 114, 119.
69. See id. at 114-15.
70. See id. at 114-119.
71. See Ladner v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 607 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (App. Div. 1994)
(noting that counsel’s tactical decision to place emphasis on allegations for which insurer
had lowest policy limits exposure was improper). Sometimes this point can be confused by
overly broad language. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 S.W.2d 625, 628
(Tex. 1998) (stating that retained defense counsel may not permit insurer’s right to control
the defense to prejudice the “interests” of the policyholder). Interests should, however, be
understood to refer to rights retained under the insurance contract. See id. at 627 (noting
that insurer’s right to control defense allows the insurer, “to accept or reject settlement
offers and, where no conflict of interest exists, to make other decisions that would normally
be vested in the client, here the insured.”).
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expectation that it may control the defense. There may be, in some cases, a
fine line between conduct impermissibly designed to further the insurer’s
interests vis à vis the policyholder and conduct designed to further the
insurer’s legitimate goal of controlling the defense for the purpose of
minimizing the parties’ joint exposure to the claimant. Nevertheless, the
line does exist. In those situations when the insurer’s ability to control the
defense will serve to minimize the economic exposure of both policyholder
and insurer to the claimant, the case for exclusive insurer control is most
strongly made.
We can make the policyholder’s interest in controlling the defense
more substantial, but this does not change the result. Assume the
policyholder publishes a paper in the Gay & Lesbian community. One of
the policyholder’s staffers sues for same-sex sexual harassment and
discrimination. The policyholder tenders the claim to its insurer, which
accepts unconditionally. As part of the defense, insurer instructs defense
counsel to raise the defense that sexual harassment and discrimination
claims are not actionable between members of the same sex, a position that
has significant but not absolute legal support.72 This litigation position is
personally and publicly embarrassing to the policyholder who instructs
counsel not to plead the defense.
If counsel were retained directly by the policyholder for its own
account, counsel would be obligated to abide by the policyholder-client’s
instruction.73 But within the context of the triangular relationship,
however, the policyholder-client does not have the right to instruct counsel
not to plead the defense. The fact that the defense injures the policyholder’s
reputation is not controlling once the policyholder tenders the claim and
surrenders control of the defense to the insurer.74 The simple fact is that
72. The Supreme Court has held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 79-82 (1998). Not all
employers are subject to Title VII and the status of same-sex sexual harassment under state
or common law is mixed. See Norma Rotunno, Annotation, Same Sex Sexual Harassment
Under State Anti-Discrimination Laws, 73 A.L.R.5TH 1 (1999).
73. See supra text and notes 45-48 and accompanying text for discussion noting that
the decisional law and the professional codes are quite clear that a lawyer may not disregard
a client’s instructions, save in the most extreme circumstances, e.g., client instructs lawyer
to commit an illegal act or compliance with client’s instructions would require lawyer to
violate professional codes.
74. See supra note 51. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. Most importantly,
the reticence expressed in Rule 1.2 in taking a position when lawyer and client disagree on
the means by which the representation will be conducted expressly reference the “interests
of ... other persons “as a significant reason for the reticence. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
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the policyholder can not have it both ways. The policyholder can defend
on his or her own account or the policyholder can surrender the control of
the defense for the liability insurance contract’s economic benefits. But
once the policyholder surrenders control, the policyholder’s rights as a
litigant and client are subject to the allocation of rights established by the
insurance contract. The insurer is entitled to limit its economic exposure
by raising viable defenses that would defeat or reduce the claim. That right
may be contrary to the policyholder’s current interests, but to the extent the
policyholder’s interests do not rise to the level of a right protected by the
insurance contract, the insurer’s right to control the defense is not impaired.
The insurer’s actions in controlling retained defense counsel are fully
consistent with the identified joint interests of the parties under the
insurance contract, which is the defeat or minimization of the economic
consequences of the claim.
It may be argued that the right to control the defense cannot be
contracted away to another as that would impermissibly compromise the
lawyer's inviolate duty to maintain professional independence on the
client's behalf.75 That position was taken in Hayes v. Eagle-Picher
Industries, Inc.76 The decision dealt with a specific conflicts rule that
directly addresses the issue, the “aggregate settlement” rule,77 but the
decision does articulate the view that professional code provisions may be
immutable and not subject to waiver even by willing, fully informed

CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2007). Although the comment does not specifically refer to the
triangular relationship, that relationship does reflect the types of concerns that Rule 1.2
recognizes as not warranting the usual deference to client decision making and instruction.
75. Cf. Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 268 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639-41 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (noting that an attorney’s duty of undivided loyalty may not be delegated away and is
owed solely to the client).
76. 513 F.2d 892, 893-94 ( 10th Cir. 1975).
77. A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives
informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure shall include the
existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each
person in the settlement. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2007). See generally
ANNOTATED RULES supra note 58, at 148-149; Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of
Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1769-70 (2005) (arguing for a more
precise understanding of the term “aggregate settlement” and providing suggested
definitions).
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clients.78 As this paper takes a contrary position, the decision is worth
exploring.
The Hayes v. Eagle-Picher lawsuit was commenced by a large number
of plaintiffs who were all represented by common counsel. The plaintiffs
agreed amongst themselves to be bound by a majority vote regarding a
proposed settlement and voted thirteen to five to accept the defendant’s
lump sum offer.79 The trial court reduced the settlement to a judgment
based on the vote.80
The appellate court’s holding that the approval process was flawed
rested on two grounds.81 First, the court found the approval agreement to
interfere with the attorney-client relationship:
[T]his arrangement is contrary to the plain duties owed by an
attorney to a client. An agreement such as the present one which
allows a case to be settled contrary to the wishes of the client and
without his approving the terms of the settlement is opposed to
the basic fundamentals of the attorney-client relationship.
Inasmuch as the attorney is merely an agent for the client in
negotiation and settlement, the approval of the client is an all
important essential to a settlement which is to be binding, and if
this approval is not present the court is placed in a most
unfavorable position in enforcing it.82
Second, the court found that the clients could not agree to the settlement
until they were informed of the terms of the actual settlement:
One other aspect which complicates the problem is the fact
that the agreement calling for the majority governing the
decision to settle was entered into some time prior to the date of
negotiations. It is difficult to see how this could be binding on
78. Hayes, 513 F.2d at 892-93. Other provisions of the professional codes also carry
this immutability trait. For example, the no ex-parte contact rule that prohibits a lawyer
from communicating with a represented person without the consent of that person’s
attorney, is immutable; the client may not waive the attorney’s right to give or withhold
consent. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2007). Waivers of conflicts of interest
are circumscribed by Rule 1.7(b), that in some contexts bars the waiver of the conflict of
interest by the client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2007).
79. Hayes, 513 F.2d at 892-93.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 893-95.
82. Id. at 894.
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non-consenting plaintiffs as of the time of the proposed
settlement and in the light of the terms agreed on. In other
words, it would seem that plaintiffs would have the right to agree
or refuse to agree once the terms of the settlement were made
known to them.83
The ABA Ethics Committee stated that the primary justification for the
“aggregate settlement” rule is to protect each client’s right to control the
decision to settle and protect that right from outside interference.84
Hayes v. Eagle-Picher states a position that is attractive to those who
believe that the client oriented (policyholder) obligations expressed in
professional code should control the conflicts presented by the triangular
relationship.85 Moreover, the Hayes v. Eagle-Picher position on advance
consent to aggregate settlements is well accepted in the case law.86 The
position denies clients the right to contract around a rule of professional
conduct and vest actual authority in their attorneys to negotiate on their

83. Id.
84. ABA COMM. ETHICS AND PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006).
85. Pepper, supra note 7, at 47. But cf. Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass
Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 770-773 (1997)
(criticizing Hayes v. Eagle-Picher and the rigorous application of Model Rule 1.8(g) which
has been construed to require consent by all jointly represented clients to an aggregate
settlement).
86. Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048-51 (D. Colo.
1999) (holding a retainer provision that purported to deprive a client of the right to control
the case is void as against public policy). In Abbott, 200 plaintiffs filed a non-class action,
single complaint against the defendant. Id. at 1048. The plaintiffs hired a single law firm to
represent their interests. Id. The retainer agreement created a steering committee to control
the litigation and provided for a formula for allocating the proceeds of the litigation amongst
the plaintiffs. Id. at 1048-49. The court found a violation of the aggregate settlement rule,
citing Hayes v. Eagle-Pitcher and disqualified the law firm. Id. at 1050-51. In Tax
Authority v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006), the court reached a similar
conclusion when 154 franchisees sued their common franchisor through one lawyer. The
retainer provided for a majority vote as binding on all franchisees. Id. at 515. The court
found that such provisions violated New Jersey’s Rule 1.8(g), which is pattered on Model
Rule 1.8(g), but the court gave its decision prospective application only, thus saving the
provision from invalidation. Id. at 523. The court treated the matter as one of first
impression, as New Jersey had recently replaced its Model Code based rules within a Model
Rules based regime. Id. Given that the court found no significant difference between the
Model Code and Model Rule provisions, that position is interesting to say the least. Perhaps
the court was troubled by the difficulties rigid enforcement of Rule 1.8(g) would engender.
The court did refer the matter to the Commission on Ethics Reform to examine the matter.
Id.
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behalf and commit the clients to a settlement.87 Such a conferral of actual
authority would be contrary to the “approval” language of the first part of
the opinion and the “knowledge of terms” language in the second part of
the opinion.
Decisions, such as Hayes v. Eagle-Picher, proceed from the flawed
premises that clients are either less competent and less capable than
principals in general or that a client cannot delegate authority ex ante
unless the client is as fully informed of the benefits and costs of the
decision as the client would be ex post.88 The first premise has no basis in
fact; there is no reason to suppose that clients, as principals, are less in
informed as to their own interests and how those interests may be achieved
than principals in general. The second premise is also flawed; uncertainty
is a necessary element of most decision making. Decision makers have to
balance the cost of acquiring more information against the benefit of
having that information. Sometimes the information is not now available;
yet, the benefits of action based on a present commitment may be
compelling. In such a situation, the decision to proceed, based on a
commitment in the face of uncertainty, is reasonable.
Using professional codes to disable clients from entering into
agreements delegating authority to control counsel begs the question why a
requirement ostensibly for the client's benefit, cannot be waived or
modified by the client. The professional codes take an inconsistent
approach on this point – some provisions limiting client options are

87. Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894-895 (10th Cir. 1975).
88. The professional codes do not prevent the client from conferring actual authority
on the lawyer to settle the case on terms the lawyer deems advisable. MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (2007) (noting that “[a]t the outset of a representation, the
client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client’s behalf without further
consultation.”). See Eunice A. Eichelberger, Annotation, Authority of Attorney to
Compromise Action – Modern Cases, 90 A.L.R. 4TH 326, § 8 (1991) (collecting cases
holding that an attorney may be delegated actual authority ex ante to enter into agreement
on the client’s behalf to settle the matter for the client). This approach is countermanded by
Rule 1.8(g) apparently out of concern that the lawyer may sacrifice the interests of some
clients to advance the interests of others, although why a client could not provide ex ante an
advance waiver of that right is not addressed in Rule 1.8(g). By its terms, Rule 1.8(g)
requires disclosures that are not amenable to advance waiver, but it is an open question
whether the protection provided by Rule 1.8(g) could be waived by appropriate general
disclosures as to what protections Rule 1.8(g) provides to individual clients. The
Restatement briefly addresses the issue. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 122 cmt. d (2000) (stating that advance waivers are subject to “special
scrutiny”). See infra note 89 (discussing advance waivers). See infra Part IV.
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waiveable, others are not.89 The professional codes have not developed a
rationale that explains this inconsistency.90
Is the right to instruct and control counsel so sacrosanct and so
essential to the professional relationship that any effort by a non-entity
client to divest himself of the right and delegate it to an interested party
would be deemed socially and legally unacceptable per se?91 When an
indemnitor (insurer) is sued directly, the indemnitee (policyholder) does
not control the defense.92 Under a no reservation, policy limits defense,
89. A client can generally waive most protections provided to clients against lawyer
breaches of the professional codes. Zador Corp. v. Kwan, Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 763 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (approving the use of advance waivers of otherwise disqualifying conflicts so as
to permit the lawyer to represent continuing client adverse to now former co-client). See
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 (2000) (noting
general ability of clients to waive disqualifying conflicts of interests otherwise preventing
joint representation). Consent may also be given to “future conflicts” although such consent
is subject to “special scrutiny.” Id. § 122 cmt. d. Although the consent may not be openended, but should be specific and tied to the matter in which the lawyer is representing the
client providing the consent. This requirement tracks existing law: some opinions permit
open-ended waivers when the parties are “experienced users of legal services.” E.g., ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 436 (2005). Some protections may
not be waived. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2007) (barring
lawyer from making ex ante agreement with client limiting liability of lawyer for
malpractice, unless the client is independently represented in making such a decision). No
American jurisdiction so permits, but such limitations are recognized in a few foreign
jurisdictions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 54 (2000) (stating
that “[a]n agreement prospectively limiting a lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice is
unenforceable”). Many American jurisdictions now permit lawyers to avoid vicarious
liability for the malpractice of other members of a law firm by forming the firm as a
professional corporation or limited liability partnership.
Annotation, Liability of
Professional Corporation of Lawyers, or Individual Members Thereof, for Malpractice or
Other Tort of Another Member, 39 A.L.R. 4TH 556 (1985).
90. Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289
(2000) (discussing default and immutable rules of professional conduct). Silver & Syverud,
Insurance Defense Lawyers, supra note 30 (discussing mutable and immutable rules of
professional conduct). Professor Painter develops the theme that rules of professional
conduct should be more contractual in structure and function. Richard W. Painter, Rules
Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665 (2001).
91. WOLFRAM, LEGAL ETHICS, supra note 2, at 148 (noting that the traditional bilateral
model of the lawyer-client relationship is antiquated and unduly limiting); Leubsdorf, supra
note 6 (noting disharmony between the traditional concept of the lawyer-client relationship
as between individuals and the modern reality that legal relationships exist between and
among groups of individuals).
92. See Sherwood Brands v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 698 A.2d 1078, 1083
(Md. 1997); cf. Canton Poultry & Deli Inc. v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom & Woolverton, 135
Cal. Rptr.2d 695, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that in workers compensation litigation
once employer is dismissed from the litigation, employer has no reasonable basis for
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the claim is effectively only against the insurer, as if the claim were
brought as a direct action.93 Function should control form. A general
prohibition against a lawyer accepting instructions from the insurer
because of an abstract ideal of professional independence arising out of the
fact that the indemnitee rather than indemnitor is the named defendant
would inflict injury on the very persons that the ideal is supposed to
protect because this course of action would prevent policyholders from
reaching bargains that protect their economic interests at their least cost.94
It would also interfere with the policyholder’s ability to exercise control
over his affairs by depriving him of options that are preserved when
insurer control is respected.95 Under the insurer-control model the
policyholder has the choice of withholding tender and controlling the
defense or making the tender in exchange for the benefits of insurance.96
While the alternative (tender the claim yet retain control) appears
superficially superior for the policyholder, that alternative raises problems
that may diminish the value of the insurance contract to the policyholder.
For example, if the policyholder controls the defense, the traditional basis
for binding the insurer to the adjudication of the underlying claim and
barring the insurer from raising coverage defenses is lost.97 Moreover,
insurer control is economically efficient.98 Depriving the insurer of control
believing that it is a client of retained defense counsel; counsel owes sole duty to insurer
absent developments in the case that require counsel to defend or protect the interests of the
employer).
93. See Robertson v. Chen, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 267-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). See
generally Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Insurers’ Right to Defend their Insureds, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 115 (2001-2002).
94. See generally William T. Barker, Insurance Defense Ethics and the Liability
Insurance Bargain, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 75 (1997-1998) (discussing the bargaining aspects of
the insurer/insured relationship).
95. Id.
96. Cf. Delmonte v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 975 P.2d 1159, 1173 (Haw. 1999)
(noting that if the policyholder elects to reject a defense offered by the insurer, the
policyholder would thereafter be financially responsible for the costs of the defense). In the
spirit of full disclosure, it should be noted that the Delmonte court takes positions contrary
to those proposed in this paper in stating, Aa contractual provision that conflicts with an
attorney’s representation in accord with the Hawaii’s Rules of Professional Conduct . . .
must yield to the requirement of professional ethics. Id. (internal citation omitted).
97. See James M. Fischer, Insurer or Policyholder Control of the Defense and the
Duty to Fund Settlements, 2 NEV. L.J. 1, 12 (2002).
98. See 7C JOHN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE 4687 (rev. ed. 1979). In
situations where the claim is within policy limits, courts frequently state that only the
insurer has a financial stake in the litigation. See, e.g., Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Adequate coverage for the potential liability
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will likely raise the cost of policies or require the insurer to take counter
action elsewhere, such as by limiting coverage or including the costs of
defense in the policy limits.
A blanket rule prohibiting delegation is also inconsistent with the rule
permitting the lawyer and the client(s) to define the scope of the
representation.99 Permitting the insurer to exercise exclusive control over
the defense of the claim is a reasonable accommodation of the interests of
both insurer and policyholder. These interests include the duties and
obligations that both assume under the standard liability insurance policy,
the express tender by the policyholder of the defense of the claim to the
insurer, and the fact that the claim will be resolved within policy limits. In
this respect the Restatement is enlightening in its discussion of some
reasons why a client might legitimately wish to limit his representation,
“[a] client might reasonably choose to forgo some of the protection against
conflicts of interest, for example, in order to get the help of an especially
able or inexpensive lawyer or a lawyer already familiar to the client.”100
So how does counsel respond to the conflicting instructions from the
insurer and the policyholder regarding litigation tactics? Counsel should
inform the policyholder that pursuant to the arrangement by which counsel
was retained, counsel receives and follows reasonable instructions from the
insurer regarding the defense of the claim. Counsel can no more follow
the policyholder-client’s instructions in this regard than counsel could
obey a client’s instruction to disburse funds in the lawyer’s possession
impressed with a litigation lien, which is to say that counsel cannot.101
being conceded, control by the carrier is virtually absolute, since the insured has no
exposure whatever.”). This issue is discussed in connection with Hypothetical 2. See infra
Part IV.
99. “Subject to other requirements stated in this restatement, a client and lawyer may
agree to limit a duty that a lawyer would otherwise owe to the client if: (a) the client is
adequately informed and consents; and (b) the terms of the limitation are reasonable in the
circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19 (2000). See
also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §19 cmt. (b) (2000).
101. See In the Matter of Respondent F, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 17, 28 (1992)
(“[A]n attorney must retain funds in trust when the attorney’s right to the funds is disputed
by the client. The funds are required to be kept in trust until the resolution of the dispute.
The rule also applies to obligations to third parties.”); State v. Angelo, 667 A.2d 81, 83
(Conn. Ct. App. 1995) (a defense attorney who disbursed funds to a client in disregard of a
state-imposed lien was liable to the state for damages); Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Ltd.
P’ship, 917 P.2d 447, 450 (Nev. 1996) (holding that when a client assigns rights to the
proceeds of litigation to a creditor the client’s attorney is not obligated to pay the proceeds
to his client); Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ronzo, 605 A.2d 705, 707 (N.J. Super.Ct. App.
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That does not mean that the policyholder is an inconvenient but necessary
appendage to the litigation, a “potted plant” to borrow a phase.102 Counsel
must, however, resolve the issue of control consistent with the client's
reasonable expectations of the scope of the representation, and, on that
point, the policyholder-client cannot reasonably expect that he may control
a defense that he has tendered away to the insurer.103
What happens, however, if the issue involves a matter that has
traditionally been deemed an “end” of the representation rather than a
“means,” for example, the right to settle? Does this factor tip the balance
in favor of ceding to the policyholder/client the right to control the
defense? In addition, the discussion of control over litigation strategy
elides the issue of whether the insurer and the policyholder are both clients
of retained defense counsel, or whether the policyholder was the sole
client. Is that distinction meaningful in this context? These questions are
addressed in the next hypothetical.
IV WHO CONTROLS DEFENSE COUNSEL REGARDING
SETTLEMENTS
Policyholder is sued for covered personal injuries. Insurer has
unconditionally accepted the tender of the claim and has
appointed Lawyer as retained defense counsel. Insurer is willing
to settle the matter for $25,000, a sum within policy limits.
Div. 1992) (holding that lienholder could recover against attorney who disbursed funds in
derogation of lien securing workers’ compensation benefits paid to attorney’s client); Leon
v. Martinez, 638 N.E.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that when attorneys have notice of
an assignment of a portion of their client’s recovery, the attorney may be liable to the
assignee if he disburses funds in derogation of the assignment).
102. The now famous comment was made by Mr. Brendan Sullivan, Jr., counsel for
Lt. Col. Oliver North during the Iran-Contra investigation. Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint
Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition and the H. Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions
with Iran, 100TH CONG. 263, (1988) (testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver North). The term has
found its way into the popular language and now refers to an individual’s refusal to be seen
or perceived as an uninvolved spectator. See, e.g., United States v. Batka, 724 F. Supp. 350,
352 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (“[A] federal judge is not required merely to grace the proceedings with
his presence as would the proverbial potted palm tree).
103. See Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 713 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2003) (plaintiff physician did not have a cause of action against the defendant
insurance company for settling against his wishes because he had tendered his defense; had
he wished to retain the right of consent he could have paid for a policy that allowed for
insured consent).
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Policyholder opposes the settlement. The insurance policy
contains standard conditions requiring the policyholder to assist
and cooperate in
the defense of the claim. Insurer instructs
Lawyer to settle the case. What should Lawyer do?
The insurer, having assumed the defense of its policyholder, has a duty
to settle the claim104 and a concomitant right to settle even over the
policyholder's objections,105 although there is some authority that the
insurer's right to settle over the policyholder's objections must be exercised
in good faith,106 and not prejudice the policyholder’s rights.107 Let us
104. Bailey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336, 1339 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)
(reasoning that due to the contractual nature of the insurer/insured relationship, the insurer
owes the insured a duty of good faith in the performance of the contract); Short v. Dairyland
Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 388 (Minn. 1983) (“The insurer’s duty of good faith is breached
in situations in which the insured is clearly liable and the insurer refuses to settle within the
policy limits…”).
105. Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So.2d 194, 201-02 (Ala. 1988) (holding that retained
defense counsel had authority to settle medical malpractice claim for sum within policy
limits notwithstanding physician-policyholder’s objections); Harbor Ins. Co. v. City of
Ontario, 282 Cal. Rptr. 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (reaching the same result regarding a selfinsured retention); Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591
So.2d 174, 178 (Fla. 1992) (holding that, absent exigent circumstances, when the insurance
contract provides that the insurer may settle the claim as it deems expedient, no bad faith
action may be maintained against the insurer for a within policy limits settlement); Am.
Home Assurance Co., Inc., v. Hermann’s Warehouse Corp., 563 A.2d 444, 446, 448 (N.J.
1989) (holding that an insurer which settled a third party claim against the policyholder for
an amount within policy limits could recover the deductible from the policyholder even
though the policyholder did not approve the settlement). A few courts have limited the
insurer’s right to settle over the objections of the policyholder, but these are a distinct
minority. Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1372 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
retained defense counsel breached duty to policyholder by continuing with representation
without informing policyholder of imminent settlement knowing that policyholder objected
to settlement), aff’d, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980); Saucedo v. Winger, 915 P.2d 129, 132-36
(Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that unless the policy expressly gives the insurer the right to
settle without the policyholder’s consent, the insurer must secure the policyholder’s consent
to a within limits settlement). Saucedo involved a medical malpractice liability policy and
the court noted that the policy did prohibit the policyholder from settling without the
insurer’s consent unless the policyholder assumed all responsibility for the settlement. Id. at
132-33. Cf. Miller v. Byrne, 916 P.2d 566, 574 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the
policyholder must be notified of any pending settlement so that the policyholder can take
appropriate action to protect her interests).
106. See Gardner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 841 F.2d 82, 86 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the insurer did not act in bad faith in settling case). See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER
& THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 12.05(a) (8th ed.
1996) (noting that jurisdictions have split as to whether language in standard liability
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assume that the insurer's settlement decision is based on a reasonable
assessment of the merits of the claim. Let us also assume that the insurance
policy does not give the policyholder the right to preclude a settlement by
withholding consent.108
On these facts and with the accompanying assumptions, the insurer can
lawfully go through with the settlement; however, the fact that the insurer
has the legal right to close the claim by a settlement over the policyholder's
objections does not necessarily mean that retained defense counsel may
assist and facilitate the settlement.109 Notwithstanding this absence of a
insurance policies, which authorizes the insurer to effect settlement as it “deems expedient,”
insulates the insurer from bad faith actions whenever the insurer settles the claim ultimately
within policy limits).
107. For example, an insurer that settles a claim and causes its policyholder lose a
valid counterclaim may have acted in bad faith. Barney v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 Cal.
Rptr. 215, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Similarly, an insurer’s broad discretion over settlement
may be circumscribed when the policy contains a retrospective premium feature, which
allows the insurer to adjust the premium retroactively based on claim experience. Sec.
Officers Serv., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 653, 658 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993). There is a fine line between the retrospective premium cases and the deductible
reimbursement cases; in both situations the insurer is settling with the policyholder’s
money. Nonetheless, the decisions reach opposite conclusions. Perhaps the broadest
constraint on the insurer’s ability to consummate a within limits settlement was adopted by
the district court in Caplan v. Fellheimer, 886 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev’d, 68 F.3d
828 (3d Cir. 1995). In that case the district court held that a settlement that would legally
prevent a subsequent claim by the policyholder for malicious prosecution, apparently
because the “successful termination” element of the cause of cause of action would be
missing, could be enjoined by the objecting policyholder. Id. at 501-02. The court did not
address how meritorious, if at all, the malicious prosecution action would need to be,
although some likelihood of success would be required to the extent the success of the claim
for injunctive relief was dependent on a showing of “probability of success on the merits,” a
standard part of the equitable remedy in most jurisdictions. Id. at 501-02. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that federal courts should not involve themselves
directly in reviewing settlement of private litigation and the “deems expedient” language of
the insurance contract gave the insurer the ability to conclude a within policy limits
settlement without obtaining the approval of the policyholder. 68 F.3d at 836-37.
108. Such provisions are usually limited to professional malpractice insurance
contexts where policyholders have demonstrated a concern that settlement will damage the
policyholder's professional reputation or trigger licensure action by a disciplinary board.
Some of the decisions that have subjected insurers to bad faith actions for within policy
limits settlements have involved professionals. See Schuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist.
Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 So.2d 174, 177-78 (Fla. 1992); cf. Saucedo v.
Winger, M.D., 915 P.2d 129, 133 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996). See supra note 105 for more
discussion of Saucedo.
109. See Rogers, 392 N.E.2d at 1372 (holding that retained counsel defense counsel
breached duty to policyholder by continuing with representation without informing
policyholder of imminent settlement knowing that policyholder objected to settlement). That
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policyholder right to complain under the insurance contract, the
professional bar contends that retained defense counsel is precluded from
implementing a settlement within policy limits if the policyholder
objects.110
That poses the control question here: in implementing a within policy
limits settlement who controls retained defense counsel – the insurer or the
policyholder? We should not lose sight of the basic problem. If the insurer
can instruct defense counsel to implement settlement, even over the
policyholder’s objections, the insurer’s ability to settle is eased. The
situation is otherwise if the policyholder may prevent defense counsel from
viewpoint has been generally rejected. See Silver & Syverud, Insurance Defense Lawyers,
supra note 30, at 296-301.
110. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP 403
(holding that policyholder retains the right to renege on the tender of the defense provided
by the insurer; therefore if a dispute arises as to the desirability of a settlement, the
policyholder may terminate the triangular relationship, thus precluding counsel from
participating in the settlement on the insurer’s behalf); but cf. Villa v. Cole, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d
644, 649-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that in situation where a party was provided a
defense by another party, the represented party could not disavow a settlement partially to
the extent he perceived it to be in his interest to do so):
Here, Villa accepted all the benefits of the City’s
representation of him, and of the settlement that terminated
the lawsuit against him. He did not express any objection
to the fact that the City had assumed all the costs of his
defense; he did not offer to reimburse the City for his pro
rata share of litigation expenses; and he never offered to
hold the City harmless for the costs he would incur in
continuing to defend the lawsuit on his own. In short,
while accepting the benefits of his dismissal, Villa did
nothing to set aside or repudiate the settlement of which
that dismissal was a part. On this basis, the City clearly
could not assume that Villa would forego later claiming the
right to reimbursement and indemnification from the City
for any attorney fees, litigation costs, or damage he
incurred in further defense of Seeterlin’s action. In order to
protect itself against further litigation, the City was entitled
to provide for Villa’s representation and also to require his
dismissal as part of the overall settlement. Villa may not
now disavow that settlement, having effectively ratified it
by accepting its benefits.
Id. Having accepted the benefits of a defense, is it reasonable to permit the
policyholder to now disavow the defense because it is in his interest (but not his right) to do
so?
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assisting the insurer. The insurer will have to independently deal with the
plaintiff/client and her lawyer. This will increase costs and present
opportunities for confusion.
An aspect of the duty of loyalty is the obligation to follow the client's
lawful instructions and help the client achieve the ends of the
representation as defined by the client.111 Counsel should advise the client
of the consequences of implementing the client's choices,112 but, as
discussed previously, in connection with Hypothetical 1, under the
professional codes the choice of ends belongs to the client.113 Indeed, the
failure to follow a client's lawful instructions can be grounds for
professional discipline and malpractice even though the lawyer's decision
to disregard the client's instructions was not unreasonable.114
To the extent that the choice of ends belongs to the policyholder-client,
it would not be proper for counsel to take the policyholder out of the loop
by failing to inform the policyholder of the insurer's decision to settle and
thereby avoid receiving an instruction not to settle from the policyholder.
It is the duty of counsel to keep the client reasonably informed about
significant developments affecting the representation.115 Settlement falls
within this category,116 and this would be particularly true if a client has
111. See supra note 2.
112. Doe v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, 838 P.2d 804, 807
(Alaska 1992); Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 601, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993):
One of any attorney’s basic function is to advise …
Not only should an attorney furnish advice when requested,
but he or she should also volunteer opinions when
necessary to further the client’s objectives …[E]ven when a
retention is expressly limited, the attorney may still have a
duty to alert the client to legal problems which are
reasonably apparent, even though they fall outside the
scope of the retention.
113. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
114. See Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. 1980) (stating that a lawyer
may be liable for losses resulting from the lawyer’s failure to follow “with reasonable
promptness and care” the explicit instructions of the client; the fact that the lawyer honestly
believes deviation from the client’s instruction is in the client’s best interests is no defense).
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 cmt. D (2000).
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007) (“A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client”); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (2000); ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 58, at 49-52.
116. See Miller v. Sloan, 978 P.2d 922, 931 (Kan. 1999) (holding that defense
counsel breached their fiduciary duty owed to the policyholder-client when they failed to
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made known his position on a matter and the development is directly
contrary to the client's position.117 Efforts by counsel to burden a client's
free decision making in this area have been consistently struck down.118 A
corollary of this rule holds that counsel must seasonably inform the client
of all settlement offers in order that the client may exercise his authority
over the matter.119 Thus, under the professional codes deliberately
bypassing the policyholder in order to facilitate the insurer's instructions to
settle, even though the insurer's instructions are lawful, appears, on the
surface, to put counsel in the untenable position of disregarding the
policyholder's rights as a client regarding settlement.
When defense counsel informs the policyholder/client of the settlement
or prospect of settlement, how should counsel respond to an instruction
from the policyholder/client (such as: don’t settle) that is inconsistent with
instructions received by the insurer (settle)? The focus in the decided cases
has been on the rights and duties of defense counsel vis à vis her
inform the client of a settlement hearing); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007)
(“A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a
matter); ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 34 (2007) (noting that lawyers
have no inherent authority to settle a client’s claim.”).
117. Hobart v. Decker (In re Estate of Falco), 233 Cal. Rptr. 807, 815 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (stating that the client’s right to reject a settlement is absolute and unqualified); see
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 22, cmt. c (2000)
(stating that authority to settle belongs to client, client may delegate authority to lawyer but
delegation is revocable). But cf. Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 561 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that it was not unfair or unconscionable for a lawyer to condition his
willingness to represent a client on the client’s agreement to accept a “minimum settlement
amount”). In Ramirez the court found that the minimum amount was a reasonable if not
generous valuation of the client’s claim. Id at 561. More importantly, the dispute centered
not over the enforceability of the settlement, because the client did agree to the settlement,
but was centered on counsel’s right to fees and the related issue whether counsel’s conduct
disqualified him from receiving a fee or operated to reduce the fee he would take under the
retainer agreement. Id.
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 22 cmt. c (2000)
(noting that an irrevocable delegation of settlement authority to the lawyer is illegal as is an
agreement that both the client and the lawyer must approve any settlement); but cf. Ramirez,
26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561; Robertson v. Chen, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 264, 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that written consent of policyholder was not required by “open court” statute when
defense counsel, with authority from insurer, agreed to within limits settlement). An “open
court” statute requires that settlements be signed by the party or made before the court if the
settlement is to be summarily enforced. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 664.6 (West 1996
Supp.); see generally James M. Fischer, Enforcement of Settlements: A Survey, 27 TORT &
INS. L.J. 82, 88-89 (1991) (discussing “open court” requirements).
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §20(3) (2000)
(stating that A “lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by the client….”).
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relationship with the policyholder and the insurer. The assumption appears
to be that counsel should handle that situation the same as any situation
when a lawyer, having entered into a concurrent or simultaneous joint
“client” representation, receives conflicting instructions from each
principal.120 The “client” may be an actual client or a “client equivalent,”
which is a non client who is owed some or all of the duties that a lawyer
would owe an actual client.121
There is a tendency here to attempt to resolve the issue by focusing on
whether counsel has one client or two client, and, if the latter, whether, as
between the two clients, one client should be preferred over the other as a
matter of law. To determine counsel’s professional obligations we must
look at the entire relationship between the parties and not just focus
exclusively on the lawyer-client relationship. Trying to resolve the
problem solely from the “who is the client” perspective introduces
tremendous artificiality into the triangular relationship. Do policyholders
really know or care whether retained defense counsel’s relationship with
the insurer is that of “client” or “third party payer?” The reality of the
relationship turns on who selects and instructs counsel, a point repeatedly
driven home in the conflict of interest cases. Under either a “client” or
“third party payer” approach the insurer selects and instructs counsel and
will continue to select and instruct counsel absent a fundamental reworking
of the triangular relationship.122 Having this power, having an immediate
120. In most cases courts take the position that the presence of conflicting
instructions from co-clients or client equivalents reflects an actual conflict which counsel
must address under the professional codes. See Susan Randall, Managed Litigation and the
Professional Obligations of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3-4
(2001). In some cases the potential for conflicting obligations induces courts to find no
lawyer-client relationship with one of the parties. Cf. Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737,
743 (Cal. 1976) (finding no duty to advise buyer when recognition of such a duty would
conflict with Lawyer’s duty to client-seller).
121. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2007) (discussing
“duties” owed to prospective clients who consult an attorney regarding representation, but
no retention results).
122. The furthest any court has gone in challenging the basic assumption that, absent
a conflict of interest, the insurer may select defense counsel and control the defense, is to
impose some limits when the insurer uses in-house staff counsel. Even here, only two
jurisdictions have prohibited the insurer from using staff counsel to represent the
policyholder. See Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Ky. Bar Assoc., 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996). There
are a few ethics opinions proscribing the use of in-house staff counsel. Ohio Supreme Court
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 94-9 (1994), reported in 10 ABA/BNA
LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT 291 (1994-1995). Several articles have addressed
the issue of using staff counsel to represent policyholders in third party actions. See Robert
J. Johnson, In-House Counsel Employed by Insurance Companies: A Difficult Dilemma
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financial stake in the matter, and having a relationship with defense counsel
that transcends the individual case, the insurer is a “client-equivalent” if it
is not a client. The lawyer will necessarily, and rightly, be concerned with
the insurer’s interests, as the lawyer is necessarily and rightly concerned
with the policyholder’s interests. The critical question is not “who is the
client” but what rights (and duties) attend to the insurer’s right under the
insurance contract to select counsel and control the defense through the
instruction and direction of counsel.
Silver and Syverud argue that in the context of "within limits"
settlements "defense counsel has no duty to advise or act for the
[policyholder] on settlement, period."123 I agree, but for a different reason
than offered by Silver and Syverud. They based their position on the claim
that retained defense counsel enjoys a scope-limited relationship with the
policyholder-client.
Settlement responsibility is not part of the
representation:
Counsel must inform the insured of developments relating to
settlement, including settlement demands received from other
parties, because the insured is entitled to that information.
Counsel also must tell the insured about the scope restriction and
explain that the insured may need to hire separate counsel to
handle settlement issues. But, in our judgment, counsel need not
and should not otherwise advise the insured. When responsibility
for settlement is excluded from the scope of the relationship with
the insured, it is not defense counsel’s job to tell the insured how
the insured may be affected by settlement developments or by
settlement on particular terms.124
This approach likely complies with scope-limited representation
recognized by the ABA Model Rules as long as it is explained to the client
and the client gives informed consent.125 Counsel must also not forget that
Confronting the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 945 (1996);
Leo J. Jordan & Hilde E. Kahn, Ethical Issues Relating to Staff Counsel Representation of
Insureds, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 25 (1994); Ronald E. Mallen, Defense by Salaried Counsel: A
Bane or a Blessing?, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 518 (1994); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the
Eternal Triangle of Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996).
123. Silver & Syverud, Insurance Defence Lawyers, supra note 30, at 299.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2007) (permitting “reasonable”
limitation).
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the scope-limited representation may still require him to advise the client
of the ramifications of retention-related activities even if those activities
are outside the scope of the retention.126
I prefer to base the role of the retained defense counsel regarding
settlement on the policyholder's economic indifference to the within limits
settlement. Only the insurer has money on the table, so only the insurer
should be playing.127 Implicit in Silver and Syverud's position is the idea
that the policyholder's residual interests in the matter(such as reputation,
preexisting relationships with the claimant effect of settlement on future
insurability and premiums, etc.) are too attenuated to warrant legal
protection.128 If the policyholder believed otherwise, he could bargain for a
“consent-to-settle” clause or self insure.129 “Consent-to-settle” provisions
are not commonplace in liability policies; they either increase the cost of
insurance or decrease the value of the policy purchased. Consent-to-settle
provisions commonly contain risk shifting language so that the cost of an
erroneous decision not to settle is borne by the policyholder who withheld
consent.130 Such a risk allocation strategy is not a viable alternative for
consumer-oriented, insurance purchase decisions. When a policyholder
decides to purchase traditional insurance without a consent-to-settle
provision and decides to tender a claim to the insurer for a defense, the
essence of the Silver-Syverud position is that, as to within limits

126. Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
the basic responsibility of an attorney is to advise their client, the attorney may limit the
scope of representation, but no the scope of the duty to advise).
127. See supra note 92, discussing Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr.2d at
703 (holding that retained defense counsel could negotiate global settlement of claims for
which only worker’s compensation insurer would be responsible; in doing so counsel
breached no duties owed to policyholder-employer).
128. See Fiege v. Cooke, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496, 499(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that settlement was binding even through the defendant (policyholder) did not give assent; it
was sufficient that the retained defense counsel and the insurance adjuster consented to the
settlement); Orion Ins. Co. v. General Electric Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 397, 401, 403 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1985), aff’d 509 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that the insurer retained
the right to settle the action in which its policyholders were represented by independent
counsel selected and controlled by the policyholders pursuant to the terms of the insurance
contract). See supra notes 33-34, 52, 81 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 52, 108.
130. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1172-78 (1990)
(discussing the use of “consent-to-settle” clauses to protect professional reputation).

64

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

settlements, the policyholder has ceded all its legally recognizable rights to
the insurer.131
Silver and Syverud capture the economic realities of the insurance
contract in their approach to within limits settlements. They also capture
the realities of the lawyer-client relationship and the lawyer's professional
duties attendant to that relationship because that professional relationship is
created as a result of and flows from the insurance contract; it does not
exist independent of the insurance contract. The analysis here is therefore
similar to that taken with respect to the first hypothetical and, as was the
case earlier, the proper construction of the client-lawyer relationship is
influenced by the underlying insurance contract from which the clientlawyer relationship evolves.132 This conclusion should apply under either
the two-client or one-client model that is recognized in the context of the
triangular relationship.133
A. INSURER AS CO-CLIENT
For a joint client representation, the standard position is that counsel
must give each client the quality and kind of representation each would
131. Silver & Syverud, Insurance Defense Lawyers, supra note 30 (does not
specifically address the issue of insurer authority to settle when to do so would cause the
policyholder to lose a valid counterclaim or when the insurer could recover settlement costs
through retrospective premium rating).
132. This point has received some judicial acceptance. The Alabama Supreme
Court has stated:
[W]e believe that the insurance contract does affect
the attorney-client relationship with respect to settlement of
an action brought against an insured. If the insured has
contracted away the right to require his consent prior to a
settlement of a claim against him, no real conflict of
interest exists between the insured and the insurer, at least
where the claim or settlement is within policy limits and
there has been no reservation of rights by the insurer.
Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So.2d 194, 201 (Ala. 1988) (rejecting contrary position
taken in Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979)). However, a subsequent Alabama
decision held, however, that if the policyholder has a direct stake in the settlement because
of a deductible reimbursement requirement, the policyholder’s consent must be obtained.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Edge Memorial Hosp., 584 So.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Ala.
1991).
133. See 4 Ronald Mallen & Jeffrey Smith, Legal Malpractice §29:7, at 176 (2006)
(discussing application of Rule 1.8(f) and one-client/two-client models).
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receive if that person was counsel's sole client.134 This is, however, on
reflection too simplistic; the very essence of a situation presenting a
conflict of positions is the presence of conflicting interests as to specific
matters. No lawyer in the context of the joint representation can provide
the exact same representation that would be provided in the single client
representation. Joint representation necessarily implies that to some extent
the lawyer may (re)solve client differences in a fashion that help one client
yet disadvantage the other client as to that particular application. The
reason for this is the clients’ belief that the overall benefits derived from
the joint representation will outweigh localized disadvantages resulting
from the lawyer’s effort to maximize joint gains for the jointly represented
clients. The question is whether, and to what extent, the clients may agree
to enter into a relationship that envisions that their shared attorney may, for
their joint aggregate benefit, act pursuant to the instruction of one of the
clients alone even though, on occasion, that specific action that is not in the
immediate, short term interests of one of the clients, as the client now
defines his interests. Again, in keeping with the specifications of the
discussion, we assume that the instruction given is consistent with the
rights established by the underlying document that controls the relationship
between the clients, the insurance contract. That condition is met here
since the insurance contract vests settlement authority in the insurer
exclusively and bars the policyholder from undermining the insurer’s right
to settle if the insurer deems a within limits settlement appropriate.
In the joint client context the clients should be permitted to agree
between themselves as to how counsel shall be instructed. The proposal
offered by Silver and Syverud implicitly adopts this approach by treating
the insurance contract and the retainer agreements as authority allocating
documents. Under the approach suggested in response to hypothetical
number 1, in the normal case the allocation of authority to the insurer
would legitimate the insurer's instruction to counsel to settle the claim
within policy limits. The standard objection to this approach is as follows:
even if the parties make provisions in their agreements allocating authority,
between themselves, the provisions in the retainer may not be irrevocable
as between attorney and client.135 In other words the insurance contract
134. Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (stating
that the loyalty owed one client cannot consume that owed another); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (2007) (stating that “the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty
to each client….”).
135. Courts frequently state that the lawyer-client relationship does not create a
general implied authority for the lawyer to settle the client’s claim, and that there is no
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cannot control the retainer. If counsel must respect a client's decision to
revoke a prior consent, we are back to our starting position; the insurer may
act, but counsel must sit on the sidelines.136

prohibition against a competent client vesting the lawyer with actual authority to settle.
Michaud v. Michaud, 932 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1991); Garabedian v. Allstates Eng’g Co.,
811 F.2d 802, 803 (3d Cir. 1987); McEnany v. West De. County Com. Sch. Dist., 844 F.
Supp. 523, 529 (N.D. Iowa 1994). Similarly, the policyholder may authorize the insurer to
settle on its behalf. The Restatement addresses the issue:
A client may authorize a lawyer to negotiate a
settlement that is subject to the client’s approval or to settle
a matter on terms indicated by the client. In class actions,
special rules apply; a court, after notice and hearing, may
approve a settlement negotiated by the lawyer for the class
without the approval of named representatives or members
of the class. The Section allows a client to confer
settlement authority on a lawyer, provided that the
authorization is revocable before a settlement is reached. A
client authorization must be expressed by the client or
fairly implied from the dealings of the lawyer and client.
Thus, a client may authorize a lawyer to enter a settlement
within a given range. A client is bound by a settlement
reached by such a lawyer before revocation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 cmt. c (2000).
Similarly, the policyholder may authorize the insurer to settle on its behalf.
The
policyholder authorizes settlement by the terms of the standard liability insurance contract
and the tender. Cf. Ramirez v. Sturdevant, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 561-62 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that client’s agreement in retaining authorizing lawyer to accept specified
“minimum” settlement amount was neither unfair nor unconscionable when amount
reflected reasonable assessment of the value of the claim). A “within limits” settlement as
contemplated by the parties to the insurance contract is functionally equivalent to the
“minimum settlement amount” discussed in Ramirez.
In both situations the
client/policyholder has agreed to a specific position.
136. Outside the “conflict of interest” context, the general approach of courts is to
permit the insurer unilateral authority to execute “within limits” settlements, see supra note
105 and accompanying text, and even recover the cost of the settlement if it turns out no
indemnity was owed under the insurance contract if the policyholder has been given
appropriate notice and has objected to the settlement. See Md. Cas. Co. v. Imperial
Contracting Co., Inc., 260 Cal. Rptr. 797, 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that an insurer
who defended under reservation of rights could recover amount of settlement from
policyholder when it was subsequently determined that claim was not covered). Given the
insurer’s preemptive authority in the matter of concluding settlements, it is difficult to
reconcile any suggestions that retained defense counsel should adopt a “hands off” approach
towards settlements because of policyholder objections communicated to defense counsel.
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The usual judicial approach to the dilemma is to accept the “standard
position”, and find that counsel’s professional duties trump the clients’
duties and obligations under the insurance contract, insofar as counsel’s
representation is concerned. Faced with conflicting instructions from the
policyholder and the insurer, the fair inference from the decided “conflict
of interest” cases is that counsel should inform the insurer that its
instructions cannot be carried out by counsel. Because disclosure of the
reasons for counsel’s non-assistance would possibly prejudice the
policyholder by disclosing a possible breach of the policyholder’s duty to
cooperate and assist, counsel may not be able to disclose the reasons for
non-assistance to the insurer,137 absent policyholder authorization.138
Although the case law and ethics opinions state that when defense
counsel receives conflicting instructions she should withdraw, there is little
case law actually applying that thinking to the problem presented by
Hypothetical 2. That is not really surprising because requiring defense
counsel to withdraw and permitting the policyholder to complicate
reasonable settlements is a singularly bad idea when the policyholder has
previously surrendered his right to control the defense to the insurer.
Courts quite reasonably resist taking the withdrawal principle to its natural
and logical conclusion because the end product is socially wasteful and
inconsistent with the expectations of the parties to the insurance contract.
This reluctance should encourage us to reexamine the validity of the
arguments that underlie the withdrawal requirement when defense counsel
receives conflicting instructions. Rather than emphasizing the status of the
parties to the insurance contract as clients or non-clients, as the traditional
approach does, I propose that we emphasize the parties’ reasonable
expectations of defense counsel’s role as developed from the insurance
contract, as common sense and good judgment would direct us. This
approach will, I believe, lead to views of the triangular relationship that
further, rather than frustrate, the goals of the insurance contract.
137. Cf. Parsons v. Cont’l Nat’l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94, 99 (Ariz. 1976) (defense
counsel should not have disclosed policyholder-client confidential information to the
insurer; insurer was estopped from basing coverage denial on information counsel
improperly conveyed); Employers Cas. Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 560-61 (Tex. 1973)
(same).
138. Cf. ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 08-450 (2008) (opining that retained defense counsel may not disclose client
confidential information of policyholder to insurer absent policyholder consent; if failure to
disclose would involve counsel in the commission of a fraud against the insurer, counsel
must withdraw from the representation).
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The critical issue is whether providing a policyholder with a lawyer
who owes certain responsibilities to a co-client, the insurer, would be, in
the context of the hypothetical, injurious to the policyholder, the public, or
the profession. If retained defense counsel were permitted to ignore the
policyholder’s instruction not to settle, and implement the insurer-client’s
instruction to effect the within policy limits settlement, would the interests
of either the policyholder or the legal profession be damaged such that we
should reject empowering counsel to so act? In resolving this question we
must remember that the insurer still retains, in most jurisdictions, the power
to settle the claim over the policyholder’s objections.139 The inability to
control the defense by instructing counsel to effect the settlement may,
however, complicate the implementation of the settlement since it will be
necessary to file the dismissals and take other action in the litigation related
to the claim, which will conclude the litigation and the insurer cannot do
this unilaterally.140 Nonetheless, unless the policyholder takes control of
the defense away from the insurer, the policyholder’s recalcitrance
regarding settlement will, in all likelihood, simply prolong the settlement
process, rather that prevent settlement realization and conclusion of the
litigation.
Moreover, as discussed in connection with Hypothetical 1, there is no
overriding reason why the policyholder’s delegation of control of the
defense to the insurer pursuant to the tender should not influence the
allocation of power as between the policyholder and the insurer insofar as
the lawyer is concerned. Pursuant to the tender, the policyholder has
requested a defense of the claim by the insurer. It hardly now lies for the
policyholder to contend that he should be permitted to assume a position
that he earlier relinquished, particularly given the insurer’s reliance on the
139. See New Plumbing Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, Sooy & Byron, 121 Cal. Rptr.
2d 472, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (barring claim of malpractice against retained defense
counsel for failing to notify the policyholder-client of settlement negotiations and failing to
interpose defenses to claim; insurer properly exercised its right under the policy to settle the
claim; therefore, policyholder-client sustained no damages); cf. Purdy v. Pac. Auto. Ins. Co.,
203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that legal malpractice claim for
excess policy limits judgment could not be stated because the cause of the loss was the
insurer’s independent decision not to settle).
140. If the policyholder wishes to assert control of the defense, it must be for the
policyholder’s account, not the insurer’s. See Rogers v. Robson, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1372
(Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that if the policyholder objects to a settlement negotiated by the
insurer, the policyholder may “release the insurance company from its objection under the
policy, select different counsel, defend the action at his own expense and bear the risk of an
adverse decision.”), aff’d on other grounds, 407 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980).
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tender in assuming the cost of the defense. The policyholder should not be
allowed to manipulate the situation to her advantage any more than the
insurer should be allowed to manipulate its right to control the defense to
its sole advantage in a manner not expressly allowed by the contract.141
A number of courts have recognized that powers normally possessed
by the client may be limited when the client has induced reliance on the
belief that the power will not be exercised. In Unified Sewerage Agency v.
Jelco, Inc. the court refused to disqualify a law firm when the former client
attempted to revoke a prior consent that the current client and the law firm
had relied on in establishing the lawyer-client relationship.142 In Ethics
Opinion 317 the District of Columbia Bar Association directly addressed
the issue of continued representation when the lawyer and the current client
relied on a consent that the consenting party now wishes to revoke. The
Opinion noted that permitting the revocation to force the termination of the
lawyer-client relationship would be improper and not reflect the interests of
the other affected parties who in reliance on the consent had invested time,
money, and effort in the representation.143 The triangular relationship
likewise involves an investment of time, money, trust, and effort that both
parties (policyholder and insurer) will adhere to their prior commitments,
here, the ceding of control of the defense and the right to settle to the
insurer. That ceding and accompanying reasonable reliance by the insurer
warrants permitting retained defense counsel to implement an instruction
by the insurer to settle within policy limits even over the objections of the
policyholder.
The better view of the policyholder-insurer arrangement under the
standard liability insurance policy permits the insurer to control the
defense, including having the sole right to instruct counsel. In other words,
141. Cf. Hannebaum v. Direnzo & Bomier, 469 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that any problem associated with a verdict form was created by the
defendants’ decision to use single counsel and defendants should not be permitted to use a
self-created situation to obtain a reversal).
142. 646 F.2d 1339, 1346 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Armenta v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 273, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“Where such work product is the result of
collaboration by counsel, all holders of the work product privilege must consent to waiver of
the privilege.”).
143. DC
BAR
LEGAL
ETHICS
COMM.,
OP.
317,
available
at
http://www.dcbar.org1for_
lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinion/opin317.cfm. The same result was recently reached by
the North Carolina State Bar Ethics Committee. N.C. BAR ETHICS COMM., IN FORMAL OP.
11 (2007), available at http://www.ncbar.com/ethics (in the “select by number” drop down
menu choose “2007 Formal Opinion 11”).
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control of counsel should follow the right to select counsel. Whoever has
control possesses the sole right to exercise direction and instruction of
counsel to the exclusion of the other party to the arrangement.
B. INSURER AS THIRD PARTY PAYER
The same arguments that apply in the joint client context also compel a
similar result in the single client/third party payer context. The absence of
a lawyer-client relationship between defense counsel and the insurer does
not diminish the role of the insurance contract, its language vesting control
of the defense in the insurer, and the tender of the defense to the insurer by
the policyholder as facts imbuing the insurer with the contractual authority
to control the defense by directing and instructing counsel.144 Detailed
disclosures by counsel in order to obtain the type of informed consent
envisioned by the professional codes to obtain a waiver of a potential
conflict of interest have not been the norm in the triangular relationship
context.145 Courts have consistently held, or implied, that the provisions of
144. See supra note 16.
145. Under certain circumstances a person may by contract clothe another with
power to retain a lawyer to conduct a defense. . . . ‘Consent and approval’ to represent the
insured are clearly implied when the insured complies with his reciprocal duty under the
insurance contract by forwarding the court process to the insurance company. If the insured
does not desire to avail himself of the company’s obligation to defend the suit including
counsel, together with payment of any judgment and costs, he is at complete liberty to
renounce his rights under the insurance contract and employ independent counsel at his own
expense.
ABA COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, FORMAL OP. 282 (1950)
International Association of Defense Counsel, 7:4 PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR INS. DEFENSE
LAWYERS 17, (Supp. 2003) (“A defense lawyer who is engaged by a claims professional
need not separately obtain an insured’s consent to or ratification of the appointment. By
demanding a defense under a standard liability insurance policy, an insured authorizes a
carrier to retain a lawyer for the insured.”); but see Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 463 S.E.2d
397 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), in which the court held that counsel retained by the insurer to
represent a policyholder could not move to strike a default entered against the policyholder
when the policyholder had never consented to the representation. Some courts have
permitted the insurer to intervene and present a defense in the face of a policyholder’s
default. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr.2d 807, 809 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000); Nasongkhla v. Gonzalez, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 379 (Cal. App. Dep’t., Super. Ct. 1994)
(holding that insurer should be permitted to intervene to set aside a default entered against
the policyholder for failure to respond to discovery requests otherwise the insurer possibly
would have no other opportunity to litigate fault or damages issues and would carry an
unfair burden of proving lack of coverage). Intervention is, however, limited to protecting
the insurer’s interest, not the policyholder’s.
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the insurance contract, coupled with the tender of claim to the insurer,
adequately manifest the policyholder’s knowing intent that the insurer
assume the defense of the claim.146 No court has required further
disclosures by counsel as a precondition to counsel undertaking the
representation of the policyholder. The tendency has been just to the
contrary. Some courts have required the insurer to assume the defense, and
appoint counsel, simply upon being notified by the policyholder of the
claim, a tender being implied by the courts from the notice.147

146
Under the terms of most liability insurance policies,
the insured agrees to permit the insurer to choose counsel to
defend the insured against claims by third parties. As we
stated in Fid. & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, this Acustomary
clause in insurance policies . . . is consent in advance by the
insured to such dual representation and obviates an
improper relationship.” However, if an actual conflict
develops during the course of the representation, the
attorney may not continue to represent both parties.
Atlanta Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 639 A.2d 652, 658 (Md. 1994) (citation omitted);
see Crist v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 529 F. Supp. 601, 603 (D. Utah 1992) (noting that “the
insurer’s duty to defend corresponds to the insured’s duty to relinquish control of the
defense and one cannot arise without the other”); but see Tenn. Super. Ct. Board of Prof.
Resp., Formal Opn. 99-F-143 (1999) available at http://www.tbpr.org/Attorneys/Ethics
Opinions/Pdfs/99-F-143.pdf, holding that defense counsel must refrain from accepting
directives from the insurer about the conduct of the defense and must refuse to share client
confidential information with an outside audit service without the policyholder-client’s
consent. More importantly, the committee also concluded that the policyholder’s rights
could not be waived in advance by the insurance contract, but required contemporaneous
disclosure by the lawyer and consent by the client upon full disclosure; Dunkley v.
Shoemate, 497 S.E.2d 713, 715 (N.C. App. 1998) (holding that insurance defense counsel
selected by the insurer may not enter an appearance without the consent of the clientpolicyholder); but see supra note 135.
147. See White Mountain Cable Constr. Co., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 631 A.2d
907, 910 (N.H. 1993) (holding that notice by policyholder to insurer was sufficient to trigger
insurer’s duty to defend when notice was coupled with policyholder’s statement that insurer
had duty to defend); Employers Cas. Co. v. Mireles, 520 S.W.2d 516, 521-522 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975). The “notice only” test appears to be a minority view. SCSC Corp. v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316 (Minn. 1995) (formal tender of defense of the claim to
the insurer is condition precedent to triggering insurer’s duty to defend); see LaFarge Corp.
v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1995); Eastman v. United States,
257 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D. Ind. 1966); Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 349
N.W.2d 547, 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
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V. CONCLUSION
The appropriate approach to allocation of power between policyholder
and insurer in the context of the triangular relationship is to recognize that
the delegation of control accomplished by the insurance contract and by the
tender affects the relationship between the policyholder and defense
counsel. The policyholder is provided a defense and counsel necessarily
looks for instruction to the party who has the lawful authority to control the
defense. That person is the insurer. And that authority extends both to
tactical questions, such as presented in hypothetical 1, or ends related
questions, such as presented in hypothetical 2, as long as those questions
are within the boundaries of the insurance contract. A workable, albeit
rough, rule of thumb here is that counsel should accept and follow
instructions from the insurer, and disregard contrary instructions from the
policyholder, to the extent (1) the insurer’s instructions are consistent with
the insurer’s right to control the defense; (2) the implementation of the
insurer’s instructions do not require counsel to commit an illegal act or
violate the professional codes, as illuminated by the lawful delegation of
control over the attorney to the insurer by the policyholder; and (3) the
implementation of the insurer’s instructions would not cause counsel
knowingly to assist the insurer in breaching a duty owed by the insurer to
the policyholder.148 The issues raised by hypotheticals 1 and 2 falls
squarely within the above guidelines. In controlling the defense and
settling within limits, the insurer, whether or not a client or third party
payor, is acting within its lawful rights and consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the policyholder. In both cases, retained defense counsel
should follow the insurer’s instructions.
There appears to be no compelling reason why it should be presumed
that a lawyer representing joint clients or joint interests cannot exercise
independent professional judgment and render competent advice or engage
in proper conduct consistent with the intended scope of the representation.
If and when a lawyer fails to do this, remedies exist which may be
148. I use the term “knowingly” deliberately as I am attempting to define the
lawyer’s professional obligations in the context of the triangular relationship. Rule 1.0(f): “
‘Knowingly,’ ‘known,’ or ‘knows’ denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A
person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.” ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2007).Whether the lawyer should be liable for recklessly or
negligently assisting the insurer in breaching a duty owed to the policyholder raises issues
more closely connected with malpractice liability than professional responsibility, issues
that I do not address here.
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employed by the injured parties. Yet the fact that rules have been broken
does not lead one to conclude that they will necessarily be broken. Nor has
it been demonstrated that the frequency of violations or their severity is so
great that a preemptive rule is required that would restructure the
relationship so as to preclude the lawyer from giving advice that advances
the parties’ stated objectives and which caused the lawyer to be retained in
the first place.
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THREE INSIGHTS FROM THE CANADIAN D&O INSURANCE
MARKET: INERTIA, INFORMATION AND INSIDERS1
M. Martin Boyer2

ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to our understanding of the role of Director's
and Officer's insurance by answering three very specific questions: Do
directors and corporations actively optimize their decision to purchase
D&O insurance? Can we devise a profitable investment strategy based on
the D&O insurance information? And does D&O insurance motivate
managers to increase profitability? To answer the first question, I will
argue that the most important determinant of D&O purchase in any year is
whether the firm purchased it in the previous year so that managers do not
appear to reassess actively their need for such coverage very often. For the
second question, I find that there are profitable investment strategies that
entail the purchasing of the stock of corporations that have relatively high
directors' and officers' insurance unit price (premium divided by coverage)
and sell the stock of corporations that have relatively low directors' and
officers' unit price. I attribute the profitability of the strategy to the fact that
directors' and officers' insurance represents an aggregate measure of board
efficiency and corporate governance health. Finally, using a cross section
of Canadian unit trust companies, I show that D&O insurance seems to demotivate managers to extract cash flows from assets, although this demotivation does not seem to reach the stock market. Two important caveats
are in order: I am using a very short time period and I am using only
Canadian corporations. Sadly, information regarding directors' and officers'
insurance has not been available for very long, and is still not available
publicly in the United States.
1. I would like to thank Mathieu Delvaux-Derome and Pascal Drouin for able
research assistance, as well as Stéphane Rousseau and Claude Francoeur for animated
discussions. Part of this research was sponsored by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada. The continuing financial support of CIRANO is also gratefully
acknowledged.
2. CEFA Professor of Finance and Insurance, and CIRANO Fellow, HEC Montréal,
Université de Montréal, 3000 chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, QC H3T 2A7
Canada; 514-340-6704; martin.boyer@hec.ca.
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INTRODUCTION
A. CORPORATE DIRECTOR LIABILITY AND PROTECTION
As representatives of the corporation, directors and officers are liable
for the corporation’s actions.3 More importantly, the directors and officers
are personally responsible for those actions, and accordingly their personal
assets are at risk in the event of a lawsuit against the corporation and its
management.4 Following the recent loss of confidence in corporate
governance resulting from the debacle of corporate giants like Enron,
Worldcom, Adelphia and Anderson, corporate managers are facing greater
risk of lawsuits originating from angry shareholders who feel they were
kept in the dark regarding the company's operations. According to a 2002
survey, 19% of firms had at least one lawsuit brought against their directors
in the previous ten years.5 One way for a corporate director to protect his
personal wealth is to have the corporation buy insurance on his behalf.6
This insurance is known as Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance.
A D&O insurance policy becomes applicable when a manager is sued
in his capacity as a representative of the corporation.7 The insurance
company indemnifies the corporation and/or the manager only if the
manager acted in good faith on behalf of the company; i.e., managers are
not covered in case of gross negligence or criminal behavior.8 Depending
on the type of D&O contract, the manager could be indemnified directly, or
the corporation could be compensated for the expenses incurred in the
manager's defense.9 As with traditional insurance contracts, D&O
insurance contracts stipulate a premium to be paid, a policy limit, and a
deductible.10
3. M. Martin Boyer, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Shareholders’
Protection 1 (Ctr. for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Orgs., Working Paper No.
2003s-64, 2003), available at http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003s-64.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002 Directors and Officers Liability Survey: US and
Canadian
Results,
Apr.
23,
2003,
available
at
www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=TILL/USA/2003/200304/DO_summary2
002a.pdf.
6. Boyer, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Id.
8. Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey L. Coles, Managerial Indemnification
and Liability Insurance; The Effect on Shareholder Wealth, 54 J. RISK & INS. 721, 724
(1987); John M. R. Chalmers, Larry Y. Dann & Jarrad Harford, Managerial Opportunism?
Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases, 57 J. FIN. 609, 613 (2002).
9. Bhagat et al., supra note 8, at 724; Chalmers et al., supra note 8, at 613.
10. Bhagat et al., supra note 8, at 724.
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It is important to note that D&O insurance is not the only way to
protect managers against lawsuits. A corporation can also amend its charter
so that the director liability is limited.11 These limited liability provisions
“all but eliminate the directors' personal financial responsibility toward the
firm and its shareholders.”12 By 1996, more than 70% of American
corporations adopted limited liability provisions.13 A third way that a
corporation can protect its directors is through corporate indemnification
plans. These plans give directors protection against third-party lawsuits
because under these plans the corporations are responsible for
indemnifying the directors for court expenses.14 Corporate indemnification
plans protect directors who acted in the best interest of the corporation,
even if they are found guilty, so long as the harm was caused while acting
in the best interests of the corporation and the director did not reap any
personal benefit from their conduct.15 The public data collected for this
study makes no mention of corporate indemnification plans and because
Canadian corporate law does not allow limited liability provisions,16 this
study relies exclusively on D&O insurance to study the financial protection
offered to corporate directors.
B. PAST RESEARCH
Because of the limited access to public information prior to 1990,17
only a few studies have been conducted on the demand for D&O insurance.
Public information became available following the Cadbury Report in the
United Kingdom and the Dey Report in Canada.18 Both reports
recommended to their respective securities commission that more
information be made available on the compensation of officers and
directors.19 As a result, more information regarding managerial
11. Maria Gutierrez, A Contractual Approach to the Regulation of Corporate
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 17 (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper No.
0013, 2000).
12. Boyer, supra note 3, at 1.
13. Gutierrez, supra note 11, at 17.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16 R. Crête et S. Rousseau, Droit des sociétés par actions, 2e éd., Montréal, Éditions
Thémis, 2008, 881 p.
17. Prior to 1990, the only information related to D&O insurance was collected via
surveys by Wyatt, now part of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. Boyer, supra note 3, at 8.
18. Id.
19. COMM. ON THE FIN. ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.2 (1992),
available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf; TORONTO STOCK EXCH.
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compensation is available in both countries, including the purchase of
D&O insurance.
The first studies that used the newly available public data in Canada
and the United Kingdom were conducted by J.E. Core and N. O'Sullivan.20
Using a sample of 222 firms whose fiscal year ended between May 31,
1994 and December 31, 1994, Core found that the most important
determinants of whether D&O insurance was purchased were the risk of a
lawsuit and the cost of financial distress.21 In a follow-up article, Core
found that the factors explaining premiums were about the same as the
factors explaining the demand for D&O insurance.22 Core's results are
supported by O'Sullivan who concluded that in the United Kingdom, D&O
insurance coverage and managerial share ownership are corporate
governance instrument substitutes.23 Moreover, Core and O'Sullivan
suggested that D&O insurance acts as a monitoring device.24
If D&O insurance reduces the expected cost of bankruptcy and acts as
a corporate governance instrument or monitoring device, one should expect
that stock returns should be positively correlated with D&O insurance
purchases. Surprisingly, however, D&O insurance does not seem to have
any impact on stock returns.25
More recently, a study conducted by J. Chalmers, L. Dann, and J.
Hartford examined the interaction between D&O insurance coverage and
initial public offering (IPO) under-pricing.26 This study looked at an
original sample of firms that went public between 1992 and 1996.27 The
Chalmers study found that corporations with substantial D&O insurance
coverage were, on average, more likely to be sued in the future for

COMM. ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CAN., WHERE WERE THE DIRECTORS?
FOR IMPROVED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA § 5.50 (1994).

GUIDELINES

20. John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance,
64 J. RISK & INS. 63, 64, 70 (1997); Noel O’Sullivan, Insuring the Agents : The Role of
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance in Corporate Governance, 64 J. RISK & INS. 545, 546
(1997).
21. Core, supra note 20, at 70, 81.
22. See John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium : An Outside
Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 449 (2000);
Core, supra note 20.
23. O’Sullivan, supra note 20, at 554.
24. O’Sullivan, supra note 23, at 554. See generally Core, supra note 22 (suggesting
that D&O premiums contain useful information about the quality of corporate governance).
25. Bhagat et al., supra note 8, at 722.
26. Chalmers et al., supra note 8, at 609-10.
27. Id. at 610-611.
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mispricing.28 More specifically, the study found that the three-year
performance is negatively related to the amount of D&O insurance
purchased at the IPO.29 Put another way, the greater the D&O insurance
coverage, the less underpriced the stock was at the time of the initial public
offering.
The liability crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s was a period of
intense uncertainty for insurance companies, especially D&O insurance
providers. This crisis affected all types of liability insurance including
personal automobile liability insurance, medical malpractice, product
liability and general liability.30 This uncertainty is attributable to changes
in the legal environment.31 As changes in the legal environment were an
undiversifiable risk for insurers, the law of large numbers no longer applied
to these insurance products.32 As a result, diversification was necessary to
cover for legal environment risks.33 The increased economic importance of
mutual insurance companies resulted directly from this liability crisis.34
This organizational response from the insurance industry was also
accompanied by a contractual response: The introduction of “claims made
and reported” (CMR) insurance policies.35
Most D&O insurance contracts are written on a CMR basis.36 CMR
contracts differ from regular occurrence based contracts in that they cover
losses that are made and reported during the policy year, even though such
claims may have been incurred in previous years.37 Regular occurrence
based contracts cover losses that are incurred during the policy year no
matter when the claim is reported in the future.38
28. Chalmers et al., supra note 8.
29. Id. at 633.
30. See generally George. L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521 (1986). For a discussion on the insurance crisis and D&O
insurance see, Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit : Litigation Without Foundation?, 1
J.LAW, ECON & ORG. 55, 68-9 (1991).
31. Neil A. Doherty, The Design of Insurance Contracts When Liability Rules are
Unstable, 58 J. RISK & INS. 227, 227 (1991).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 227-28.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Boyer, supra note 3, at 7.
37. Id. “For example, suppose that an incident occurs in 1995 but is not reported until
2000 when a claim is filed. Under a CMR contract, all the financial responsibility for the
loss falls upon the 2000 insurer. Under an occurrence based insurance contract, it is the
1995 insurer who is responsible.” Id.
38. Id.
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Past behavior has a double importance in designing the current year's
insurance contract. Firstly, past behavior could be an indication of current
behavior so that any information related to the insured’s risk gathered in
the past will be used as a signal regarding the insured’s current risk.39 This
is true both for occurrence based and CMR contracts.40 Secondly, past
behavior is an indication of current losses paid in the case of CMR
contracts.41 Thus past behavior becomes doubly important when the
insurance contract is written on a CMR basis.
C. FINDINGS
The findings of this study are based on an original data set of publicly
traded Canadian corporations that filed their annual reports between
January, 1 1993 and December 31, 1998. Canadian data is used because
basic D&O insurance information (policy limit, deductible and premium) is
made public in the corporations' management proxies and information
circulars (information that is absent from standard reporting documents in
the United States).42
The first point this paper makes is that there is a lot of inertia
embedded in the decision to purchase D&O insurance, as much as to the
amount of coverage chosen. This result is not completely new, but it is
important to mention when trying to explain why firms purchase insurance
and in what amount. It appears that when asked whether to purchase D&O
insurance and in what amount, firms answer by a question: What did we
do last year? The only noticeable variation from year to year is the
premium paid.
The second result relates to the informational value to investors of
making public the D&O insurance coverage. In a world where insurers are
examining thoroughly the risk level of their clients, one would expect that
an investment strategy based on the perceived risk levels of Canadian
corporations should be profitable. How should one infer from the
management proxy and information circular an insurer's assessment on one
firm's riskiness? I will argue that the unit price of insurance (that is the
premium-to-limit ratio) is a good indicator. This indicator should also have
more explanatory power for large firms because an insurer should be
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1200 (2005-2006).
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spending more time auditing the internal procedures and financial health of
a larger corporation because it has more to lose by not doing so. Using a
limited number of yearly data points, I found that large firms who face a
higher unit price of insurance are more likely to experience a low market
return than large firms who face a lower unit price. The evidence for this is
not as robust for smaller firms unless the first year of data, 1994, is not
considered. An investment strategy that would be long in low unit price
firms and short in high unit price firms would, on average, earn a five-year
return of 25% from 1994 through 1998. This result supports the position
that D&O insurance information is valuable to investors and should
therefore be made public in the public firms' management proxies.
Finally, the third result of the paper is based on a particularity of the
Canadian securities market: the existence of income trust companies.
Income trusts in Canada, which are similar to the now defunct limited
master partnerships in the United States, are characterized by a dual-class
structure, which presumably, reduces investor protection. If that is the case,
then the moral hazard problem for managers of having D&O insurance
(that is, not investing as much effort in generating wealth for the
shareholders) should be more evident for income trust than for stock
corporations. I found that a measure of accounting performance (growth of
the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is lower
when coverage is larger, but that does not translate into lower stock market
performance (measured as the total yield).
Data Collection and Data Source
The financial data used in this study was obtained from three different
sources: Compustat, Stock Guide and CanCorp Financial. The use of three
different sources allowed for a larger data set compared to Compustat
alone. Unfortunately information was not always the same for corporations
whose financial information appeared in more than one source. If that
occurred, a lexicographic approach to the problem was utilized, trusting the
Compustat entry over the other two, and the Stock Guide entry over
CanCorp's. Stock prices and total returns were drawn from the TSEWestern tapes. All values are in Canadian dollars; any U.S. dollar figure
has been converted to Canadian dollar using the exchange rate at the fiscal
year-end of each company. Precise information was collected regarding
executive compensation of publicly traded Canadian companies listed on
the Toronto Stock Exchange. Companies traded on the TSE are required to
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make public much more information concerning their D&O policies than
was previously required, including coverage limits and premiums.43
Information regarding D&O insurance purchases and executive
compensation of publicly traded Canadian companies listed on the Toronto
Stock Exchange was collected from the annual management proxies and
information circulars. These management proxies also gave information
related to the firm's block holders, board member compensation and
ownership, as well as the type and number of shares held by each officer
(regular or multi-voting).44 These proxies also report the basic information
regarding D&O coverage, such as whether the corporation had D&O
insurance, the D&O insurance policy limit, and occasionally the deductible
and the premium paid.45
The original sample included 354 Canadian corporations drawn from 7
economic sectors: bio-pharmaceutical, forest and paper, industrial products,
technological, consumer products, merchandising, and communication and
media. These sectors were chosen based on the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE) sector list drawn from the TSE Fact Book. Two important sectors of
the Canadian economy, financial institutions, and mining and natural
resources, were deliberately omitted to keep the sample more homogenous.
Because of holes in the data 27 firms, mainly smaller firms were deleted
from the start. There is no survivor bias because we collected data on new
companies, as well as companies that disappeared during the sampled
years. Because of this incomplete panel, the study was left with 1594
observations, which gave an average of 4.9 years per company (out of a
maximum of 7). Of the 327 firms used in the final sample, close to 60%
had information for 5 years or more, including 22% for all the years. Of the
sample in this study, 73.4% of the firms (241 firms) purchased D&O
insurance at least once during those seven years. Of the 327 firms, over
17% did not exist anymore at the start of 2000. Table 1.1 presents a
43. Griffith, supra note 42, at 1200. Since 1996 all this information is available on
the Ontario Securities Commission’s internet site (http://www.sedar.com). Id. Prior to
1996, the information was collected directly from companies or purchased from
Micromedia. Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence of
Organizational Inertia from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 12 (Ctr. for Interuniversity
Research and Analysis on Orgs., Working Paper No. 2004s-33, 2004), available at
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2004s-33.pdf.
44. M. Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit? Evidence from
Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 12-13 (Ctr. for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on
Orgs.,
Working
Paper
No.
2003s-42,
2003),
available
at
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003s-42.pdf.
45. Id. at 13.
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detailed table of the number of firms, divided by sector, per year included
in the sample.
Table 1.1. Number of firms per year by economic sector
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
% of
total

Sector
Biopharmaceutical

4

9

10

13

19

19

16

5.83

Forest and
Paper

19

27

31

32

29

29

25

12.11

Industrial
Products

30

63

79

82

83

80

64

30.18

Technological

5

15

21

28

37

36

33

11.04

Consumer
Products

21

38

44

47

48

48

37

11.75

C&I Products

4

5

9

8

8

8

7

3.07

Merchandizing

15

27

33

36

35

29

23

12.42

Media

9

18

21

22

17

17

17

7.56

Total

107

202

248

268

276

266

222

1594

For each economic sector, all corporations listed in the TSE publication
and traded on the exchange were included in the data set for each year of
the sample. This exercise yielded a total of 1519 observations. Because of
incongruities in the financial and management proxies (for example board
or CEO ownership of more than 100% of the company's stock or no trading
in the stock during the year) a high number of observations were deleted
from the original data set, so that the final data set included 1407
observations for 318 firms. Table 1.2 presents the statistics related to D&O
insurance penetration by industry.
Insurance penetration was calculated as the proportion of corporations
that purchased D&O insurance. On average, 70% of the firms purchased
D&O insurance, although penetration seemed to increase over the years
(67% in 1993, 73% in 1998). D&O insurance penetration in the data set
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was slightly below that reported by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin (1999), for
the year 1998, but higher than Core (1997) for the years 1993 to 1994.46 In
the case of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 84% of Canadian corporations were
reported to purchase D&O insurance in 1998.47 That is a full ten percentage
points higher than in the sample used for this study. My understanding is
that these differences are explained by four important factors. First,
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin relied on a corporation survey that biased their
results because of the type of respondent. Second, the number of
corporations polled was smaller than the entire sample of possible
companies. Third, the same companies were not polled every year, so that
it was difficult to keep a tab on the actual trend in the industry. Finally, the
data set constructed for this study does not include financial firms, mining
firms, public utilities and not-for-profit firms.

46. See Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 1999 Directors and Officers Liability Survey:
Executive Summary of U.S. and Canadian Results (1999) (on file with the Connecticut
Insurance Law Journal); Core, supra note 20.
47. Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, supra note 46. By comparison, D&O insurance
penetration in the United States was 84% in 1993 and 92% in 1998.
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Table 1.2. D&O insurance penetration by economic sector and fiscal
year
Fiscal Year

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Biopharmaceutical

88%

92%

92%

90%

90%

89%

Forest and
Paper

59%

58%

63%

64%

67%

70%

Industrial
Products

68%

69%

71%

76%

74%

64%

Technological

90%

90%

84%

70%

68%

74%

Consumer
Products

68%

65%

70%

67%

63%

67%

Merchandizing

52%

57%

58%

56%

55%

55%

Media

77%

78%

78%

73%

79%

85%

Weighted
Average

67%

69%

71%

70%

71%

73%

Sector

Percentage of corporations by economic sector and by year that carry
D&O insurance. The weighted average is calculated by taking into account
the number of firms by industry.
In the case of Core (1997), 63% of corporations whose fiscal year
ended between June 1, 1993 and May 31, 1994 were reported to have D&O
insurance.48 Although Core relied on the same public information source as
this study, his sample of companies was different because he included
public utility, financial and mining corporations.49 This explains why
Core's sample consisted of 222 companies, compared to the 181 companies
(1993) and 238 companies (1994) used in this study.

48. See Core, supra note 20, at 70.
49. Boyer, supra note 44, at 1, 10.
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RESULTS
A. INERTIA

The first argument presented in this paper is that risk management in
corporations in general, and D&O purchases in particular, are subject to
inertia. An organization plagued with inertia is one that is unwilling to
change ex post what it did ex ante.50 Applied to the particular case of
insurance purchases, inertia means that the current insurance contract
specifications are better explained by the managers' previous contract
choice than by the current economic condition of the firm. To show that
inertia plays a role, my contention is that the traditional financial and
governance measures that have been used to explain risk management
decisions do not work as effectively as a measure of organizational inertia.
To support the existence of inertia in D&O insurance purchased, it is
interesting to note that firms that purchase D&O insurance do so for all the
years, and firms that do not, never do. This does tell a lot about the
presence of inertia in that the best predictor of a corporation buying D&O
insurance this year is whether it purchased insurance last year. One can
imagine that managers that were never covered under a D&O insurance
policy do not request it because they do not see its use; and managers that
have had it cannot think why they would get rid of it.
Why are financial and governance considerations not relevant? One
possible explanation relies on the CMR structure of D&O insurance
contracts. CMR contracts act as a lobster trap: corporations who purchase
it one year can never realistically get rid of it in the future.51 Purchasing a
CMR contract is tantamount to choosing to be consistently insured since
firms find it difficult to drop coverage once it is purchased.52 Indeed, if a
firm cancels its CMR insurance policy at a given time, it implicitly decides
to drop the coverage in the future for any and every past loss that might
have been incurred, but not yet reported.53 And even if the firm decides to
reinstate its coverage in later years, it usually will not be covered for past
occurrences that have not yet been reported.54 Dropping a contract written
on a CMR basis, such as a D&O insurance contract, is therefore very risky.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Boyer, supra note 3, at 7.
James Povlich, Risk financing solutions to employment practices liability, RISK
MANAGEMENT, May 1994, at 57, 58.
54. Boyer, supra note 44, at 14.
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The structure of a CMR contract explains why firms never drop
coverage, but it does not explain why some firms never purchase the
insurance. This latter fact is better explained by considering that some
firms view D&O insurance as destructive since it arguably reduces the
directors' incentives to work hard.55 Either way, both managerial habit
(including the CEO's beliefs) and the stated inertia associated with CMR
contracts explain the decision to purchase D&O insurance.
The choice of a deductible and policy limit is also very stable over the
years. After controlling for the six traditional reasons that explain why
corporations purchase insurance (managerial risk aversion, asset
substitution, under investment, real services, bankruptcy, and convexity of
the tax schedule), the Boyer study finds that nothing explains D&O policy
limits and deductibles in a given year as much as the previous year's limit
and deductible.56 A possible explanation comes from the method used to
sell D&O insurance policies. D&O insurance is mainly sold by insurance
brokers who negotiate with insurance companies on behalf of the insured.57
In Canada, the top two insurance brokers hold a 66% market share in terms
of the number of accounts (it is the top four brokers in the U.S. that hold
that much market power).58 In premium terms, the top two insurers hold a
50% market share in the United States, and the top three D&O insurers
(AIG, Chubb and Lloyd's) collect about 65% of the premiums.59 In Canada,
a majority of corporations receive their D&O insurance coverage from one
unique insurer.60
Another interesting feature of D&O insurance is the existence of socalled policy limit sticky points. Indeed, coverage limits are sold by layers
of $1,000,000, although the most important steps appear to be $5,000,000,
so that we see a clustering of D&O limits around a few sticky points.61 For
instance, out of the 173 Canadian listed firms that purchased D&O
insurance in 1998, two-thirds chose one of six policy limits: $5,000,000 (18
times), $10,000,000 (43 times), $15,000,000 (12 times), $20,000,000 (18
times), $25,000,000 (10 times) and $50,000,000 (13 times).62 Other years
have similar sticky points.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See ECONOMIST, June, 2003 at 14.
Boyer, supra note 44, at 18.
Id. at 5.
Boyer, supra note 3, at 7.
Boyer, supra note 44, at 5; Boyer supra note 3, at 7.
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, supra note 5, at 6.
Boyer, supra note 3, at 7
Id.
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B. INFORMATION
Insurance companies that write D&O insurance will, presumably, use
all available information as to a company's financial condition and the
efficiency of its governance procedures. Because of the amount of money
involved in the event of a lawsuit, or only because of their extensive
expertise in handling D&O claims, insurers have access to information that
is not available to other agents in the economy.63 Insurers could, for
example, conduct background checks on some of the firm's board members
to better assess their competency and ultimately the real risk of a lawsuit.64
Gathering this information may not be possible for investors. Due to the
fact that the insurer's assessment of the firm's risk enters a ratemaking
matrix that yields only a premium given the amount of coverage
demanded,65 we may wonder whether there is any information embedded in
the premium per dollar of coverage. Put in another way that has more
appeal to a financial economist, one could ask whether a profitable
investment strategy based on the D&O information contained in the
management proxies and information circular could be designed.
Before presenting these results, let us examine how D&O insurance
prices evolved during the years under study (1993-1998). Table 2.1 shows
the evolution of the premium-to-limit ratio over the six years of my sample,
for different cut-off points.

63. See Core, supra note 22, at 453.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 454.
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Table 2.1 Premium in Canadian dollars for each thousand dollars of
D&O insurance coverage (1993-1998)
∆94 –
98

Year

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Number of
observations

88

150

169

179

186

163

95%

11.91

13.75

15.00

15.00

13.33

9.40

31.6%

75%

5.23

5.85

4.80

4.50

4.40

4.35

25.6%

50%
(median)

3.12

3.02

3.08

2.79

2.60

2.60

13.9%

25%

2.23

2.06

1.99

1.89

1.67

1.75

15.0%

5%

1.22

0.70

0.86

0.82

0.80

0.52

25.7%

We see in the table that, from 1994 to 1998, the average premium went
down for every tranche by an average of 20% and by an average of 25%
from 1993 to 1998. As the price of each unit of coverage fell from 1993
through 1998, not all corporations answered according to well known
principles of microeconomics by purchasing more coverage. We can
observe in Table 2.2 that firms that were small demanders of D&O
insurance responded to a reduction in price by decreasing their D&O
insurance coverage.66

66. This raises an interesting possible area of economic inquiry in that we may have,
in this particular instance, an example of a Giffen good.
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Table 2.2 D&O insurance policy limit in thousands of Canadian dollars
(1993-1998)
Year
Number of
observations

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

95

158

177

189

193

170

∆ 94 –
98

95%

390,054 436,363 493,866 486,940 648,078 755,244

73.1%

75%

148,452 153,239 138,737 148,483 175,324 199,505

30.2%

50%
(median)

84,521

75,510

71,480

72,267

75,659

64,841 -14.1%

25%

34,630

31,339

31,912

32,814

33,764

29,321 -6.44%

5%

9,686

9,819

9,348

9,600

10,292

8,048 -18.0%

At the same time as the unit price was falling, the average firm size was not
increasing much either in terms of assets or market value of equity as we
can see in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3 Evolution of firm size as measured by the log of assets
and the log of the market value of equity (1993-1998)
Panel A. Assets
Year

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Number of
observations

95

158

177

189

193

170

95%

7.92

8.16

8.22

8.24

8.15

8.68

75%

6.49

6.44

6.48

6.29

6.49

6.75

50% (median)

5.03

4.95

5.19

5.17

5.33

5.59

25%

3.85

3.93

4.00

4.13

4.11

4.18

5%

2.59

2.88

3.16

3.36

3.04

2.71

Panel B. Market value of equity
Year

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Number of
observations

90

156

173

187

191

169

95%

7.65

7.66

7.89

7.74

8.06

8.16

75%

6.54

6.22

6.16

6.26

6.48

6.48

50% (median)

4.79

4.70

4.88

5.16

5.22

4.99

25%

3.92

3.80

3.76

4.01

4.08

3.78

5%

1.92

2.27

2.40

2.75

3.05

2.03

The next analysis is by no means robust to many attacks from
econometricians and statisticians; but the D&O insurance information is
available only once a year, which makes portfolio investment decisions
possible only once a year. As a result, only five years’ data are available to
asses the profitability of the investment strategy, based on the aggregate
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information revealed in a firm's management proxy and information
circular. The goal is to see whether the unit price of D&O insurance is a
profitable decision criterion for portfolio allocation. To do so requires
splitting the data set into different investment baskets. The investment
strategy would be to sell short the least profitable basket and use the
proceeds to invest in the most profitable basket. The hypothesis is that unit
price is a measure of the firm's riskiness that is not otherwise observable by
investors. As a result, firms that purchase insurance with a low unit price
should be more profitable than firms that purchase insurance with a high
unit price. The unit price will thus determine, for each year, two baskets of
firms with approximately the same number of firms in each basket.
Hypothesis 2.1 Firms faced with a higher unit price
of D&O insurance should be less profitable.
An important component of D&O insurance is the sheer size of the
corporation,67 if only because there are more possible damages that one
needs to cover in the event of a lawsuit when the corporation is larger.68
Moreover, because lawsuits should be more costly for larger corporations,
an insurer underwriting a D&O insurance policy should spend more time
verifying governance practices and auditing the financial statements of
larger corporations. Insurers should spend more time examining a large
corporation and their assessment of the risk should be more precise.
To test this hypothesis, the data were split into four baskets: two size
baskets and two unit price baskets. To limit the impact of important outliers
in the sample,69the data were windsorized70 by removing the company with
the highest annual return and the company with the lowest; a total of eight
observations per year were removed. The distribution of firms in each
basket is displayed in Table 2.4.

67. See Griffith, supra note 43, at 1201 (discussing firm size as D&O premium
factor).
68. Core, supra note 20, at 67-68, 73, 82 (discussing large firm size as a litigation
factor). Firm size should be controlled for in portfolio allocation in accordance with the
Fama and French model. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Differences in the Risks
and Returns of NYSE and NASD Stocks, 49 FIN. ANALYSTS J., 37, 38-39 (1993) (explaining
firm size as a factor of the three-factor model).
69. The outliers in the sample included an obvious data error, as one firm’s return was
4800%.
70. See Karen Kafadar, John Tukey and Robustness, 18 STAT. SCI. 319, 322-23 (2003).
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Table 2.4 Number of firms in each size and unit price basket
Year
Number of firms

1994
32
21
21
30

1995
37
30
32
40

The basket of firms in the table are

1996
42
29
32
43

1997
44
37
35
43

1998
39
33
35
39

High unit price Low unit price
Large firm
Large firm
High unit price Low unit price
Small firm
Small firm

The second hypothesis is that the D&O insurance information related to
the unit price of insurance should be more informative for larger
corporations than for smaller corporations. The difference in performance
between firms that face a low unit price of D&O insurance and firms that
face a high unit price of insurance should be more visible for larger firms.
Hypothesis 2.2 The predictive power of the unit price
of D&O insurance should be greater for larger firms.
The average basket returns per year are displayed in the Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Average annual return of firms in each size and unit price basket
Year
Annual return (%)

1994
1995
1996
10.3 -4.76 -3.78 2.00 22.6 24.3
24.4 -1.55 6.99 27.7 34.4 23.7

1997
1998
17.6 42.0 -11.4 -6.41
9.88 8.46 -25.7 -11.6

High unit price Low unit price

P
Large firm
Large firm
All returns are calculated as τ − 1 and presented as
High
unit
price
Low
unit price
Pτ −1
Small firm

Small firm

The hypothesis for the unit price is that, controlling for size and
extreme outliers, firms that purchase D&O insurance at a relatively low
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price per unit of coverage71 are more financially sound and face less
corporate governance risk. As a result, on average, they should have higher
returns. For small firms, this does not appear to be statistically significant.
An investment strategy that would require investing the same amount of
money in every small firm with a low unit price would only perform
marginally better than the same strategy in every small firm with a high
unit price. The five-year total return of investing in small firms faced with a
low unit price is 49%, whereas the five-year total return of investing in
small firms faced with a high unit price is 46%. Given the standard
deviations, these total returns are not statistically significant.
For large corporations72 the difference is more pronounced. Except for
the first year of the study, the average return for low unit price firms is
always higher than for high unit price firms. The total return of investing in
large firms faced with a low unit price is 61%, whereas the total return of
large firms faced with a high unit price is 35%.
If 1994 is removed from the study for concerns associated with
devising an investment strategy that uses only nineteen firms in the large
firm with low unit price and small firm with high per unit price categories,
the total return over four years is 23% for large firms with high unit price,
17% for small firms with high unit price, 69% for large firms with low unit
price and 51% for small firms with low unit price. By "going long" with
low unit price companies and "going short" with high unit price companies,
an investor would have been able, over the years 1995-1998, to generate a
sizeable profit margin73.
The unit price of D&O insurance analysis has an interesting predictive
power for the company’s future profitability. As the unit price is higher,
reflecting, in the insurer's mind a higher risk of litigation, future returns
appear to be lower. This is even stronger for larger firms than for smaller
firms, and supports this section’s two hypotheses.
C. INSIDERS
One final insight from the Canadian market is associated with a
particular aspect of Canadian security regulation: Income trusts. Trust

71. See the companies in the right two cells of Table 2.4 supra p.93.
72. See the companies in the top two cells of Table 2.4 supra p.93.
73. The profit margin would have been 46% for large companies and 34% for small
companies.
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agreements largely replicate the Canada Business Corporations Act
(CBCA) provisions, but not completely as shown in Gillen (2006).
Income trusts operate, however, in the context of trust law that has not
generally been developed with a view to the use of the trust as a structure
for running a business ... (and) has thus not been developed with a view to
protecting investors and does not contain the kinds of governance and
shareholder remedy provisions that one typically finds in corporate statutes.
Also, trust instruments of different income trusts differ from one to another
in one or more aspects that create a source of potential confusion for unit
holders since their governance knowledge of one IT may not be
transferable or applicable to another.74
An important aspect of Canadian income trusts is their dual-board
structure.75 As a result of this structure, income trusts have a board of
directors as well as a board of trustees whose duty and privileges are not
necessarily the same.76 It is thus important to control for this aspect of
income trusts in Canada.
This section will analyze D & O insurance’s impact on the profitability
of unit trusts. Income trusts are presumably riskier than stock companies
from a governance point of view.77 Additionally, being insured induces
moral hazard problems.78 Therefore it should be more likely that D&O
insurance coverage will have a negative impact on performance for a unit
trust. Performance was measured in two ways. First, it was measured by
D&O insurance coverage’s impact on an accounting measure that reflects
the trust’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA). This performance measure gives investors an idea of how much
cash flow is generated by the income trust’s activities.79 Therefore, if moral
hazard is present, income trusts should have lower EBITDA growth where
managers are well protected by a D&O insurance policy. The second
74. Mark Gillen, A Comparison of Business Income Trust Governance and Corporate
Governance: Is There a Need for Legislation or Further Regulation?, 51 MCGILL L.J. 327,
378 (2006).
75. CERTIFIED GEN. ACCOUNTANTS ASS’N. OF CAN., DEMYSTIFYING INCOME TRUSTS 21
(2006). See Figure 2 infra p. 106 for an illustration of income trust corporate structure.
76. CERTIFIED GEN. ACCOUNTANTS ASS’N. OF CAN., supra note 75, at 21.
77. See Mark Gillen, A Comparison of Business Income Trust Governance and
Corporate Governance: Is There a Need for Legislation or Further Regulation?, 51
MCGILL L.J. 327, 378 (2006) (stating that investors avoided investments in business income
trusts due to unlimited liability concerns).
78. Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 84-85 (2001).
79. See, e.g., Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5 F. Supp.2d 1117, 1130 (D. Nev. 1998)
(describing EBITDA as a cash flow measure).
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performance measure is the total yield of the unit trust on the Toronto stock
market. This total yield is calculated as the annual cash received during the
year plus the unit trust price at the end of year divided by the unit trust
price at the beginning of the year (i.e., Rt =

Ct + Pt
).
Pt −1

This data set is much different from the data set used in the two
previous sections. This sample includes all 144 income observations
reported in the Canadian Financial Market Research Center database as of
December 31st 2005.80
Income trusts in Canada are classified according to four categories:
business, energy, utility and real estate (REITs).81 REITs are common and
well known in the United States.82 The Canadian income trusts market
breakdown is as follows: business trusts, fifty-five percent; utility trusts,
ten percent; REITs, fifteen percent; and energy trusts, twenty percent.83
The hypothesis is that the amount of insurance coverage should have a
negative impact on a firm's performance. To measure coverage, the log of
the D&O insurance policy limit as well as the binary variable determining
whether the firm is at all insured were used. For firms that are not insured,
the log of the policy limit variable was set to zero. These two variables
should have a negative impact on performance.
The other variables used for regression control are: firm size; cash flow
volatility; managerial compensation; board independence; and managerial
entrenchment. For size, the log of the market value of equity was used,
whereas stock price volatility in the year was used as a proxy for cash flow
volatility. Stock price volatility is calculated as the annualized daily
standard deviation of the stock returns. Both the directors’ and the trustees’
80. The final sample includes 144 observations. The initial sample included all the
relevant information for 237 income trusts whose fiscal year ended in 2005. Forty-eight
were excluded because they were created in 2005 and another eighteen because they were
created in 2004; it would have been impossible to calculate their performance. Another
twenty-seven were excluded due to incomplete accounting data.
81. Canadian income trusts breakdown into three categories: business trusts; royalty
trusts; and REITs. See CERTIFIED GEN. ACCOUNTANTS ASS’N OF CAN., supra note 75, at 6164. Royalty trusts can further be broken down into energy and utility trusts. See Trust
Units: Income Trusts, http://www.investcom.com/incometrust/whatis.htm (last visited Sep.
24, 2007).
82. See S. Titman & A. Warga, Risk and the Performance of Real Estate Investment
Trusts: A Multiple Index Approach, 14 REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS 3, (1986).
83. See M. Boyer et al., Income Trusts Governance and Performance: Time for a Postmortem, Mimeograph, HEC Montréal (2009).
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compensation are controlled. This compensation is calculated as the log of
the annual compensation of directors and trustees respectively. If the labour
market is efficient, higher paid directors and trustees should have a positive
impact on the income trust's performance. It is also important to control for
the independence of the board of director and of the board of trustees,
because independent boards are signs of good governance84 and presumed
to have positive impact on firm performance. This independence is
measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board of
directors, and as the proportion of independent trustees on the board of
trustees. Two variables were included that measure the level of
entrenchment of officers, directors and trustees. The first, contract
entrenchment, is whether managers have access to a golden parachute or
other anti-takeover measure that could reduce the managers' willingness to
invest time and effort in the firm. The second, insider power, is measured
as the sum of the voting rights of all investors holding more than 10%of the
income trust's shares as a percentage of total voting rights.
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 present the linear regression results that model
the accounting performance and the stock market performance of the
income trusts in 2005. Accounting performance is measured as the
variation in the income trust's EBITDA from 2004 to 2005, and stock
market performance is measured as the total yield of the income trust stock
in 2005.
The two tables present five regression models, depending on the
variables that are included in the regression. Model 1 is the most basic
model; it only controls for D&O insurance coverage, firm size, and stock
price volatility. Model 2 addswhether insurance is purchased to the
regression. Model 3has the highest goodness of fit of all five models;85 and
it adds managerial compensation to the regression. Model 4 adds the
independence of the two boards to model 3 while Model 5 adds the
managerial entrenchment measures to see if either plays any role in
determining the income trust’s performance. In all regression models a
dummy variable was included86 to control for the industry in which the
income trust operates.
The log of the policy limit consistently has a negative impact on the
accounting performance of the income trust through the five empirical
models as illustrated in Table 3.1. In line with this hypothesis, it appears
84. Core, supra note 22, at 460.
85. The goodness of fit was measured by the adjusted R².
86. The dummy variables are not represented in the tables.
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that the growth of cash flows is impeded by the amount of coverage for
directors. This lends strong credence to the moral hazard hypothesis
regarding D&O insurance protection since the growth of cash flows is
lower when firms purchase more coverage, even after controlling for a
multitude of other factors.
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Table 3.1 The determinants of the performance of Canadian income
trusts in 2005:
Accounting returns as calculated by the growth of the earnings before
interest, taxes depreciation and amortization
Dependent variable:
Independent
Variable

Model 1

EBITDAτ
EBITDAτ −1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.349

0.281

0.277

0.328

(0.445)

(0.442)

(0.445)

(0.434)

-0.042**

-0.060*

-0.055*

-0.055*

-0.060*

(0.015)

(0.027)

(0.028)

(0.028)

(0.029)

0.038

0.043

-0.033

-0.026

-0.003

(0.107)

(0.107)

(0.111)

(0.113)

(0.117)

Stock Price

-4.180**

-4.195**

-4.413**

-4.218**

-4.239**

Volatility

(1.127)

(1.129)

(1.118)

(1.219)

(1.227)

0.066*

0.070*

0.065*

(0.028)

(0.029)

(0.030)

-0.019

-0.015

-0.013

(0.023)

(0.027)

(0.27)

Independence

0.210

0.259

of Trustee

(0.779)

(0.790)

Independence

-0.471

-0.424

of Directors

(0.673)

(0.685)

Insured
Log (Limit)
Firm Size

Director Pay
Trustee Pay

-0.250

Insider Power

(0.603)

Contract

0.187

Entrenchment

(0.260)

2

R

0.156

0.154

0.176

0.167

0.159

The dependent variable is the one-year variation in the firm’s earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization; OLS regression with sector (business, energy, utility and real
estate income trusts) fixed effects and 144 observations. The ** (*) represents a coefficient
that is significant at the 1% (5%) level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Stock price volatility and the directors' total compensation are also
significant through the different models in explaining performance.
Volatility has a negative impact whereas director compensation has a
positive impact. This suggests that the level of risk of a firm's operation
does have an impact on its ability to generate future cash flows, perhaps
because financiers are less likely to invest resources in firms that have
riskier operations. In terms of managerial compensation, there is support
for the labour market efficiency hypothesis; the more highly paid directors
generate high cash flow growth, a signal that quality has its price.
While director compensation has a significant positive impact on
EDBITDA growth, the trustees’ compensation has no impact, or if any, it is
negative. Is trustee compensation less efficient than director compensation?
Do trustees not feel as much need to perform as directors? It is not possible
to say for sure, but there is an indication that CEOs who are less scrutinized
by investors are "really paid like bureaucrats".87 This study found no other
statistically significant variable in determining the accounting performance
of Canadian income trusts.
In terms of stock market performance, D&O insurance protection has
no impact on the total yield of income trusts in 2005; this is illustrated in
Table 3.2. The only variable that appears to have a significant impact is the
volatility of the stock price. Similar to its impact in the accounting
performance regressions, stock price volatility, which is used as a proxy for
cash flow volatility, has a negative impact on stock market performance.
No other variable seems to be able to explain the income trusts' total yield.

87. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives – It’s Not How Much
You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138. But see Brian J. Hall &
Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J.ECON. 653, 654
(1998) (arguing that CEOs are “not paid like Bureaucrats”).

2008]

INERTIA, INFORMATION AND INSIDERS

101

Table 3.2 The determinants of the performance of Canadian income trusts in 2005:
Total stock market yield (cash plus capital gain return)

Dependent variable: Rt =
Independent
Variable

Model 1

Ct + Pt
Pt −1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.014

0.023

0.025

0.026

(0.092)

(0.093)

(0.093)

(0.094)

-0.001

-0.001

-0.003

-0.003

-0.003

(0.003)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.003

0.004

-0.008

-0.006

0.016

(0.022)

(0.022)

(0.023)

(0.023)

(0.117)

Stock Price

-0.935**

-0.936**

-0.939**

-0.958**

-0.946**

Volatility

(0.231)

(0.232)

(0.234)

(0.255)

(0.254)

-0.001

-0.003

-0.003

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.004

0.004

0.004

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.006)

Independence

0.003

0.042

of Trustee

(0.163)

(0.164)

Independence

0.112

0.152

of Directors

(0.141)

(0.142)

Insured
Log (Limit)
Firm Size

Director Pay
Trustee Pay

0.002

Insider Power

(0.001)

Contract

0.017

Entrenchment

(0.054)

2

R

0.176

0.170

0.162

0.155

0.163

The dependent variable is the firm's one-year total stock market yield; OLS regression with sector (business,
energy, utility and real estate income trusts) fixed effects and 144 observations. The ** (*) represents a
coefficient that is significant at the 1% (5%) level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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An interesting conclusion to draw from this section is that, although
D&O insurance coverage has a negative impact on the growth of the
income trusts' cash flows, this impact does not appear to translate to a
lower stock market return. There are two possible explanations for this. The
first one is that there is too much noise in the stock market value. This
explanation could be valid if the results were different when using the
dividend yield rather than the total yields, but in this case they are not
significant.88 Even if the impact of D&O insurance coverage had a
significant negative impact on the dividend yield, one would be hard
pressed to imagine a reason why the impact on the capital gain yield would
be positive. Why would investors attribute a positive growth option value
to firms that have more D&O insurance coverage?
A second explanation is that using the total yield is too crude a measure
to make any inference related to the impact of D&O insurance on firm
performance. An alternative would be to use a simple capital asset pricing
model (CAPM)89 approach for 2004 to find the expected return for 2005,
and then look at how much the actual return differed from the expected
return. Another alternative would be to look at the total yield Sharpe ratio.90
But, it is doubtful that any of these alternatives would change the results
significantly.
II. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper was to: further our understanding of the
motivations for a corporation to purchase directors' and officers' liability
insurance; explore how investors could use the information; and whether
D&O insurance coverage has any impact on firm performance. D&O
insurance purchase decisions, based on the dataset of Canadian publicly
traded companies from the late 1990’s, are largely driven by managerial

88. In this case, the results were not significant and were not included in the data
tables.
89. CAPM, “holds that rational investors value stocks according only to their
expected return and nondiversifiable risk.” Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets
Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH under Conditions of Uncertainty and
Disagreement. 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 475 (1997).
90. In order to calculate the Sharpe ratio you take the return net of the risk free rate
and divide it by the standard deviation of the return. William F. Sharpe, The Sharpe Ratio,
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT, 49, 50 (Fall 1994). “The Sharpe ratio is designed to measure the
expected return per unit for a zero-investment strategy. The difference between the returns
on two investment assets represents the results of such a strategy.” Id. at 57.
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inertia; one year's decision is tributary to last year's decision.91 The
information contained in the management proxy and information circular
related to D&O insurance appears to have value for the market; a profitable
trading strategy can be devised by purchasing the common stock of large
Canadian corporations that face a low unit price of insurance92 and shorting
the common stock of large Canadian corporations that face a high unit
price. This strategy, over the arguably very short time period under study,
yields a profit of 10% on average per year. D&O insurance coverage has a
negative impact on the accounting performance of a piece of financial
Canadian, Income trust, but that the market return does not seem to be
affected. This suggests that managers are faced with moral hazard problems
because D&O insurance coverage reduces their ability to increase cash
flows in the firm. The fact that market returns do not seem to follow the
same pattern is problematic and is left open for further research.
What can be taken away from ’these three insights? The most important
conclusion is that studying D&O insurance should be of the utmost
importance for anyone interested in corporate governance. There are three
reasons for this. First, D&O insurance remains a largely unexplored
territory of academic research, not to mention professional research; few
papers have been devoted to this aspect of corporate governance.93 Some
91. See supra Part I.A.
92. That is to say they have a low premium-to-coverage ratio.
93. While there have been few articles written on D&O insurance, in the past seven
years there have been articles written on D&O insurance’s role in corporate governance
monitoring, as a measure of ex ante litigation risk, and the insurer’s role as written reporting
results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors' and officers' liability
insurance, and how liability insurer intermediary to s transmit and transform the content of
corporate and securities law., as well as articles on how D & O premiums can be used as a
measure of ex ante litigation risk, and the connection between corporate governance and
D&O insurance. See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007)
(discussing how corporate managers buy D&O coverage for self-serving reasons, and that
because the coverage itself, “does not control moral hazard, it “reduces the extent to which
shareholder litigation aligns managers' and shareholders' incentives.” ); Tom Baker & Sean
J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and
Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2007) (reporting the empirical
study results of an empirical study ofon the underwriting process of D&O insurance which
found that insurers seek to price D&O policies according to the risk posed by each
prospective insured and in assessing risk, underwriters focus on corporate governance); John
E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Prelim: An outside Assessment of the
quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2000) (reporting and
discussing confirmatory evidence that D&O premiums reflect the quality of the firm's
corporate governance); Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should
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governance questions are still left unanswered: Is D&O insurance part of
the compensation package? Is it a tool to align the manager's incentives
with those of the shareholders? Is it truly designed to protect corporate
directors or other stakeholders like the shareholders and the debtholders?
Second, there is evidence that D&O insurance conveys information to the
market about the future performance of the companies, whether the stock
market performance or the accounting performance.94 The reason D&O
insurance conveys information is that insurers, contrary to most firm
stakeholders, have a lot to lose by insuring a company at the wrong price.95
As a result we should expect insurers to invest resources in auditing the
corporate governance behaviour of the companies that seek protection
through a D&O insurance policy. This auditing is even more informative
because of the claims made and reported nature of D&O insurance; it
reflects as much past behaviour as current risk of litigation.
The most important conclusion is that shareholders should value D&O
insurance information. As a result, the information should be made public
in the United States.”96 A company's D&O insurance premium could thus
signal important information concerning the firm's governance quality to
investors and other capital market participants."97 This is supported by
hypothesis 2. D&O insurance information is a better signal than the CEO's
age, and could be construed as part of the compensation package of the
directors and officers of the corporation. Given that so much is revealed
regarding the compensation of top executives and the structure of the
board, it appears to me paradoxical that information as easy to present as
D&O insurance policy limit, deductible and premium, and so informative
as to the governance health of a firm does not find its way to the annual
reports.

Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance
Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (2006) (advocating for a change in U.S. securities
regulation to make mandatory disclosure of D&O policy details).
94. See Chalmers et al., supra note 8, at 625, 629 (discussing relationship between
D&O insurance premiums and future stock value).
95. Ronald E. Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors’ and Officers’
Liability Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 442-43 (1987).
96. See Griffith, supra note 43, at 1203-07 (discussing importance of D&O insurance
disclosure to investors).
97. Id. at 1208.
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Appendix: Corporate structures
Figure 1: Stock company corporate structure
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Figure 2: Income trust corporate structure
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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN INSURANCE
Susan Randall
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance case law is increasingly marked by judicial reliance on the
principle of freedom of contract. In recent years, courts have been inclined
to enforce insurance policies as written, with the goal of effectuating the
intentions of the parties and the result that the insurance company typically
prevails. This reflexive invocation of contract principles is not appropriate
in insurance disputes, for at least two reasons.
The first is familiar, centering on the adhesive nature of insurance
relationships. Insurance policies, like many consumer contracts, are
standardized forms, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Policyholders
have no opportunity to negotiate terms, conditions, or price and typically
do not even see the policy until after they have completed the purchase.
Insurance policies are complex and technical documents that very few
policyholders can read or understand. These ideas have been thoroughly
explored in the scholarly literature.1
The second reason to question the increasing judicial adherence to
standard contract doctrine is well-known but its relevance in this context
has not been explored. Insurance is a highly regulated industry. The laws
of every state require regulatory review and approval of insurance policies
prior to their use, and all states have some form of rate regulation. States
also regulate the format and appearance of insurance policies; impose
“readability” standards; prescribe and proscribe numerous policy
provisions; and in some contexts require an individual’s purchase of
insurance or a company’s provision of it.
This statutory and regulatory control of insurance relationships should
displace judicial reliance on contract principles. Just as an insurance
consumer’s freedom is limited to the initial choice to purchase insurance
(or to engage in an activity for which insurance is required), an insurance
1. See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts about
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). For a specific
discussion of the concept in the context of insurance, see James M. Fischer, Why Are
Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995 (1992).
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company’s freedom is limited and constrained in varying degrees,
depending on the level of statutory and regulatory control exercised in each
of the jurisdictions regulating it. The extensive regulation of insurance
policy provisions and pricing, in combination with the adhesive nature of
insurance relationships, demonstrates that freedom of contract as a public
policy consideration is largely irrelevant in the interpretation of standard
insurance policies. No “intent of the parties” undergirds the substantive
terms and provisions of the policy. There is no “bargain” to be protected;
instead, there is an agreement on terms over which the consumer has no
control and the insurance company has incomplete control. To determine
the meaning of insurance policies, courts should rely on interpretive
constructs that emphasis regulatory goals and strategies: solvency of
insurance companies, fairness to consumers, and availability of insurance.
These goals, rather than freedom of contract and protection of the parties’
intentions, constitute the important public policies at issue in interpretation
and construction.
Acknowledging the centrality of regulation and the accordingly
diminished relevance of contract doctrine in insurance policy interpretation
will make no difference in the outcome of many disputes. Like freedom of
contract, the legislative and administrative role in mandating or approving
policy language suggests that the language of policies should be enforced.
However, different starting points will often yield different results. Where
the analytical frame is contract, the judicial focus must be the parties’
intentions. The writing documents the parties’ intentions, and so the policy
comprises the “law of the bargain” and the analytical starting point. In
some views, it is also the end of the analysis.2 When judges operate in the
paradigm of contract, the fictional will of the parties–as expressed in the
policy language–prevails.
In contrast, where policies are viewed not as a bargain between parties,
but as standard documents governed by statute and requiring regulatory
approval, the analysis changes. Considerations external to the policy
become relevant, including the statutory framework and the intent of the
legislature; the power of the regulator and the nature and aims of the
approval process, as well as the role of the judiciary in reviewing
administrative actions; and broad public policy concerns, as defined by
2. Some courts refuse to consider evidence beyond the policy where the language is
plain, following Professor Williston’s approach in the first Restatement of Contracts; others
take a broader view, following Professor Corbin and the second Restatement, recognizing
that the meaning of words depends on context and permitting resort to extrinsic evidence to
assist in ascertaining intention.
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statute, regulation, and decisional law. Understanding that insurance
policies are highly regulated documents rather than freely-negotiated
contracts permits judicial interpretation that recognizes the important
public policies which justify insurance regulation. Under this analytical
paradigm, courts can protect insurance consumers’ substantive rights
regarding insurance coverage, rather than an illusory freedom of contract.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INSURANCE POLICIES
In the 1970s, contract law scholars chronicled a decline in freedom of
contract over the preceding century, notably in Grant Gilmore’s The Death
of Contract3 and P.S. Atiyah’s The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract.4
Scholars identified various factors accounting for the decline, including the
rise of standard form contracts, the growth of consumer protection law, and
the development of the concepts of adhesion and unconscionability. The
resurgence of free market principles in 1980s, spurred by the
transformation of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the
increasing prevalence of scholarship in law and economics, has caused
another shift in the law, with a judicial return to standard contract
principles.5
Insurance law parallels these larger trends. The dominant approach to
policy interpretation and construction following the decline of contract was
founded on the view that insurance policies are adhesion contracts and that
insurance consumers consequently require judicial protection. In contract
law generally, courts revised rules for adhesion contracts to account for the
consumer’s inability to negotiate terms and the corresponding risks of
consumer exploitation. Given the distinctive characteristics of insurance
agreements, where policyholders pay premiums in exchange for a promise
to indemnify in the event of specified but uncertain future events, courts
created specialized modifications of those revised rules for application to
insurance policies. The most notable manifestations of this approach have
been a strong version of contra proferentem, under which an ambiguity
automatically yields a decision for the policyholder;6 protection of
policyholders’ reasonable expectations of coverage even in the face of

3. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald Collins ed., 1995).
4. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
5. See, e.g., The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract, (F.H. Buckley, ed., 1999);
P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT (5th ed. 1995).
6. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 35-46.
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explicit policy language to the contrary;7 and recognition of breach of an
insurance policy as the tort of bad faith in order to provide a disincentive
to wrongful denial of claims or coercive settlements.8
The competing approach is standard contract doctrine, which has
regained ground in recent years. Courts are increasingly willing to treat
insurance policies as ordinary contracts,9 subject to ordinary principles of
7. The doctrine was first described in Robert Keeton’s seminal article, Insurance
Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970) (“The
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations.”). For subsequent discussions of the
doctrine, see Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations after
Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (1998), and Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 823
(1990).
8. See 14 COUCH ON INS. §204:11 (3d ed. 2006) (Absent the bad faith action, a
policyholder’s only recourse was through contract, with damages limited to amounts due
under the policy plus interest. Bad faith permits recovery beyond contract damages,
including damages for emotional or economic harm as well as punitive damages).
9. In the last year, numerous courts have articulated the view that insurance policies
are ordinary contracts, subject to ordinary principles of contract interpretation. See, e.g.,
Kessler v. Shimp, 2007 WL 506026 (N.C. App. 2007) (insurance policies must be construed
as written in order to preserve fundamental right of freedom of contract); Axis Reinsurance
Co. V. Melancon, 2007 WL 60968 (E.D. La. 2007) (principle of freedom of contract
governs risks an insurance company may exclude); Federated Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Vaugh,
2007 WL 20066 (Ala. 2007); ABT Bldg. Prod. Corp. V. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. Of
Pittsburgh, 472 F.3d 99 (4th Cir. 2006); United Services Auto Ass’n v. Riley, 2006 WL
1490160 (Md. 2006) (“Insurance contracts are treated as any other contract.”); Moscarillo v.
Professional Risk Management, 2006 WL 1501050 (Md.App. 2006)(insurance policy
construed according to contract principles to determine parties’ intentions); Vestin Mortg.,
Inc. v. First American Title Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1513232 (Utah 2006) (“An insurance policy
is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer and is construed pursuant to the
same rules applied to ordinary contracts.”); Sims v. Allstate Ins. Co. 2006 WL 1495110 (Ill.
App. 2006) (court’s primary objective in construing insurance policy is to give effect to the
parties’ intentions); McElmeel v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 2006 WL 1228911 (Ill. App.
2006) (“An insurance policy is a contract and the general rules of contract interpretation
apply.”) Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 27 (insurance policies are subject to
same principles applicable to any other species of contract; unambiguous provisions
enforced to uphold individual freedom to contract); Klemmetsen v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1409549 (D. Colo. 2006) (insurance policy interpreted according to
ordinary contract principles, with primary goal to effectuate intent of the parties); Bonin v.
Westport Ins. Corp., 2006 WL 1343439 (La. 2006) (insurance policy should be construed
using the general rules of interpretation of contracts in Civil Code; noting judicial
responsibility to determine parties’ intent); see City Fuel Corp. V. National Fire Ins. Co.,
846 N.E.2d 775 (Mass. 2006) (applying Maryland law and noting that Maryland does not
follow the rule that insurance policies are to be construed most strongly against the
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contract law, including protecting freedom of contract and effectuating the
parties’ intentions. According to one recent opinion, “the judiciary is
without authority to modify unambiguous contracts or rebalance the
contractual equities struck by the contracting parties because fundamental
principles of contract law preclude such subjective post hoc judicial
determinations of “reasonableness” as a basis upon which courts may
refuse to enforce unambiguous contractual provisions.”10 Accordingly,
judges have begun to reject the reasonable expectations doctrine and to
revise contra proferentem so that there is no longer a distinctive insurance
version of the doctrine. The trend towards limitation of bad faith actions is
another manifestation of the judicial turn away from specialized rules for
insurance policies. The next subsections demonstrate how each of these
specialized insurance principles have given way to standard contract
doctrine.
A. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has given way to firm judicial
pronouncements about enforcing unambiguous policies as written.
Numerous commentators have acknowledged this trend.11 In 1990, twenty
insurer.... instead, Maryland takes the view that insurance policies are to be construed like
other contracts in order to determine the parties’ intentions.” but if ambiguity remains after
review of extrinsic evidence, ordinarily resolution against drafter–like Mich. case next
paragraph); Chang v. Brethern Mut. Ins. Co. 2006 WL 1130872 (Md. App. 2006); Carter v.
Property Owners Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. App. 2006) (insurance contracts subject to
same rules of interpretation as other contracts). See also Tech-Built 153, Inc. v. Virginia
Sur. Co., Inc., 2006 WL 1042077 (N.H. 2006) (“where the intent of the contracting parties
can be conclusively resolved by objective extrinsic evidence...we will not ignore that
evidence in favor of dogmatic adherence to insurance maxims.”).
10. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 2005).
11. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is
Indispensable, If We Only Knew What For?, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 151 (1998) (noting that most
courts use the doctrine only when the policy is ambiguous); Roger C. Henderson, The
Formulation of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 69 (1998);
Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5
CONN. INS. L. J. 21 (1998) (discussing the relationship between the doctrine of reasonable
expectations and contract law); Susan M. Popik and Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable
Expectations after Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 425 (1998)
(concluding that problems inherent in the doctrine itself account for its failure to develop
into a coherent, principled body of law); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations
Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 107 (1998) (noting growing opposition to more aggressive
versions of reasonable expectations); Jeffrey Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue
Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of
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years after its initial explication by Judge Keeton, ten jurisdictions had
adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations.12
Today only two
jurisdictions–Alaska and Hawai’i–accept the doctrine as it was originally
formulated, by permitting policyholders’ expectations to trump clear policy
language.13 Many courts discuss and apply a doctrine which they
characterize as “the doctrine of reasonable expectations”; in reality, almost
all of these courts are conflating the construction of ambiguities against the
insurer with the doctrine of reasonable expectations. For example, the
West Virginia Supreme Court recently articulated Judge Keeton’s classic
formulation of the doctrine thus, “The doctrine of reasonable expectations
provides that the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of policy provisions would have
negated those expectations”14 but then immediately limited the doctrine to
cases of ambiguity:
‘[i]n West Virginia, the doctrine of reasonable expectations
is limited to those instances . . . in which the policy
language is ambiguous.’ This Court has explained that
‘[t]he doctrine of reasonable expectations is essentially a

Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 181 (1998) (arguing that the doctrine is underutilized due to
the focus on its pure version as opposed to use as a corollary to the ambiguity doctrine); See
also Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 295 (1998) (noting that research in consumer psychology
demonstrates that consumers do not develop expectations about coverage, undercutting the
theoretical justification for the doctrine).
12. Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 824 (1990). Jeffrey Stempel, writing in 1998,
found “approximately a half-dozen” jurisdictions adopting the “pure” version of the Keeton
doctrine. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L. J.
181 (1998). Other commentators have come up with a very different count–38
jurisdictions–but that number includes jurisdictions which use the policyholder’s reasonable
expectations to assist in resolving policy ambiguity rather than the original formulation of
the doctrine. BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE §103(b) at 21 (9th ed. 1998).
13. See Nelson v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 162 P.3d 1228,1235 (Alaska 2007);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 393 F.Supp.2d 948, 951 (D. Alaska 2005); Keneke Roofing Inc.
v. Island Ins. Co. 98 P.3d 246(Haw. 2004).
14. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 632 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.Va.
2006).
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rule of construction, and unambiguous contracts do not
require construction by the courts.15
Similarly, two early adherents of the classic doctrine of reasonable
expectations, Iowa and Arizona, have retained it in name, but substituted a
very different rule. Both jurisdictions base their version of the doctrine on
§211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Standardized Agreements,
which provides in pertinent part:
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the
party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew
that the writing contained a particular term, that term is not
part of the agreement.16
The focus of the classic insurance doctrine is the policyholder’s
expectations; the focus of the Restatement is the insurer as drafter of the
standardized agreement and the insurer’s understanding of the
policyholder’s assent.17 Comment (f), as applied to insurance, states that
the insurer’s reason to believe that the policyholder would not assent “may
be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, . . .
eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, . . . or eliminates
the dominant purpose of the transaction.”18 The doctrine of reasonable
expectations in Iowa and Arizona clearly owes much to the Restatement
formulation, specifically drawing from Comment (f). In Iowa, the doctrine
may be invoked only where an exclusion (1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2)
eviscerates terms explicitly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant
purpose of the transaction. . . Moreover, as a precondition to reliance on
this doctrine, an insured must establish that an ordinary layperson would
misunderstand the policy coverage or that there are circumstances
attributable to the insurer that led the insured to expect coverage.19
15. Id. See also Lawson v. American Gen’l Assur. Co., 455 F.Supp.2d 526 (S.D. W.
Va. 2006) (doctrine of reasonable expectations applied where policy ambiguous or insurer
fails to communicate exclusion to insured or there is a misconception about the insurance
purchased).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §211(3).
17. But see Wallace v. Balint, 761 N.E.2d 598, 606 (Ohio 2002) (equating the two
formulations).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §211(3), cmt.(f).
19. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Sand Livestock Sys., 728 N.W.2d 216, 220-21
(Iowa 2007); Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v.
Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 546, 551 (Iowa 1999).
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Arizona cases utilize similar language.20 Under this formulation, other
contract doctrines–ambiguity, unconscionability, fraud, and estoppel–do
the work. The doctrine of reasonable expectations as formulated by Judge
Keeton plays no role.
Minnesota utilizes a similar approach, with its courts holding that
“[t]he doctrine is generally applied when an insurance policy has been
misrepresented or misunderstood, or when a legal technicality would defeat
the insured’s objectively reasonable expectations.”21 Courts in New
Hampshire use the term “reasonable expectations” in cases involving
estoppel based on an agent’s representations which are contrary to the
policy language,22 while Indiana courts enforce unambiguous clauses in
accord with the insured’s reasonable expectations where policies provide
“only illusory coverage.”23 Each of these formulations impose significant
restrictions which rob the doctrine of reasonable expectations of its
essential character.24
Another measure of the doctrine’s waning importance is its explicit
rejection by the great majority of jurisdictions. In these jurisdictions, there
is no doctrine of reasonable expectations; the policyholder’s reasonable
expectations function only to limit the reach of the principle of resolving
ambiguities against the insurer. Twenty-seven jurisdictions fall into this
category.25 Some of these jurisdictions continue to refer to the “reasonable
20. See, e.g. Morgan v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV 06-1136-PHX-JAT, slip
op. at 2(D. Ariz. 2007). The Arizona Supreme Court specifically adopted the rationale of
Comment (f) in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters, 682 P.2d 388, 405
(Ariz. 1984).
21. Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
22. See, e.g.,Trefethen v. N.H. Ins. Group, 645 A.2d 72, 75 (N.H. 1994)
23. McGuire v. Century Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
24. See, e.g.,Bituminous Cas. Corp. V. Sand Livestock Sys., 728 N.W.2d 216, 22021(Iowa 2007); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 2005);
Amco Ins. Co. v. Estate of Wehde, No. 05-0503, 2006 WL 650234, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App.
2006). Arizona imposes similar limitations. See, e.g., Gordiner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
742 P.2d 277, 283-84 (Ariz. 1987) (policyholder’s reasonable expectations overcome policy
language only where policy is ambiguous; policyholder has inadequate notice of unusual or
unexpected terms; or insurer creates an objective or subjective impression of coverage);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Grabowski, 150 P.3d 275, 281 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
25. See Merino v. Allstate Indem. Co., 231 Fed.Appx. 682, 683 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Under California law, the reasonable expectations doctrine applies only if the policy is
ambiguous or if a term is a limitation on coverage not brought to the insured’s attention.”);
Terra Nova Ins., Ltd. v. Fort Bridger Historical Rendezvous Site Corp., 151 Fed.Appx. 678,
681 (10th Cir. 2005) (indicating that Wyoming courts would apply doctrine of reasonable
expectations to ambiguous policy); Kolb v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 355 F.3d 1132, 1136
(8th Cir. 2004) (applying Arkansas law); Avemo Ins. Co. v. Auburn Flying Serv., Inc., 242
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F.3d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Under Nebraska law, we would only consider reasonable
expectations if the contract language was first found to be ambiguous.”); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 270 F.3d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“District of Columbia law
forbids application of the reasonable expectations doctrine to alter an otherwise clear policy
provision.”); Park-Ohio Indus., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 975 F.2d 1215, 1223 (6th Cir.
1992) (Ohio has rejected the reasonable expectation doctrine); Nelson v. Becton, 929 F.2d
1287, 1291 (8th Cir. 1991) (Eighth Circuit expressly refused to incorporate doctrine of
reasonable expectations as part of federal common law); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Gamble, No. 055189, 2007 WL 1657107, at *4 (D. N.J. June 5, 2007); Dougherty v. Farmers New Century
Ins. Co., No. 3:CV 06-98, 2007 WL 1074756, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007) (reasonable
expectations doctrine does not apply unless policy ambiguous; insurer makes unilateral
change to policy without notifying insured; or insured requests one type of coverage and
receives another); S. Land and Golf Co. Ltd. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:03-2189DCN, 2006 WL 2443340, at *3 (D. S.C. Aug. 22, 2006); Peck v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,
363 F.Supp.2d 137, 145 (D. Conn. 2005); Miller v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 376
F.Supp.2d 1238, 1245 (D. N.M. 2005); Sigmund v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 374 F.Supp.2d
33, 36 (D. D.C. 2005); 40 Gardenville, L.L.C. v. Travelers, 387 F.Supp.2d 205, 212 (W.D.
N.Y. 2005); Giddens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 356 F.Supp.2d 1313,
1325 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (reasonable expectations doctrine cannot be used to avoid otherwise
unambiguous limitation in policy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Giddens v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 445 F.3d 1286, 1301 (11th Cir. 2006); Federated Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Abston Petroleum, Inc., No. 1051589, 2007 WL 1098564, at *9 (Ala. Apr. 13, 2007);
Safeway Ins. Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Herrera, 912 So.2d 1140, 1145 (Ala. 2005) (“[T]his Court
limited the doctrine of ‘reasonable expectations’ to ambiguous provisions of an insurance
policy.”]; TIG Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Homestore, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 4th 749, 755-56 (2006)
(“Where the policy is clear and unequivocal, the only thing the insured may ‘reasonably
expect’ is the coverage afforded by the plain language of the mutually agreed-upon terms.”);
Hodgson v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 124 Cal. App. 4th 1358, 1361 n.2 (2004) (“It has never
been the rule that a court could ignore the clear and explicit terms of insurance policy under
the guise of protecting the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Hallowell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925, 928 (Del. 1982) (“[W]e hold that the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is applicable in Delaware to a policy of insurance only if the terms
thereof are ambiguous or conflicting, or if thepolicy contains a hidden trap or pitfall, or if
the fine print purports to take away what is written in large print.”); Deni Assoc. of Fla.,
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. 1998) (“We decline to
adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations. . . . To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous
provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the premiums are
charged.”); Sapp v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 486 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ga. App. 1997); Ryals
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 803, 805 (Idaho 2000) (“We decline the invitation
[to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations]. We have previously rejected the
reasonable expectations doctrine in favor of traditional rules of contract construction.”); El
Rincon Supportive Servs. Org., Inc. v. First Nonprofit Mut. Ins. Co., 803 N.E.2d 532, 540
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“The ‘reasonable expectations’ doctrine is not recognized in Illinois.”);
Conseco, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 49D130202CP000348, 2002
WL 31961447, at *13 (Ind. Cir. Dec. 31, 2002) (reasonable expectations doctrine has no
application unless policy ambiguous or illusory); Rhynerson v. Hardy, No. 95282, 2006 WL
1976781, at *6 (Kan. App. July 14, 2006) (“In Kansas, the doctrine of reasonable
expectations only applies when a contract is ambiguous.”); A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Mass.

116

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

Insurers Insolvency Fund, 838 N.E.2d 1237, 1250 (Mass. 2005); Wilkie v. Auto-Owners
Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 782 (Mich. 2003) (“[T]he rule of reasonable expectations . . . is
invalid as an approach to contract interpretation.”); Harvey v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 258695,
2006 WL 707789, at *2 (Mich. App. Mar. 21, 2006) (“‘[T]he rule of reasonable
expectations has no application in Michigan, and those cases that recognized this doctrine’
have been overruled.”); Reinsurance Ass’n of Minn. v. Johannessen, 516 N.W.2d 562, 566
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“The doctrine should not be applied where a prominent policy term
excludes coverage and the evidence does not indicated the insured was misled.”); Farmers
Ins. Exch. v. Young, 832 P.2d 376, 379 n.3 (Nev. 1992) (discussing other jurisdictions’ use
of reasonable expectations doctrine and stating “We have not gone that far”; using
expectations of parties only where the policy is ambiguous); N.H. Banfield v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 880 A.2d 373, 379 (N.H. 2005); Morrison v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Am., 887 A.2d 166,
169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Argent v. Brady, 901 A.2d 419, 424 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2006) (“Only where the language is ambiguous does the doctrine of reasonable
expectations come into play, permitting a construction that favors such expectations of an
insured.”); Rehders v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 P.3d 237, 246 (N.M. App. 2006) (“The doctrine
of reasonable expectations may be invoked when the language of an insurance policy or
representations of the insurance company lead an insured to reasonably expect coverage. . .
The doctrine is also available where policy language is ambiguous.”); Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Lagodinski, 683 N.W.2d 903, 911-12 (N.D. 2004) (“This Court has expressly
declined to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations.”); Sterling Merch. Co. v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ohio App. 1986) (“[T]he reasonable expectation doctrine
requires a court to rewrite an insurance contract which does not meet popular expectations.
Such rewriting is done regardless of the bargain entered into by the parties to the contract.
Such judicial activism has not been adopted in Ohio by its courts.”); Max True Plastering
Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 870 (Okl. 1996) (“Oklahoma law mandates that
we join the majority of jurisdictions which have considered application of the doctrine and
apply it to cases in which policy language is ambiguous and to situations where, although
clear, the policy contains exclusions masked by technical or obscure language or hidden
exclusions.”); BP Am., Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 832, 839 (Okl.
2005); Morgan v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 400 P.2d 223, 225 (Or. 1965); Donegal Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Baumhammers, 893 A.2d 797, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (insured may not complain
that reasonable expectations frustrated where policy limitations are clear and unambiguous);
JEP Mgmt., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 4170, 2006 WL 2372961, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 8,
2006) (“The reasonable expectations doctrine does not apply to unambiguous policy
language. The Supreme court has identified only two applications for the doctrine of
reasonable expectations: protecting non-commercial insured from policy terms which are
not readily apparent; and protecting non-commercial insured from deception by insurance
agents.”); Ex Parte: United States Auto. Ass’n, 614 S.E.2d 652, 654 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(“The doctrine of reasonable expectations, which is essentially that the objectively
reasonable expectations of insurde as to coverage will be honored even though a careful
review of the terms of the policy would have shown otherwise, has been rejected in South
Carolina.”); Culhane v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 704 N.W.2d 287, 292 (S.D. 2005) ("[T]his
Court has repeatedly declined to adopt [the reasonable expectations] doctrine;” “The
doctrine of reasonable expectations simply does not apply to policy language [where it is
unambiguous].”); Vandeventer v. All Am. Life & Cas. Co., 101 S.W.3d 703, 710 n.8 (Tex.
App. 2003) (“Texas law does not recognize the ‘Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations’ of
the insured as a ba sis to disregard unambiguous policy provisions.”); Smith v. Rio Grand
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expectations doctrine”; but it is clear from the language and facts of the
cases that it is not the doctrine explicated by Judge Keeton. Other
jurisdictions, while not explicitly rejecting the doctrine, define it such that
it is limited to situations where the policy is ambiguous.26 A number of
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 227 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex. App. 1950); Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1992) (court rejects doctrine of reasonable expectations;
citing cases which “show our unwillingness to alter fundamentally the terms of insurance
policies in the absence of legislative direction” and “consequent uneasiness of a majority of
this court with the notion of a reasonable expectations doctrine.”); Findlay v. United Pac.
Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 116, 121 (Wash. 1996) (“The ‘reasonable expectation’ doctrine has never
been adopted in Washington.”); Rowland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 512 P.2d 1129,
1131 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); O’Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 76 P.3d 308,
315 (Wyo. 2003) (rules of construction such as doctrine of reasonable expectations
inapplicable where contract terms are clear and unambiguous); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Wyo. 1988) (doctrine of
reasonable expectations does not apply where policy is unambiguous); See, e.g., Walter H.
Crosky, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in California: A Judge’s View, 5 CONN.
INS. L.J. 451, 457 (1998) (use of objectively reasonable expectations of insured to resolve
ambiguities).
26. See Hoang v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149 P.3d 798, 802 (Colo. 2007) (invoking
the reasonable expectations doctrine but measuring the insured’s expectations against those
of a careful reader of the policy); Brown v. Ind. Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528, 540 (Ky. 2005)
(“Th[e] principle [of reasonable expectations] pertains to alleged ambiguities within the
policy. The gist of the doctrine is that the insured is entitled to all the coverage he may
reasonably expect to be provided under the policy. Only an unequivocally conspicuous,
plain and clear manifestation of the company’s intention to exclude coverage will defeat that
expectation.”); In Re St. Louis Encephalitis Outbreak in Ouachita Parish, 939 So.2d 563,
568 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“Ambiguity will be resolved by ascertaining how a reasonable
insurance policy purchaser would construe the clause at the time the insurance contract was
entered. The court should construe the policy ‘to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the
parties in the light of the customs and usages of the industry.’ In insurance parlance, this is
labeled the reasonable expectations doctrine.”); Wellcome v. Home Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 190,
194 (Mont. 1993) (“Expectations which are contrary to a clear exclusion from coverage are
not ‘objectively reasonable.’”). See also Hamilton v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 465
F.Supp.2d 1060, 1067 (D. Mont. 2006) (“‘[T]he reasonable expectations doctrine is
inapplicable where . . . the terms of the insurance policy clearly demonstrate an intent to
exclude coverage’ because expectations that are contrary to a clear exclusion are not
objectively reasonable.”); Aguigar v. Generali Assicurazioi Ins. Co., 715 N.E.2d 1046,
1048-49 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (“Massachusetts cases have smiled upon, even if not yet
wholly embraced, the process of analyzing a provision of an insurance contract in light of
the reasonable expectation of the insurance buyer.” But note that “When reasonable
expectations analysis comes into play, it is more likely to do so when the task is to interpret
an ambiguous provision rather than an unambiguous one.”); Kertz v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co, No. ED 88839, 2007 WL 1976787, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. July 10, 2007) (“The
doctrine of reasonable expectations guarantees that the ‘objectively reasonable expectations
of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
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jurisdictions, have neither explicitly rejected or adopted the doctrine,27
while in others there is no dispositive discussion of the issue.28 In short, the
devolution of the doctrine of reasonable expectations exemplifies the
increasing judicial reliance on standard contract in insurance cases.
B. BAD FAITH ACTIONS
Another measure of the courts’ reversion to standard contract
principles in insurance cases is the increasingly common classification of
the action for bad faith as a contract action.
While the cause of action, in both third-party and first-party cases,
originally sounded in tort,29 many courts now classify the action as
contract-based.30 A significant number of recent decisions state that
contract rather than tort provides the theoretical basis for bad faith breach
in first-party31 as well as third-party32 actions.
expectations.’ However, the ‘doctrine or reasonable expectations is not in strict accordance
with traditional principles of contract interpretation.’ Therefore, ‘application of the objective
reasonable expectation doctrine . . . depends on the presence of an ambiguity in the policy
language.’”); Alea London Ltd. v. Bono-Soltysiak Enters., 16 S.W.3d 403, 415 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006) (“The ‘objective reasonable expectations of adherents and beneficiaries to
insurance contracts will be honored even though a thorough study of policy provisions
would have negated these expectations.’ However, the reasonable expectations rule cannot
be used to construe unambiguous policy terms.”).
27. See Todd v. Dow Chem. Co., 760 F.2d 192, 196 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e regard the
doctrine of reasonable expectations, as applied in this context, with some skepticism. The
effect of such a theory is to place a gloss over the doctrine of estoppel, which would allow
recovery without showing prejudice or detrimental reliance. We find no clear support for
such a theory in the caselaw of Arkansas.”), Chandler v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 833
F.Supp. 735, 738 n. 8 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (questioning whether doctrine of reasonable
expectations applied in Arkansas); Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Wash., D.C. v. Kline & Son
Cement Repair, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 779, 798 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“Virginia has never
explicitly adopted the ‘reasonable expectations’ doctrine.”).
28. Maine, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
29. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967) (permitting an
award of damages for mental suffering where insurer breached duty to settle).
30. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW Law §25G, (3rd ed.
2002). The classification may be inconsequential in some instances, since contract remedies,
flexibly applied, can afford full compensation in many cases. For example, in the thirdparty context, contract damages would cover foreseeable consequences of an insurer’s
unjustified refusal to defend its policyholder, including the entry of a judgment in excess of
policy limits. Id.
31. See, e.g., Coleman Dupont Homsey v.Vigilant Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp.2d 433, 437
(D. Del. 2007); HHC Assoc. v. Assur. Co. of America, 256 F.Supp.2d 505, 508 (E.D. Va.
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Consistent with a contract-based approach, a number of courts have
limited the first-party action to situations in which there is actually
coverage under the policy, even where the claim depends on the insurer’s
failure to conduct a timely investigation of the claim.33 This limitation
presumably derives from the view of the action as one sounding in contract
rather than tort: even if the insurer’s conduct is negligent, reckless,
intentional, or even malicious, there is no basis for complaint if there is no
coverage and correspondingly no breach of contract. The view extends in
some cases to third-party actions. The California Supreme Court found
2003); Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993); Bhattacharyya v. Quincy Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 799 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 2004); Zenor v. Standard Ins. Co.,
No. Civ. 01-1226-FR, 2002 WL 31466503, at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2002). See also Kakule v.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. Civ. A.06-4995, 2007 WL 1810667, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(predicting that Pennsylvania courts would extend rationale of third-party cases, holding
action sounded in contract, to first-party cases); University Medical Assoc. v.
Unumprovident Corp., 335 F.Supp.2d 702, 711-12 (S.C. 2004) (recognizing that the first
party action for bad faith sounds in tort, but limiting damages to contract damages);
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 798 n.8 (Utah 1991). Contra Gov't
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 176 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1033 (D. Haw. 2001); Stephens v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of America, 852 P.2d 565, 567 (Mont. 1993); Wathor v. Mut. Assurance. Adm’rs,
Inc., 87 P.3d 559, 564 n.1 (Okla. 2004) (action sounds in tort, notwithstanding that it also
constitutes breach of contract).
32. See, e.g., New England Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 352
F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2003); Hartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir.
2001); Ross v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-0811-CV-W-FJG, 2007 WL
1774443, at *3 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 2007) (bad faith action for breach of duty to defend
sounds in contract, while action for breach of duty to settle sounds in tort); Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. v. CTIA, 480 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D. D.C. Jan. 5, 2007); Naumes, Inc. v. Chubb
Custom Ins. Co., Civil No. 05-1327, 2007 WL 54782, at *6 (D. Or. 2007); Geo M. Martin
Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, Civil No. 04-2725 (PJS/JJG), 2006 WL 3804379 at, *4
(D. Minn. 2006); Essex Builders Group, Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1302,
1305 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Anderson v. Va. Sur. Co., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 182, 185 (D. Me.
1998); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 839 So.2d 614, 616 (Ala.
2002); Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 880 A.2d 106, 119 (Conn. 2005); Aves v.
Shah, 906 P.2d 642, 648 (Kan. 1995); Birth Center v. St. Paul Co. Inc., 787 A.2d 376, 391
(Pa. 2001) (Nigro, J., dissenting). Contra, Microsoft Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. C01-1815C,
2003 WL 24330081, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb 13, 2003); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol,
176 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1033 n.35 (D. Haw. 2001); Daugherty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 55 P.3d
224, 226 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Canal Indemn. Co. v. Greene, 593 S.E.2d 41, 46 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003); Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 1082, 1092 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999).
33 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 317 (Ala. 1999); Waller v.
Truck Ins. Exch., Inc. 900 P.2d 619, 639 (Cal. 1995); Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 45 P.3d 829, 834 (Idaho 2002) (plaintiff in bad faith case must establish coverage
even if claim based on unreasonable delay); Richardson v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 984 P.2d
917, 923 (Or. App. 1999).
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that there was no action for bad faith breach of the duty to defend in a
third-party case where there was no potential for coverage under the policy:
it is clear that if there is no potential for coverage, and hence, no duty to
defend under the terms of the policy, there can be no action for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the covenant is
based on the contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer.34
C. CONSTRUING AMBIGUITIES AGAINST THE INSURER
Even the hardiest of the specialized insurance rules, the ambiguity
doctrine, has shifted, with courts moving away from automatic construction
in favor of the policyholder to reliance on standard contract rules.35 The
normal analytic sequence in contract interpretation requires the court first
to assess the clarity of the contract language. If the language is clear, it is
enforced;36 if it is ambiguous, the fact-finder determines the parties’
intentions37 through the review of extrinsic or parol evidence.38 If the
ambiguity remains, the contract is construed against the drafter.39 Contra
proferentem is thus a rule of last resort, applicable only after other means
of determining the parties’ intent have failed. The insurance version of the
rule differs radically. Once the court finds an ambiguity, the interpretation
favoring the policyholder prevails, without reference to the parties’ intent
and without examination of extrinsic evidence.40 Thus, in the context of
34. Waller v. Truck Ins. Exch., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 639 (Cal. 1995).
35. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1107-1108 (2006); Scott G. Johnson, Resolving
Ambiguities in Insurance Policy Language: The Contra Proferentem Doctrine and Use of
Extrinsic Evidence, 33 WTR. BRIEF 33, 34 (2004); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of
Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 537 (1997); David S. Miller,
Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1849, 1850-1859 (1988), for discussions of the doctrine.
36. See generally 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS §32.3 (4th ed. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §201 cmt.
(a), §202 (2005).
37. See generally 11 WILLISTON, supra note 36, §32:2.
38. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§202-03 (2005); UCC §1205(4) (2000); 11 WILLISTON, supra note 36, §49:19; 5-24 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§24.9,
24.10 (2007). Such evidence includes circumstances existing at the formation of the
contract, the parties’ purposes, the parties’ course of performance or course of dealing, and
trade usages.
39. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, §206; CORBIN, supra note 38, §24.27
(2007); WILLISTON, supra note 38, §32:12 (4th ed. 2006).
40. See, e.g., Daburlos v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Am., 521 F.2d 18, 26 (3d Cir. 1975)
(applying Pennsylvania law, noting that courts may receive extrinsic evidence where
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insurance, contra proferentem is applied as a primary rule of construction
In recent years,
without resort to ordinary interpretive rules.41
commentators have advocated for adherence to usual contract rules,42 and
courts have increasingly applied those rules.43 A striking example comes
contract ambiguous, but distinguishing insurance contracts. “However, if the contract is an
insurance contract, the ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer. There is no need in
an insurance case to take that extrinsic evidence.”). Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 649 F.
Supp. 1460, 1466 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (no reliance on extrinsic evidence in interpreting
insurance policy because Pennsylvania law provides clear rule of construction requiring
resolution of ambiguities against insurer); Beale v. Am. Nat’l Lawyers Ins. Reciprocal, 843
A.2d 78, 87-88 (Md. Ct. App. 2004) (distinguishing majority rule, strict construction against
insurance company, with Maryland rule construing against drafter only if no extrinsic or
parol evidence available or such evidence does not resolve ambiguity); Cheney v. Bell Nat.
Life Ins. Co. 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. Ct. App. 1989) (distinguishing majority strict
construction rule against insurance company with Maryland rule construing against drafter
only if no extrinsic or parol evidence available or such evidence does not resolve
ambiguity); Andres v. Am. Std. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 134 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Or. App. 2006)
(comparing judicial task in contract interpretation, which requires resolution of contract
ambiguity through resort to extrinsic evidence to determine parties’ intent, and interpretation
of insurance policies, which involves examination of policy for ambiguity and resolution
against insurer). Although they appear to apply the strict insurance law version of contra
proferentem, many courts have not explicitly discussed the differences between standard
contract interpretation and insurance law in the interpretation and construction of policies.
Many cases acknowledge the distinction between contract and insurance versions of contra
proferentem. See SI Mgt. L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 37,43 (Del. 1998) (where standard
form contract ambiguous, rule of construction against drafter is determinative). See also
ALLAN WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES, §603 (3d ed. 1995) (under strict rule,
“once an ambiguity is discovered, courts may not look first to extrinsic evidence in order to
eliminate the ambiguity; they may, instead, automatically resolve the ambiguity against the
insurer.”).
41. Andres, 134 P.3d. at 1063. The application of either approach will yield the same
result in many instances, since there may be minimal or no extrinsic evidence bearing on the
resolution of the ambiguity. Because insurance contracts consist of industry-drafted and
statutorily-mandated provisions, they are not typically subject to the sort of negotiation
which produces useful extrinsic evidence. However, the difference in the approaches may be
dispositive in other situations, such as cases involving an agent’s representations.
42. See generally WINDT, supra note 40, §603 (noting that automatic resolution of
ambiguity against insurer results in the creation of policy coverage contrary to parties’
intent and arguing that rule should be abandoned in favor of ordinary rule); Johnson, supra
note 35, at 33 (arguing that presumption of coverage arising from ambiguity no longer
universally followed); 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON
INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES at 9-11(13th ed. 2006) (doctrine of ambiguities should only
be applied "as a last resort," and should not arise "unless it is first demonstrated that: (a) the
policy is ambiguous; and (b) the ambiguity may not be resolved by resort to extrinsic
evidence of intent").
43. See, e.g., St. Paul Travelers Cos., Inc. v. Corn Island Shipyard, Inc., 495 F.3d 376,
383 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying New York law); Willing v. Cmty. Ass’n Underwriters of Am.,
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from a recent decision by a divided Michigan Supreme Court.44 The
majority of the Court held that ordinary contract rules governed an
insurance dispute, such that contra proferentem applies only if the parties’
intent cannot be discerned through use of conventional rules of
interpretation, including examination of relevant extrinsic evidence. The
dissenters disagreed, arguing that contra proferentem in the insurance
context is a primary rule of construction, not a rule of last resort, and that
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to clarify ambiguity in the contract.45
The dissenters stated: “[T]his Court has consistently applied the rule of
construing against the drafter as its primary, indeed sole, aid to
construction.”46
III.

FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

The principle of freedom of contract rests variously on respect for
individual rights and autonomy or on the instrumentalist view that
individual choice furthers an efficient market, maximizing individual and
social utility. Freedom of contract entails at least three related conceptions
of freedom.47 The first is a positive conception involving the liberty of
Inc., No. C06-1357RSL, 2007 WL 1991038, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 5, 2007); Pierce
Assoc., Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury, 437 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20-21 (D. D.C. 2006) (applying New
York law and finding summary judgment improper where policy language ambiguous and
extrinsic evidence available); Sloan v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 2d
1037, 1048 (D. N.D. 2006) (if ERISA plan deemed ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be
considered; “any ambiguities should be construed against drafter only as a last step.”);
McNeilab, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 645 F. Supp. 525, 544 (D. N.J. 1986) (calling
Daburlos, supra note 40, into question); Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pa. Lumbermens Mut.
Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 297, 306, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (rejecting Daburlos, supra note 40,
where ambiguity arises because no meeting of minds); State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Ark. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. 06-1480, 2007 WL 1707358 (Ark. June 14, 2007); Collier
v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, Inc., 607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. Ct. App 1992); Bird v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 343, 347 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007). See generally 2 COUCH
ON INS. §22:22 (3rd ed. 2006).
44. Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 447, 456 (Mich. 2003).
45. Id. at 460.
46. Id. at 485.
47. Several books and articles treat the conceptual underpinnings of freedom of
contract; all of these inform the discussion here. P.S. ATIYAH, ET AL, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-3 (1979); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF
CONTRACT 78-79 (1993); THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F. H. Buckley,
ed.,1999); Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise and Fall”, 79 B.U.
L. Rev. 263, 282-85 (1999); Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and Second
Restatement, 78 Yale L.J. 598, 616 (1969).
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individuals to make their own choices. In contract, this is the freedom to
identify a possible exchange, to bargain for terms, and to enter an
agreement based on mutual assent. The second is a negative conception,
consisting of freedom from governmental constraints or interference while
engaging in these acts. Finally, freedom of contract entails the ability of
individuals to access the power of government to enforce their agreements.
In each of these aspects, freedom of contract has always embodied
fictions.48 The idea of freedom to assent, for example, is undercut by the
use of an objective test relying on conduct rather than actual intent,49 by the
increasingly common use of standard form contracts (like insurance
policies) to which there is often no meaningful agreement,50 and by social
and economic conditions which may constrain an individual’s autonomous
choice. Similarly, although freedom from government interference may
have been the norm at some point in the 19th century, the steady
encroachment of legislative restrictions has circumscribed that freedom as
well.51 And courts have always had the means of avoiding strict
enforcement of the terms of a contract through equity.52
In the context of insurance, there is even greater reason to question the
notion of freedom of contract as a first principle. An examination of
insurance transactions demonstrates that there is limited freedom involved.
The next two sections focus on freedom of contract as protection of the
ability to make individual choices and as involving the absence of
government interference. The first demonstrates that policyholders (with
the possible exception of some large commercial policyholders) have little
or no bargaining power and exercise no meaningful choice about policy
terms; the second demonstrates that insurance companies are subject to
extensive regulation of policy terms, conditions, and rates by state
legislatures and regulatory bodies.
48. See P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT, 9-13 (5th ed.
1995).
49. See REST. 2D CONTRACTS, §2 Comment b, 16 (2d ed 2005) (the phrase
“manifestation of intention” adopts an external or objective standard for interpreting
conduct; distinguished from undisclosed intention).
50. See REST. 2D CONTRACTS, §211 Standardized Agreements, Comment b (2d ed
2005) (noting that consumers who agree to standard forms do not read or understand the
terms, instead trusting in the good faith of the drafter and accepting the tacit representation
that like terms are routinely accepted by others similarly situated).
51. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 532-63 (2d ed.
1985).
52. See P.S. ATIYAH, supra note 47, 404-05 (noting that even in the classical period,
English judges utilized equity and other methods to accomplish substantive justice).
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Together, these sections demonstrate that the routine judicial invocation of
the principle of freedom of contract in insurance cases is a fundamental
error.
A.

FREEDOM OF CONTRACT FROM THE POLICYHOLDER’S
PERSPECTIVE: STANDARD FORMS AND ADHESION

Insurance policies are typically standard forms. Standardization is
critical because the insurance industry pools claims data to predict future
losses and price policies accordingly; accuracy in this important endeavor
requires that insurance companies offer uniform coverage.53 Property and
casualty insurers rely on the Insurance Services Office (ISO), which
collects information from property/casualty companies and makes the
resulting database available to help companies in pricing insurance. The
ISO also offers widely-used standard commercial and personal policies
(including automobile insurance, various types of property insurance,
workers compensation insurance, and liability policies of various types).54
Standardization of insurance policies is crucial to the collection of actuarial
data, but it also functions, as do all types of standardized contracts, to
reduce costs.
From the consumer’s perspective, standardization means that the
insurance industry controls the content of the policy and that there is no
negotiation over terms. Insurance policies are thus adhesion contracts,55
standard forms drafted by the insurer, offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
with the prospective policyholder at a complete disadvantage in terms of
bargaining power. As one noted author observes, insurance policies are
53. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 31-36
(4th ed. 2005).
54. See generally Insurance Serv. Office, http://www.iso.com (last visited Nov. 2,
2007. Life and health insurance are not generally written on standard forms, primarily
because data regarding the insured events (particularly mortality) is more reliable and
available. However, there is a great deal of uniformity in these types of policies as well,
partly due to statutory requirements. See infra text accompanying notes.
55. In fact, insurance policies were the first type of contract to which the term
“adhesion contract” was applied. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 295, 312 (2d ed.
1990). For general discussions of adhesion contracts, see Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion–Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 641-45
(1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1284 (1983). For a specific discussion of the concept in the context of
insurance, see James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation?: Text versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1001-02 (1992).
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actually “super-adhesion” contracts, since, in some lines of insurance, all
insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-orleave-it basis.56 The consumer’s only freely-made choice is the choice to
purchase insurance.
Insurance policies also satisfy another basic characteristic associated
with adhesion contracts, specifically disparity of information.57 Insurance
companies have far greater information and expertise than do
policyholders; insurance consumers, even sophisticated consumers, find it
extraordinarily difficult to penetrate the language of insurance policy
forms.58 Most policyholders do not attempt to read their policies.59
Even the decision to obtain insurance is not a freely-made choice in
many instances. State legislatures require the purchase of insurance in
some instances, most notably automobile insurance. Forty-seven states and
the District of Columbia require automobile liability insurance covering
bodily injury and property damage in specified amounts.60 Some also
require uninsured motorists insurance and personal injury protection.61
Once the consumer chooses to engage in the activity of owning and driving
an automobile, insurance is required. Workers’ compensation insurance is
another form of required insurance.62

56. Abraham, supra note 35 at 534.
57. But see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177, 1180 (1983) (an influential study which does not include this
aspect in its seven-factor definition of adhesion contract. Rakoff recognizes that lack of
consumer understanding is a “normal concomitant” of the use of form contracts but argues
that it is not an essential feature).
58. See id. at 1179-80 (this characteristic is part of the popular conception of adhesion
contracts but is not, according to some commentators, essential).
59. Even second and third year law students, who might be expected to be more
careful than the average consumer, and more capable of reading and understanding complex
contracts, typically admit that they have never read their automobile, health, or property
insurance policies.
60. WEST 50 STATE SURVEYS, INSURANCE – MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE, FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND REQUIRED MINIMUMS
(West
2006);
See
generally
http://www.iii.org/individuals/auto/stateautolaws/.
61. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 708, 721 (David
Shapiro ed. The Foundation Press 1995); See also ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 996-98 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2002); See generally WEST 50 STATE
SURVEYS, INSURANCE – UNINSURED/ UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (West 2006); See
generally ALAN WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE 22,36
(Anderson Publishing 2d ed. 1985).
62. COUCH ON INS. §§ 1:36, 133:2, 133:4; 133:6 (Thomson/West 3d ed. 2005).
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FREEDOM OF CONTRACT FROM THE INSURER’S
PERSPECTIVE: REGULATION OF POLICY FORMS,
RATES, AND OTHER MATTERS

State insurance codes are extensive. The codes prohibit certain
provisions and make others mandatory, and authorize insurance
commissioners to exercise significant control over insurance policy forms,
rates, and other matters. Freedom of contract is thus significantly limited
for companies as well for policyholders. These limitations obviously do
not preclude invocation of the principle of freedom of contract in policy
interpretation. However, the scope and extent of regulatory control over
the content of insurance policies strongly suggests that freedom of contract
is not an appropriate analytical starting point.
1. Rate Regulation
All states authorize rate regulation in some form, charging insurance
commissioners with ensuring that insurance rates are not excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.63 Statutes prescribe various
methods by which commissioners exercise this responsibility. The most
common approach is monitoring rates through rate filings and approval,
either prior approval, under which the commissioner must approve rates
before they may be used, or file and use, under which rates become
effective when filed but may be disapproved by the commissioner within a
specified period.64
A number of states have deregulated rates. Even those states, however,
afford insurance commissioners significant residual authority by requiring
insurance commissioners to monitor competition and to regulate rates in its
absence. The NAIC Model Rating Law, for example, provides, like all rate
regulation statutes, that “rates shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory” but also specifies that a rate in a competitive market is
63. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 375-1 CREDITORPLACED INSURANCE ACT (2007); 430-1 HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION MODEL ACT
(2007); 626-1 FINANCIAL GUARANTY INSURANCE MODEL ACT (2007); 710-1 MASS
MARKETING OF PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE MODEL REGULATION (2006); 775-1
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY MODEL RATING LAW (FILE AND USE VERSION) (2007); 780-1
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY MODEL RATING LAW (PRIOR APPROVAL VERSION) (this is the
language used by various NAIC Model Acts and it appears in most state codes).
64. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS at 780-1; See generally WEST 50 STATE STATUTORY
SURVEYS, FILING REQUIREMENTS–RATES AND RATING PLANS, supra note 60.
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deemed not excessive, and creates a presumption that the insurance market
is competitive.65 The commissioner may, after hearings, rule that the
market is not competitive and regulate rates for excessiveness in the
ordinary way. Such ruling expires no later than one year after issue. In a
competitive market, rates must be filed but are effective unless the
commissioner finds after a hearing that the insurer’s financial condition
requires rate supervision or that rating practices are unfairly
discriminatory.66 In a noncompetitive market, rates become effective only
after the commissioner has an opportunity to review and disapprove rates if
they do not meet the requirements of the Act, typically within 15 to 90
days.67 A number of states have adopted provisions similar to those in the
NAIC Model.68 Some states include provisions directing the insurance
commissioner to assess the reasonableness of the coverage or benefits in
relation to the premium charged, for all policies69 or for specific types of
insurance, usually health insurance.70
2. Policy Forms
The laws of every state require regulatory review and approval of
insurance policies prior to their use.71 Statutes typically provide that
65. NAIC MODEL LAWS, at 775-5 § 4 (there are no presumptions under the Model
Law relating to the commissioner’s assessment of adequacy and unfair discrimination); Id.
§§ 5A.(2) 5A.(3) 6.D (a number of states have adopted provisions similar to those in the
NAIC Model).
66. Id. at § 6C.
67. Id. at § 6D.
68. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-67-208 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a686, 688 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2604 (1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 287.960
(West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-16-1021 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 412:15
(LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-17-6; OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 36 § 985(West
2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4685; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-14-103 (2007).
69. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.130 (LexisNexis 2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-114 (LexisNexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-95 (2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-9
(LexisNexis 2006).
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-110 (2004); CAL. INS. CODE § 779.9; 18 (West 2005);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2713 (1999); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/155.57 (West 1993);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-130 (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §48.18.110 (West
1999).
71. See WEST 50 STATE SURVEYS, supra note 60 (West ed. 2006); See also NAIC
MODEL LAWS, supra note 63 (2007) (providing a listing of the states and references to filing
requirements and approvals). Because of significant variations in state insurance codes and
administrative regulations, generalizations are difficult. Some states impose a generallyapplicable requirement of approval; others vary depending on the type of insurance.
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regulators must disapprove a policy form that violates the insurance code;
has titles or headings which are misleading; or is substantially illegible.72
A number of state statutes further require disapproval of a policy form
where it contains inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clauses, or
exceptions and conditions that deceptively affect the risk purportedly
assumed.73 Others mandate disapproval of any policy that contains
provisions which are unjust, unfair, or inequitable, or contrary to public
policy.74
States also regulate the format and appearance of insurance policies,
typically specifying the size of the type and requiring a table of contents or
index.
The statutes also require spacing and formatting to aid
comprehension.75 Many states impose “readability” standards.76 Some of
72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-9 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.130 (2006); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1111 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-110 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 2713 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 624.4412 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2002);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1813 (2007); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.57 (2007); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.14-130 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:621 (2007); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24A, § 2413 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2236 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §
33-1-502 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.130 (2005); N.M. STAT. § 59A-18-14 (2006);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3911.01.1 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3611 (2007);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-21 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3542 (2006); VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-316 (2007); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 811 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE §
48.18.110 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-9 (2007); WIS. STAT. § 631.20 (2006); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 26-15-111 (2007). Most but not all of these statutes contain each of these three
provisions. Other states (as well as some of those cited) have similar provisions applicable
only to specific lines of insurance.
73. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.130 (2006); CAL. INS. CODE § 779.9 (West
2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2713 (2006); FLA.STAT. ANN. § 627.411 (West 2007); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1813(2) (2007); 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/155.57 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-130(1)(b) (West 2006); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:621(3) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2413(1)(B) (2006); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 500.2236 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-502 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §
687B.130(2) (2005); N.M. STAT. § 59A-18-14(A)(2) (2006); OKL. STAT. tit. 36 §
3611(A)(2) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11-21(2) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §
3542(2) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-316 (2007); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 811(3) (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.110(1)(c) (2007); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-9(b) (2007); WIS. STAT. §
631.20 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-111(B) (2007). Other states (as well as some of
those cited) have similar types of provisions applicable only to specific lines of insurance.
74. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-9 (2006); CAL. INS. CODE § 779.9 (West 2007); FLA.
STAT. § 624.4412 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-10 (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1813
(2007); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.57 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-95 (2007); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.01.1 (LexisNexis 2007).
75. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-206(a) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-297
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 627.4145 (2007) (requiring use of titles and headings in bold,
prohibiting “unnecessarily long, complicated, or obscure words, sentences, paragraphs, or
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these readability statutes require calculations involving syllable, word, and
sentence counts, often specifying a particular maximum score on the Flesch
Readability test (typically between 40-50; passages with scores of 90-100
are easily understandable by average 5th graders and passages with scores
of 0-30 can be best understood by college graduates.77).
3. Mandated Content
States control the content of insurance policies in significant and
substantial ways. Many jurisdictions mandate the inclusion of various
constructions”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 120-2-42-.04 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-104
(2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2441 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §
2B (West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 72C.05(2) (2007); MINN. STAT. § 72C.01-.13 (2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33-15-325 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-3405 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. §
687B.126 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-H:5 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:17-21
(West 2007); N.M. STAT. § 59A-19-4 (2006); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3102 (2007); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-38-20 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-30 (2007) (life insurance); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-14 (2007) (accident and health insurance); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3902.04 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3645 (2007) (life, accident and health
insurance); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.106 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-61-30 (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11A-6 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1605 (2006) (life and health
insurance); TX. CODE ANN. § 1201.101 (2007) (accident and health insurance); WIS. STAT. §
631.22 (2006). See generally John A. Glenn, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
Statutes Relating to Style or Prominence with which Provisions must be Printed in
Insurance Policy, 36 A.L.R.3d 464 (1971).
76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1110.01 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-61115(b)(5) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-297 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2740
(2006) (automobile insurance); D.C. CODE § 31-4725 (life insurance); FLA. STAT. §§
626.9641(1)(f), 627.4145 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-3-25 (2002); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
120-2-42-.04(g) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10-104 (2006); IND. CODE § 27-1-26-5
(2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-440l (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §
2441 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 2B (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2236(3)
(2007); MINN. STAT. § 72C.09-10 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-325 (2006); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-3405 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.126 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
420-H:5 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:17-21 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. § 59A-19-4 (2006);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3102 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-38-25 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.133-30 (2007) (life insurance); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-14 (2007) (accident and health
insurance); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3645
(2007) (life, accident, and health insurance); Or. Rev. Stat. § 743.106 (2005); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 38-61-30 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11A-3 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 567-1605 (2006) (life and health insurance); TX. CODE ANN. § 1201.101 (2007); WIS. STAT. §
631.22 (2006). See generally, Insurance Policies and Premiums: Readability of Insurance
Policies, West’s 50 State Regulatory Surveys (2007).
77. This article has a Flesch readability score of approximately 18.5, as determined by
Microsoft Word.
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types of provisions in insurance policies. Some of these requirements are
substantive, mandating various types of coverages or specific provisions;
others deal with procedural issues, for example, by limiting an insurer’s
power to cancel the policy. There are a vast number of such requirements
in every jurisdiction.
One of the best-known examples is the 1943 New York Standard Fire
Insurance Policy,78 which is used pursuant to statute in nearly every state
(and is incorporated into standard homeowner’s policies).79 These statutes
specify the form of the policy and the language which must be used. They
require loss payment provisions; provisions relating to fraud and
concealment by the policyholder; exclusions for certain types of property
(for example, bills, currency, deeds, and money) and specified perils
(including enemy attack, invasion, insurrection, civil war, neglect of the
insured to use reasonable means to preserve property at and after loss, and
theft); various conditions; cancellation provisions; a standard mortgage
clause; other insurance provisions; notice and claim provisions; and
valuation provisions, among others.80
All states have some form of compulsory automobile liability
insurance.81 The statutes require policy limits in at least a specified
minimum amount,82 and typically mandate other provisions as well, such as
notice and cancellation provisions.83 Many states require omnibus
coverage, that is, coverage for permissive users of the insured vehicle.84
Uninsured motorists coverage is required in most states,85 and various
provisions are statutorily-mandated, including a basic coverage
agreement;86 policyholder’s right to reject the coverage;87 limitations on
stacking;88 permitted exclusions;89 and subrogation rights.90
78. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 2007).
79. See 1-2 APPLEMAN ON INS. § 2.2.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
82. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-4 (2002).
83. See, e.g., Id. at § 33-34-3(e).
84. 12 COUCH ON INS. §170:5; 8 COUCH ON INS. § 111:23.
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §40-284(a).
87. See, e.g., Id. §40-284(c).
88. See, e.g., id. §40-284(d).
89. See, e.g., id. §40-284(e). These include exclusions where the insured is occupying
or struck by an uninsured auto or trailer owned by or provided to the insured for regular use
or owned by a self-insurer or government entity; where there is no physical contact and no
reliable evidence of the facts of the accident from a disinterested witness; to the extent that
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Many states mandate various types of provisions in disability insurance
policies, including format and readability requirements;91 entire contract
provisions;92 time limits on certain defenses;93 grace periods;94
reinstatement;95 notice of claim;96 claim forms;97 proofs of loss;98 time of
payment of claims;99 payment of claims;100 physical examination and
autopsy;101 legal actions;102 and change of beneficiary.103 The statutes also
include many optional provisions; if the policy includes provisions dealing
with these issues, it must use the statutory language or a substitute
approved by the commissioner of insurance.104 Even the order of
provisions is dictated.105
Many states have statutes requiring that life insurance policies provide
that the policy is incontestable after a certain number of years, typically one
workers’ compensation or personal injury protection benefits apply; or when suit is filed
against the uninsured motorist without notice to the insurer.
90. See, e.g., id. §40-284(f).
91. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-2 (1998); MONT. STAT. §33-15-337 (1979).
92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-4 (1998).
93. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-5 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1342.02 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3408 (2001).
94. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-6 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1347 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3410 (2001).
95. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-7 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1348 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3411 (2001).
96. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-8 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1349 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3412 (2001).
97. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-9 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1350 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3413 (2001).
98. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-10 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1351 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3414 (2001).
99. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-11 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1352 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3416 (2001).
100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-12 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §20-1353 (2002);
MICH. CONS. LAW. ANN. 500.3418 (2001).
101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-13; ARK. REV. STAT. §20-1354; MICH. CONS. LAW.
ANN. 500.3420.
102. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-14; ARK. REV. STAT. §20-1355; MICH. CONS. LAW.
ANN. 500.3422.
103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-15; ARK. REV. STAT. §20-1356; MICH. CONS. LAW.
ANN. 500.3424.
104. These provisions deal with change of occupation, misstatement of age, other
insurance with the insurer or other insurers, relations of earnings to insurance, unpaid
premiums, conformity with state statutes, illegal occupation, and intoxicants and narcotics.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§27-19-16-26.
105. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-19-27.
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or two, except for nonpayment of premiums.106 Other statutorily-mandated
provisions concern suicide. Some states require coverage for suicide which
occurs after a certain number of years, typically one or two,107 or prohibit
exclusions for suicide unless the suicide is proven to have been
contemplated at the time of the application for the policy.108
There are vast numbers of mandated health insurance provisions and
coverages. Some of these are clearly in the public interest, requiring
minimum standard benefits for individual or group health plans.109 Others
require specific designated benefits.
Some are common to many
jurisdictions. Examples include coverage for newborn and adopted
children,110 immunizations for dependent children,111 mental health
treatments,112 and treatment of various forms of substance abuse.113 Others
106. See,e.g.,ARIZ.REV.STAT.§20-1204;
CAL.INS.
CODE
§10113.5;
COL.REV.STAT.§10-7-102(B); 18 DEL.C.§2908; D.C.ST.§31-4703; WEST’S F.S.A. §627.455;
GA.CODE ANN. §33-25-3; WEST’S ID. CODE §41-1905; IL.COMP.STAT.ANN. §5/224; IOWA
CODE ANN. §508.28; LA.STAT.ANN. 22:170; MD. CODE §16-203; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
175 § 132; MICH.COMP. LAWS ANN. 500.4014; MINN.STAT.ANN. §61A.03; MONT. CODE
ANN. §33-20-105; NEB.REV.STAT. §44-502; N.H.REV.STAT. §408:10; N.J.S.A. 17B:25-4;
N.M.S.A. §59A-20-5; MCKINNEY’S N.Y.LAW §3203; N.C.GEN.STAT.ANN. §58-51-15; N.D.
CODE 26.1-33-05; OHIO REV.CODE §3917.06; 36 OKLA.ST.ANN. §4004; O.R.S. §743.168;
S.C. CODE §38-63-220; S.D. CODE §58-15-10; V.TEX.C.A. §884.354; VA.CODE ANN. §38.23107; REV.CODE WASH. 48.23.050. See generally 5 COUCH ON INS. §76; see generally 16
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §49:92 (4th ed.) (noting how unusual such restrictions are in
contracts generally).
107. See, e.g. ALA. CODE §27-15-24(a)(2)(e).
108. See, e.g., MO. ST. §376.620.
109. CONN.GEN.STAT. ANN. §38A-553; MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. 176M §2; CAL. ANN.
CODE §1357.08 (for Small Employer Group plans); MO. ST. §376.426. The mandated
minimum benefits are extensive and fairly detailed, including coverage for catastrophic
illness with lifetime maximum benefits, including hospitalization; physician care; diagnosis
and treatment of mental conditions; prescription drugs; nursing facility care; home health
services; use of radium or other radioactive materials; oxygen; chemotherapy; anesthetics;
prosthesis to replace anatomic structure lost during treatment for head and neck tumors;
diagnostic xrays and lab tests; certain oral surgeries; physical therapy; ambulance transport;
rehabilitation for alcoholism. Other provisions limit preexisting condition exclusions or
require grace periods and provisions relating to incontestability, misstatement of age, notice
of claim and proof of loss, timing of payments, limitation periods, and cancellation limits
and requirements.
110. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES, 155-1 NEWBORN AND
ADOPTED CHILDREN COVERAGE MODEL ACT; NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.043.
111. LA. REV. STAT. §22:215.14; MO. STAT. §376.1215; N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-2234.3.
112. MO. STAT. §376.1550. S.C.ST. §38-71-290; NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.0455
113. NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.046 (including inpatient and outpatient treatment);
CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. §38A-533 (medical complications of alcoholism); MO. STAT.
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are idiosyncratic, presumably resulting from the efforts of strong provider
lobbies or from consumer interest groups centered on particular health care
needs. Some of the more unique mandated coverages include costs of low
protein food products for treatment of inherited metabolic diseases;114
hearing aids for minor children;115 required drugs and devices for
contraception;116 scalp hair prostheses for hair loss resulting from alopecia
areata or alopecia totalis for persons aged eighteen or younger;117 diabetes
self-management training;118 chiropractic care;119 treatments relating to
hemophilia,120 smoking cessation,121 Wilm’s tumor,122 attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder,123 diabetes,124 osteoporosis,125 cancer,126 and
temporomandibular joint disease;127 screening and testing for alphafetoprotein IV,128 cytologic129 and human papillomavirus,130 colorectal
cancer,131 cancer,132 breast cancer,133 human leukocyte antigen,134 and
§376.779 (same); N.J.ST. 17:48-6a (alcoholism); MO.STAT. §376.811 (chemical dependency
treatment).
114. LA. REV. STAT. §22:215.22; MO. STAT. §376.1219; NEV. REV. STAT.
689A.0423; N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-41.1.
115. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.25 (2007).
116. NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0415 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0417 (2005);
N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-42 (2006).
117. MO. ANN. STAT. §376.1222 (2007).
118. ARK. CODE ANN. §23-79-602 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.21 (B)
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §689A.0427(b) (2005).
119. MO. ANN. STAT. §376.1230 (2007).
120. N.J.STAT. ANN. §17:48:6d (2007).
121. N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-44 (2006).
122. N.J.STAT. ANN. §17:48:6f (2007).
123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.15 (2007).
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.21(A) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §689A.0427(a)
(2005); N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-41 (2006).
125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22:215.16 (2007).
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:48:6k (2007) (dose-intensive chemotherapy, autologous
bone marrow transplants and peripheral blood stem cell transplants).
127. NEV. REV. STAT. 689A.0465 (2005).
128. N.M.STAT.ANN. §59A-22-45 (2006).
129. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.52; N.M.STAT.ANN. § 59A-22-40.
130. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-40.
131. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-1202; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.12; NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 689A.04042.
132. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1250.
133. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.782; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.0405; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:48-6g; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-39; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.215.11; OHIO
REV. STAT. § 3923.52.
134. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1275.
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lead;135 routine gynecological care;136 maternity transport;137 and care and
treatment of loss or impairment of speech or hearing.138 These mandated
benefits are so pervasive and so costly that a number of state legislatures
have enacted legislation requiring various impact assessments before such
proposals are considered.139
Other statutes mandate procedural protections, for example, requiring
immediate emergency services140 or prohibiting prior authorization for
emergency services,141 ensuring a right to a second medical opinion,142
requiring payment of expenses for qualified interpreter for hearing
impaired in connection with medical treatment or consultation,143 and
creating procedures for obtaining non-formulary drugs where the
formulary’s equivalent has been ineffective or is reasonably expected to
cause adverse or harmful reactions in the patient.144
There are also procedural restrictions applicable generally to multiple
lines of insurance, such as notice requirements;145 contractual limitation
periods;146 designations of governing law;147 requirements that the
application must be attached to policy if the insurer raises any defense to

135. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.1290; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6m.
136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.17.
137. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-35.
138. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376-781.
139. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.215; HAW. REV. STAT. § 23-51; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-2248; KY. REV. STAT. § 6.948; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:603.1; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24A, § 2752; MD. CODE ANN., [insurance] § 15-1501; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
3, § 38C; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J.26; MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-93; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
17B:27D-1 et seq.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-03-28. These statutes require that the state
auditor or other state official or persons or organizations seeking mandated coverage submit
to a state health care administration and to appropriate legislative committees an assessment
of social and financial impacts of the proposed mandatory coverage, including consideration
of factors such as the portion of the population needing the treatment, the availability of
coverage, public demand for the treatment and for coverage and the interest of collective
bargaining agents; affect on direct and indirect insurance costs and total health care costs.
140. GA.CODE ANN. § 33-21-18.1(1).
141. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1846.
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.51.
143. LA. STAT. ANN. § 22.215.10.
144. GA.CODE ANN. § 33-21-18.1(1998).
145. 13 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 190:10 (3d ed. 2005).
146. 16 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 235:10 (3d ed. 2005).
147. 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 24:3 (3d ed. 2005 &
Supp. 2007).
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coverage in the application;148 free look provisions;149 entire contract
provisions, providing that policy, including endorsements and attached
papers, if any, constitute the entire contract of insurance;150 limitations on
an insurer’s ability to cancel;151 and required grace periods.152
IV.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AND
INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE POLICIES

The implications of this extensive regulation of insurance policies for
interpretation of the policies have not been fully explored. Courts often
approach the task of interpretation of insurance provisions without
acknowledgment of the legislative and administrative role in the drafting
and approval of insurance policies. It might be argued that such
acknowledgment is unnecessary: both freedom of contract and recognition
of the regulatory involvement in insurance counsel enforcement of the
policy language. But the principle of freedom of contract looks to the
parties’ intent and proposes to protect and enforce that intent.
Acknowledgment of legislative and administrative involvement through
mandated provisions and policy approvals shifts the interpretative focus
from effectuating the parties’ intent to effectuating regulatory goals.
Protecting the parties’ bargain is a relatively straightforward and static
task, requiring judicial interpretation and enforcement of contract language.
The task of interpreting and enforcing regulator-approved policy provisions
148. See 3 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE § 15.1 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2007).
149. Such provisions require that the policyholder, typically with respect to life
insurance, Medicare supplement insurance, and long-term care insurance, has a specified
time to examine and cancel the policy following delivery. See WESTLAW 50 STATE
STATUTORY SURVEYS, INSURANCE POLICIES & PREMIUMS, FREE LOOK PROVISIONS (Sept.
2006).
150. MODEL LAWS REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES VOL. II, UNIF. INDIVIDUAL
ACCIDENT & SICKNESS POLICY PROVISION LAW § 3 at 180-2 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs
2007); MODEL LAWS REGUALTIONS & GUIDELINES VOL. III, GROUP LIFE INS. DEFINITIONS &
GROUP LIFE INS. STANDARD PROVISIONS MODEL ACT § 5 at 565-6 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 2007).
151. 2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INS. § 30:13 (3d ed. 2005); 3
JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’S APPLEMAN ON INS. § 16.10 (2d ed.
1998 & Supp. 2007); See WEST 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS, CANCELLATION &
NONRENEWAL–PERMITTED & PROHIBITED REASONS (September 2006); 17 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:130 (4th ed.
2000 & Supp. 2007).
152. See generally 16 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 49:80 (4th ed. 2000).
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is by contrast much more complex and dynamic, involving questions about
the scope of judicial and administrative authority and the deference, if any,
owed by the judiciary to the administrative regulator. The shape of the
analysis in a particular case will depend on the structure and provisions of
individual state insurance codes, administrative procedure acts, and
regulations, as well as the particulars of the department’s review and
approval process. This section will sketch out some preliminary answers to
these questions, and the last section will provide an example of this
interpretive regime. The basic point is clear: freedom of contract is not an
appropriate analytical starting point for interpretation of insurance policies.
Instead, a recognition of the regulatory regimes surrounding insurance
should inform judicial functioning in insurance cases.
It is clear that where policy provisions are mandated by statute or
regulation, concerns about freedom of contract are irrelevant. Courts must
interpret such provisions using principles of statutory construction and
enforce them with the goal of effectuating the legislature’s or regulator’s
intent. If a policy lacks a mandated term, courts must read the term into the
policy.153
By contrast, the case law dealing with the impact of administrative
approval of policy forms is sparse. The most common issue arises when
the Insurance Department approves a policy in violation of a statute.154 In
these cases, the courts typically afford no deference to the regulator:155
statutory interpretation is a judicial function and the courts are not bound to
accept an administrative interpretation.156 Some cases hold that where the
153. See, e.g., 4 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’S
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 22.1, §22.2 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2007).
154. Such violation may arise because the policy lacks a statutorily-mandated
provision or because a provision fails to conform to statutory requirements. See cases cited
infra note 156.
155. There are exceptions. See, e.g., State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. Louis
Supermarket #3, Inc., No. 4:04CV1358 TCM, 2006 WL 27292 at *6-*8 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 5,
2006).
156. See, e.g., Peachtree Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Sharpton, 768 So.2d 368, 373 (Ala.
2000) (stating that the fact that Insurance Department approved policy language did not
preclude judicial invalidation of that language as contrary to statute); Lindahl v. Howe, 345
N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1984) (noting that Commissioner’s approval does not divest courts
of the duty to give statute its ultimate authoritative interpretation); Mich. Chiropractic
Council v. Comm’r of Fin. & Ins. Serv., 685 N.W.2d 428, 439 (Mich.App. 2004) (stating
that the agency’s decision to approve policy was inconsistent with statutory no-fault rules
and thus reversible by court); Cruz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 614 N.W.2d 689, 694
(Mich. App. 2000) (noting that approval of an insurance form by the Commissioner of
Insurance is not conclusive proof that it complies with statute; instead, approval is “only
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Insurance Department approves provisions contrary to statute, it exceeds its
authority and its action is invalid.157
Apart from the cases involving statutory violations, most courts have
not addressed the effect of regulatory approval on judicial interpretation
and construction of insurance policies. Courts generally interpret and
construe insurance policies without acknowledgment that insurance
regulators approved the language, often with a resulting focus on the intent
of the parties and the public policy of protecting freedom of contract.
The few decisions considering the impact of regulatory approval on the
judicial role have reached varying conclusions.158 Not surprisingly,
somewhat persuasive” that form complies with statute); Watson v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 692 (Minn. 1997); Volquardson v. Hartford Ins. Co., 647 N.W.2d
599, 612 (Neb. 2002) (noting that the Director of Insurance had no authority to approve
policy form which did not provide minimum coverage afforded by statute); Spulak v. Tower
Ins. Co., Inc., 601 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Neb. 1999) (finding that an exclusion for criminal acts
by insured or others reduced coverage required by statute and therefore, Director’s approval
exceeded his authority); Rider Ins. Co. v. First Trenton Cos., 808 A.2d 143, 148 (N.J. Super.
2002); McMillan v. Allstate Indem. Co., 84 P.3d 65, 70 (N.M. 2003); Johnson v. Lincoln
Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ohio App. 1990); Fleming v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 996 P.2d 501, 504 (Or. 2000) (noting that approval by Insurance Commissioner is
not assurance that approved language is consistent with statute); Brader v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 411 A.2d 516, 517 (Pa. Super. 1979) (finding that if provision approved by
Commissioner is contrary to law, approval is also invalid since such approval exceeds
power granted to Commissioner); Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 562 N.W.2d 888, 892
(S.D. 1997); Fleming v. Yi, 982 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. App. 1998)(stating that insurance
commissioner’s approval is a factor to be considered, but not conclusive).
157. See cases cited supra note 156.
158. The decisions range from no deference to complete deference, as the text
demonstrates. This variation in the level of judicial deference to regulatory authority is
reflected in contexts other than insurance regulation. Compare McKenzie Check Advance
of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So.2d 1204, 1215 (Fla. 2006) (holding that a court must defer to
an agency interpretation as long as the interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent
and is supported by substantial, competent evidence) with Bd. of Educ. of Town of Hamden
v. State Bd. of Educ., 898 A.2d 170, 175 (Conn. 2006) (“When a state agency’s
determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny. . . the
agency is not entitled to special deference. . . .[I]t is for the courts, and not administrative
agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law.”) The Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, 1961, 1981, and the 2005 Draft, §C5-109, contemplates
broad judicial review, permitting judicial action where state agency action exceeds the
authority or violates limits imposed by federal or state constitution, statute, common law,
and any other source of law binding on the agency, fails to follow prescribed procedure, is
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. This scope of review provision is
substantially similar to the scope of review provisions of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §706. But note APA does not apply to suit for damages where the
agency does not have authority to determine the claim.
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however, when a court acknowledges the regulatory context, it typically
affords some level of deference to the regulator, indicating that contract is
not an appropriate analytical frame. A few courts have ruled that
regulatory approval binds the court, precluding judicial consideration of the
reasonableness of policy provisions.159 In these jurisdictions, regulatory
approval functions like the principle of freedom of contract, precluding
judicial analysis and resulting in the enforcement of policy language. This
result is an inappropriate abdication of the judiciary’s role in reviewing
contract language and adjudicating disputes. The legislative requirement of
regulatory approval is not a divestiture of ordinary judicial functions to
interpret insurance policies and adjudicate insurance disputes.160 The
reality is that the approval process is pro forma in many instances; file and
use is a common regulatory mechanism.161 The importance of the
requirement of regulatory approval is not that it eliminates or minimizes
judicial power, but rather that it focuses judicial efforts away from the
interpretive paradigm of contract.

159. See, e.g., Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Mich. 2005)
(“Reasonableness of insurance contracts is a matter for the executive, not judicial, branch of
government....[T]he lower courts were not free to invade the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner and determine de novo whether Continental’s policy was reasonable.”);
AMEX Assurance Co. v. Caripides, 179 F.Supp.2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
theInsurance Department’s review and approval of a policy is presumptively valid and
cannot be challenged as unfair or violative of public policy); McGraw v. Farm Bureau
General Ins. Co., 731 N.W.2d 805, 808 Mich. Ct. App. 2007). See also Wright v. Kelleher,
21 Mass. L. Rptr. 686 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006) (questioning policyholder’s public policy
argument given approval of the policy language by the Commissioner of Insurance); Allen
v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1992) (rejecting the
reasonable expectations doctrine as undercutting executive approval of insurance policies).
An interesting and, to my knowledge, unique variation of this approach appears in a
decision of the
Supreme Court, where the court ruled that because the Commissioner was
required to approve auto policies, the court would not resolve ambiguities in favor of the
insured. Gilbert v. Hanover Ins. Co., 624 N.E.2d 621 (Mass App. Ct.1993). Occasionally
the legislature specifically answers this question. See Firestone v. Acuson Corp. Long Term
Disability Plan, 326 F.Supp.2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2004)(holding that California statute
enumerating requirements for disability policies provided that commissioner’s approval
created conclusive presumption, as between the insured and the insurer, that the policy
conformed to the statute, Cal. Ins. Code 10291.5(k)).
160. The statutes discussed infra at text accompanying notes 162-171support this
conclusion. See also Rory v. Continental Ins., 703 N.W.2d 23, 50 (Mich. 2005), (Kelly, J.,
dissenting).
161. See WESTLAW 50 STATE STATUTORY SUREVEYS, INSURANCE, AGENTS,
BROKERS, AND PROCEDURES, POLICIES AND APPLICATIONS (September 2006).
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Other courts have found specifically that regulatory approval is not
binding on the judiciary. Under this view, judges owe varying levels of
deference to the insurance regulator’s approval.162 Courts have ruled
variously that the insurance regulator’s approval is entitled to no
deference;163 “some consideration”;164 “great respect”;165 “great weight”;166
or simply, “deference”.167 The better-reasoned view, as outlined above, is
that the filing and approval of a policy by the Insurance Commissioner
does not constitute the type of administrative regulation which justifies
judicial deference to the decision of the administrative agency.168
162. See generally 1 COUCH ON INS. §2:8.
163. Maska U.S., Inc. v. Kansa Gen. Ins., 198 F.3d 74, 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1999)
(indicating that public policy as expressed in statute or common law directive may warrant
invalidation of approved insurance policy provision); Schneider v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of
America, 149 F.Supp.2d 169, note 4 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Reichardt v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America, 485 F.Supp. 56, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Parkway Ins. Co. v. N.J. Neck & Back, 748
A.2d 1221, 1222 (N.J.Super. Ct. Ap. Div. 1998) (holding that the Commissioner’s authority
is absolute so long as the rules and regulations are consistent with the statutes and public
policy); Seligman v. Tucker, 347 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. 1973) (administrative approval of a
policy by the Superintendent of Insurance cannot defeat public policy of the state of New
York). See also S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. v. Banko, 2006 WL 2935281 (M.D. Fla. 2006)
(noting that plaintiff could cite no case indicating that regulatory approval of an insurance
policy form bars suits over policy language).
164. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Barnard, 156 S.E.2d 148 (1967).
165. Am. Nat. Ins. v. Ingle, 129 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
166. Lee v. John Deere Ins., 802 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ill. 2003) (holding that the
approval of a limitation period by an Insurance Department is not conclusive on courts, but
is entitled to great weight against contention that such a provision is against public policy);
Kirk v. Fin. Sec. Life Ins., 389 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ill. 1978) (holding that the approval of a 90
day limitations period by the Commissioner is entitled to great weight against contention
that the provision is against public policy); Kukoleck v. Minnesota Life Ins. Co., 2005 WL
3447623 (N.D.W.Va. 2005) (holding that the where West Virginia Code explicitly required
the commissioner of insurance to disapprove policies not in the public interest, the
commissioner’s approval is strong evidence that exclusionary language not contrary to
public policy); Am. Home Assurancev. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1328 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
that an Insurance Department’s approval of “Sexual Misconduct” provision is not
conclusive but is entitled to great weight against challenge on public policy grounds).
167. Azar v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 68 P.3d 909, 930 (N.M.App. 2003) (holding
that where statute and regulations do not directly address the issue of modal premium
charges, courts may make an independent determination that is unconstrained by the prior
administrative approval of such a policy).
168. Generette v. Donegal Mut. Ins.., 884 A.2d 266, 280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005);
Allwein v. Donegal Mut. Ins., 671 A.2d 744, 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting Alan I.
Widiss, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE §32.3); Lindahl v. Howe,
245 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1984) (“Assuming the policy was approved . . . we have no
reason to treat acquiescence in the form of the policy as an adjudication by the
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In jurisdictions affording some deference, the level of that deference
may depend on the nature and extent of the approval process. For example,
regulatory approval of a policy form without explicitly passing on the issue
of the form’s compliance with a statutory requirement is entitled to little
weight.169 The level of deference may also take account of the scope of
the regulator’s power and obligations. For example, some state statutes
require disapproval of a policy form where it contains “an inconsistent,
ambiguous, or misleading clause, or exception and condition that
deceptively affects the risk purported to be assumed in the general coverage
of the contract.”170 It is the function of the courts to interpret and apply
legislative requirements.
Where contract is the analytical frame, courts focus on the intent of the
parties and the value of freedom of contract, and enforcement of the plain
language of an insurance policy is inescapable. Where courts focus instead
the nature of insurance as invested with public policy, through legislative
and executive controls, even clear policy language need not be enforced if
it conflicts with regulatory goals.
In addition to the case law, state statutes provide ample ground for a
court to examine, interpret, and even to disregard, policy language
approved by insurance regulators. Many state insurance codes include
specific provisions relevant to the issue of the effect of regulatory approval.
Some codes provide that the insurance commissioner “shall” or “must”
disapprove a policy form if it contains or incorporates by reference any
inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clause, or exceptions and conditions
which deceptively affects the risk purported to be assumed in the general
coverage of the contract.171
commissioner of the validity of the exclusion. Such acquiescence could not in any event
divest the courts of their duty to give the statute it ultimate authoritative interpretation.”),
overruled by Miller v. Westfield Ins., 606 N.W.2d 301 (Iowa 2000).
169. Burke v. First UNUM Life Ins., 975 F.Supp. 310, 316 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(holding that correspondence between Insurance Department and insurer reflected no
consideration of whether the language of the policy’s incontestability clause conformed to
statutory requirements); Durant v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 20 A.d.2d 242, 247249, (N.Y. App. 1964) (holding that the lack of an express as opposed to implicit approval
of policy form was relevant in determining the weight to be given to Superintendent’s view
of conformity to statutory requirements).
170. See infra text accompanying note 171.
171. See, e.g., ALASKA. ST. §21.42.130 (2007); DEL.CODE ANN, tit 18, §2713
(1999); FLA.STAT. §627.411 (2005); GA.CODE ANN. §33-24-10 (1998); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§41-1813(2) (2004); KY.REV.STAT.ANN.§304.14-130(1)(b) (2006); LA.REV.STAT.ANN.
§22:621(3) (2004); ME.REV.STAT.ANN. 24-A §2413(1)(B) (2006); MONT. CODE ANN. §331-502 (2006); NEV.REV.STAT.§687B.130(2) (2003); N.M LAWS.§59A-18-14 (1978);
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Similar statutes require disapproval of a form if it contains provisions
which are unfair, inequitable, or contrary to the state’s public policy.172
These statutes do not specify who makes the determination of ambiguity or
unfairness or whose determination prevails.173 The normal exercise of
judicial power permits a court to determine that policy provisions are
ambiguous, deceptive, unfair, or contrary to public policy within the
meaning of the statute and to construe the provisions to avoid statutory
violations occasioned by an insurance regulator’s approval, accomplishing
the legislative objective of protecting insurance consumers. There are
almost no cases addressing the construction and application of these
statutes. However, at least one case recognized that their goal is to protect
policyholders by permitting courts to extend appropriate coverage where
the commissioner approved a policy in contravention of the statute’s
requirements.174 A few similar statutes explicitly assign the determination
to the insurance regulator, apparently leaving no room for substantive
judicial evaluation.175
OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 36 §3611(A)(2) (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §58-11-21(2) (2004); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit.§3542(2) (2001); V.A.CODE ANN. 38.2-316(1950); WASH.REV.CODE
§48.18.110(1)(c) (1999); W.VA.CODE §33-6-9(b) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §26-15-111(B)
(2007). One statute appears to contemplate both judicial review of the commissioner’s
action, with respect to ambiguous or deceptive clauses, and unreviewable exercise of the
commissioner’s discretion, with respect to rates. Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. §26-15111(a)(i) (“The commissioner . . . shall disapprove any form . . . if the form contains . . . any
inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading clauses, or exceptions and conditions which
deceptively affect the risk”) with (a)(ii)(“The commissioner . . . shall disapprove any form if
he finds that the benefits provided in the policy are unreasonable in relation to the premiums
charged, or the rates or classification are excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.”).
172. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-14-9(54) (1974) (form contains provisions which are
“unfair, or inequitable or contrary to the public policy of this state or which would, because
such provisions are unclear or deceptively worded, encourage misrepresentation”); GA.
CODE ANN. §33-24-10(5) (1960) (form contains “provisions which are unfair or inequitable
or contrary to the public policy of this state”); IDAHO CODE ANN. §41-1813(2) (1961) (form
contains clause which is “unfairly prejudicial to the policy holder”); (NEV. REV. STAT.
§687B.130(2) (1971) (form contains “any provision or provisions prejudicial to the interest
of the insured or policyholder”); W. VA. CODE §33-6-9(f) (1957) (if coverages provided in
form “are not sufficiently broad to be in the public interest”).
173. See WYO STAT. ANN. §§25-15-111(A), (B) (1957), supra note 171.
174. Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar & Package Store, 369 So.2d 938, 941
(Fla. 1979). See also Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 242 S.E.2d 148, 151 n.4 (Ga. 1978).
Some decisions caution that these provisions do not give judges a mandate to rewrite
insurance policies. American Fidelity Co. v. Mahoney, 174 A.2d 446, 450 (Me. 1961).
175. HI. REV. STAT. §431:10A-406 (1987) (“the commissioner shall disapprove the
forms for such insurance if the commissioner finds that they are unjust, inequitable,
misleading, or deceptive.”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT. §§742.005(3), (4) (1991) (the
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Judges may also avoid binding effects of the commissioner’s approval
of problematic policy language by determining that approval exceeded the
commissioner’s statutorily prescribed authority.
In delineating the
Insurance Commissioner’s powers, some state statutes provide that the
Commissioner may not take action which “extends, modifies, or conflicts
with any law of the state.”176 These statutes typically refer to
Commissioners’ powers to make rules or regulations. It is not clear from
the cases or the statutes whether approval of policy forms constitutes
rulemaking or adjudication. The APA defines “rule” to include “the
approval . . . of services,”177 which may be reasonably interpreted to
include approval of insurance policy forms for use in a state.178 The new
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides a broad
definition of “rule”179and then excludes a number of specific agency
actions, none of which resemble approval of policy forms by insurance
regulators.180 At least one case suggests that approval is rulemaking rather
than adjudication.181 If this view is correct, approval of a policy which
Director shall disapprove any form “if, in the director’s judgment, its use would be
prejudicial to the interests of the insurer’s policyholders”, or “if the director finds it
contains provisions which are unjust, unfair, or inequitable.”) (emphasis added). See also
Starr-Gordon v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3218778 (E.D. Cal.2006) (holding that
policy approved by commissioner is “conclusively presumed to be unambiguous” based on
CAL.INS. CODE §10291.5 (West 1941), which provides (The commissioner shall not approve
any disability policy . . . if the commissioner finds that it contains any provision, or has any
label, description of its contents, title, heading, backing, or other indication of its provisions
which is unintelligible, uncertain, ambiguous, or abstruse, or likely to mislead a person to
whom the policy is offered.) The Alabama statute accomplishes the same result by making
the decision to approve or disapprove discretionary. ALA. CODE §27-14-9 (1975) (“The
commissioner may disapprove any form . . . if it contains . . . any inconsistent, ambiguous or
misleading clauses or exceptions and conditions which deceptively affect the risk purported
to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract.”) (emphasis added).
176. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §27-2-17 (1075); DEL. CODE tit. 18 §311 (1953);
WYO.STAT. ANN §26-2-110 (1931). Pa. Dental Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 441 A.2d 1379
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (action of Department of Insurance in approving comprehensive
dental plan was not an adjudication). Under that view, the statutes would apply.
177. Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §551(4) (1946).
178. It is also possible to read the APA such that approval of a policy form would
constitute an “adjudication.” Under the APA, “adjudication” means the formulation of an
“order”, 5 U.S.C § 511(7); “orders” include final dispositions of agencies in matters other
than rulemaking but including licensing, 5 U.S.C. §551(6); and “license” includes an agency
approval, 5 U.S.C. §551(8).
179. Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act §102 (26) (2007).
180. Id.
181. Pa. Dental Ass’n, 441 A.2d at 1382 (action of Department of Insurance in
approving comprehensive dental plan was not an adjudication).
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conflicts with “any law” is beyond the power of the regulator. Cases in
which courts refuse to enforce approved policy language which
contravenes statutory requirements,182 fall within the scope of such statutes.
These statutes have a much broader reach, however, given the breadth of
the language, “any law,” which is typically interpreted to include not only
statutory and regulatory law, but also decisional law. If a policy provision
contravened a judicial ruling, it would be beyond the power of the regulator
to approve it and within the judiciary’s responsibilities to override any
approval. Again, there are no cases construing these statutes.183
In short, application of contract doctrine to insurance disputes
minimizes the judicial role in furthering the goals of insurance regulation,
while recognition that insurance policies are highly regulated documents
expands that role.
V.

INTERPRETATION: CONTRACT DOCTRINE AND THE
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE COMPARED

This section provides contrasting examples of policy interpretation
from contract and regulatory perspectives. The section focuses on the
problem of innocent co-insureds. The issue arises when one of the persons
insured under a homeowners policy engages in an act which voids the
policy coverage. Arson is a common example; the question is whether the
policy is also void with respect to an innocent co-insured, who is often a
victim of domestic violence. If so, the innocent co-insured loses not only
his or her insurance coverage, but as a practical matter, may lose the family
home. Where the court’s interpretive frame is contract, the innocent coinsured loses coverage. Where the court acknowledges the regulated nature
of insurance, the result is the opposite.
Standard homeowners policies typically cover the named insured and a
resident spouse and relatives who reside in the household or dependent
persons in care of named insured.184 Policies also typically exclude injury
or damage which is expected or intended by “an insured,”185 “the

182. See id.
183. There is some case law holding that an administrative act of approving the form
of an insurance policy cannot overcome the law settled by state courts. Seligman v. Tucker,
347 N.Y.S.2d 240, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
184. See, e.g., INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS 3 SPECIAL FORM,
DEFINITIONS, B.5. (1999)
185. Id.
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insured,”186 ”“any insured person,”187 or “any insured.”188 Other policies
are more detailed, precluding coverage for “any loss caused intentionally
by you or a family member, or by a person directed by you or a family
member to cause a loss.”189
The contract-based approach to the innocent co-insured problem is
simple. The intent of the parties controls, so the court’s objective is to
determine that intent as manifested by the policy language. Whether the
intentional acts of a co-insured will defeat coverage for an innocent coinsured turns on the exclusionary language used in the policy. A policy
excluding losses caused by intentional acts of “any insured” or “an
insured” creates a joint obligation among co-insureds and bars coverage for
both the malefactor and innocent co-insureds.190 Where the policy uses the
186. This is the language of the standard Allstate Insurance policy. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Callahan, No. 3:CV-04-2246, 2006 WL 1626651 at *5-6 (M.D.Pa. June 7, 2006)
187. Id. at * 3.
188. Id.
189. Yerardi v. Pac. Indem. Co., 436 F.Supp.2d 223,232 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006)
190. Pagett v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:05CV00042, 2006 WL 2246428, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 4, 2006) (holding that an unambiguous intentional loss exclusion was
enforceable against an innocent co-insured); N.J. Mfr Ins. Co. v. Carney, No. 3:04-CV2465, 2006 WL 2092571 at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. July 26, 2006) (holding that under language “an
insured” or “any insured”, the intentional act of one insured excludes coverage for the
innocent co-insured; however, where the husband was the sole owner, the wife’s arson did
not prevent coverage); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Callaghan, No. 3:CV-04-2246, 2006 WL
1626651 at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 07, 2006) (holding that the insurer had no duty to defend
where the plaintiff sued for deviate sexual behavior by her minor son against a child in
daycare operated by the mother and for negligent supervision by the father; the policy
excluded injury resulting from intentional or criminal acts of “any insured person”); Bonin
v. Westport Ins. Corp., 930 So. 2d 906, 916 (La. 2006) “This policy shall not apply to any
claim arising out of, attributable to, or directly or indirectly resulting from: any criminal,
dishonest, malicious or fraudulent act, error, omission or personal injury committed by an
insured.”); Yerardi , 436 F.Supp.2d at 248 (holding that there is no recovery available if
either spouse engaged in intentional conduct under an exclusion for loss that was caused
intentionally by insured or a family member); Stand. Fire Ins. Co. v. Proctor, 286 F.Supp.2d
567, 573 (D. Md. 2003); McEwin v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 118 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.
2003). The Eastern District of Missouri recently considered and rejected the regulatory
approach. State Auto Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. Louis Supermarket #3, Inc., No.
4:04CV1358, 2006 WL 27292 at *6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 05, 2006) (upholding a broad exclusion
when the Director of Insurance approved a policy not in conformance to the required 1943
Standard Form Insurance Policy of the State of New York under authority of 20 C.S.R. 5001.100(1)(B), relying on case law upholding exclusion without considering regulatory issues.
Case law indicates form consistent with Missouri law; no discussion of whether provision
“as favorable”); but seeChilders v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,799 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Mo.
App. 1990) “Under the law the court must accept the written policy as the expression of the
agreement made by the parties, and give effect to the intentions of the parties as disclosed
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words, “the insured”, the obligation is several, and the exclusion applies
only to the insured who intended the act and caused injury, not an innocent
co-insured.191
When a court faced with an innocent co-insured focuses on the nature
of the policy as a regulated document, the result may change. Most
jurisdictions require by statute a standard fire policy.192 The provisions of
this standard, or substitute provisions affording at least the same level of
coverage, must appear in commercial and personal property policies. The
statutory standard policy does not contain an exclusion for intentional acts,
so there is no argument that the exclusion conflicts with the standard.193
However, the standard includes provisions voiding coverage in cases of
fraud194 and excluding coverage for losses resulting from increased risk195
or neglect following a loss.196 These and other provisions (dealing with
cancellation, renewal, and other issues) use the phrase “the insured” rather
than “an insured” or “any insured.” Reasoning that the consistent use of
“the insured” evinces a general legislative intent to apply the limiting
provisions only to the insured at fault, a number of courts have protected

by clear and unambiguous language.”); see also Amick v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 862
F.2d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law and upholding the exclusion as clear
and unambiguous and approved by the director of insurance).
191. Osborn v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 632 So.2d 1158, 160 (La. 1994) (holding
that when the husband intentionally set fire to the house, the wife recovered under a policy
excluding specified acts by “the insured.”).
192. New York adopted a standard fire policy in 1943 and mandated its use. N.Y.
CONSOL. LAW §3404 (McKinney 2007). Many other states followed New York’s example
and enacted the 1943 standard or a similar policy. 10A COUCH ON INS. §149:3 (2007).
193. This type of case, in which the policy violates a statute, is discussed supra, text
accompanying notes 154-56.
194. The New York Standard Fire Policy provides: “This entire policy shall be void
if, whether before or after a loss, the insured has willfully concealed or misrepresented any
material fact or circumstance concerning this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest
of the insured therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating
thereto.” N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS §3404 (2007) (emphasis added).
195. The New York Standard Fire Policy provides: “Unless otherwise provided in
writing added hereto this Company shall not be liable for loss occurring (a) while the hazard
is increased by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured.” Id. (emphasis
added).
196. The New York Standard Fire Policy provides: “This Company shall not be
liable for loss by fire or other perils insured against in this policy caused, directly or
indirectly, by: . . . (i) neglect of the insured to use all reasonable means to save and preserve
the property at and after a loss, or when the propert is endangered by fire in neighboring
premises.” N Id. (emphasis added).
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innocent co-insureds in the face of unambiguous language dictating the
opposite result.197
The application of other approaches discussed in Section IV to the
problem of the innocent co-insured would permit the same result. A policy
which excludes coverage for an innocent co-insured by using the article
“an” rather than “the” in the intentional loss exclusion could easily be
considered misleading or deceptive regarding the risk to be assumed within
the meaning of various state statutes which require disapproval of a policy
form in such instances.198 Judicial correction of an insurance
commissioner’s failure to disapprove such language is permissible.
Similarly, such an exclusion might be considered unfair, inequitable, or
contrary to a state’s public policy under state statutes which also mandate
disapproval under such conditions.199 Again, the statutes permit a court to
override the commissioner’s decision to approve the language.
VI. CONCLUSION
The extensive regulation of insurance policy language, ranging
from legislatively-mandated provisions to required administrative approval
197. Sager v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Iowa 2004); Icenhour
v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 365 F.Supp.2d 743, 751 (S.D.W.Va. 2004) (holding that a West Virginia
court would refuse to enforce unambiguous policy language excluding coverage for loss
“involving intentional or criminal acts of or at the direction of one or more covered
persons”; Nangle v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 73 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Ariz. App. 2003);
Trinity Univ.l Ins. Co. v. Kirsling, 73 P.3d 102, 107 (Idaho 2003); Volquardson v. Hartford
Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 647 N.W.2d 599, 607 (Neb. 2002); Lane v. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 747
N.E.2d 1270, 1271 (N.Y. 2001); Watson v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 692
(Minn. 1997). See also Yerardi v. Pac. Indem. Co., 436 F.Supp.2d 223, 232, 247(Mass.
Dist. Ct. 2006) (refusing to consider statutory fire insurance policy where Massachusetts had
not considered the issue); Spulak v. Tower Ins. Co., Inc., 601 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Neb. 1999)
(holding that an exclusion was invalid because the director of insurance exceeded his
authority in approving an exclusion where §44-501 specified a standard policy and
permitted variation only if the variation was substantially equivalent to the standard).
Following a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court protecting an innocent co-insured under
this analysis, Sager , 680 N.W.2d 8, the Iowa legislature revised the statute to read “an
insured” in provisions dealing with fraud, increased risk, and neglect in protecting property
after loss. Iowa Code Ann. §515.138; Acts 2005, ch. 70, S.F. 360 §§19 and 20.The state
Legislature thereafter amended the language of Iowa Code §515.138 to abrogate the Sager
decision. 2005 Iowa Acts (Senate File 360 at §§19-21).
198. See supra text accompanying note 171. The insurance commissioner must
disapprove a form which is misleading or contains an exception which “deceptively affects
the risk purported to be assumed”.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
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of policies, renders the model of private contract and the principle of
freedom of contract irrelevant in interpretation of insurance policies.
Courts should approach the construction of insurance policies mindful that
they are not individually negotiated bargains but highly regulated
documents; the judicial goal should be ascertaining and effectuating
regulatory goals, rather than the illusory intent of the parties.
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BAD FAITH IN ALABAMA’S CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
“TORT HELL” OR REFORMED JURISDICTION?
Kristen LeBlond
I.

INTRODUCTION

The perception of Alabama in the late 1980s and early 1990s as “tort
hell” for corporate defendants has left many insurance companies reluctant
to write business and thereby take on litigation exposure in the state.1
Since that time period meaningful and significant changes have taken
place. The combination of a dramatic shift in the composition of the
Alabama Supreme Court, punitive damage reform, tort reform and the
evolution of the bad faith cause of action has produced an environment
vastly different from that of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This note
examines Alabama’s transition from tort hell to a jurisdiction where
plaintiffs carry a heavy burden in asserting bad faith and where punitive
damages are regularly and significantly reduced on appeal.
II. ALABAMA AS TORT HELL
Alabama’s reputation as “tort hell on a monumental level”2 developed
in the late 1980s and early 1990s as juries began to routinely return verdicts
characterized by large punitive damage awards,3 often for conduct that fell
“far short of the kinds of ‘reprehensible’ behavior that had been required
for punitive damages in the past.” 4 A study done in the 1990s revealed
that, in general, multi-million dollar punitive damage verdicts were

1. Nathan C. Prater, Comment, Punitive Damages in Alabama: A Proposal for
Reform, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (1995-1996); Linda Himelstein, Jackpots from
Alabama Juries, BUS. WK., Nov. 28, 1994, at 83; Jerry Underwood, Big-Money Verdicts
Scare State Farm Bypasses State for New Site, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 6, 1995, at 6D.
2. Chad E. Stewart, Comment, Damage Caps in Alabama’s Civil Justice System: An
Uncivil War Within the State, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 201, 213 (1998-1999).
3. George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 LA. L.
REV. 825, 826-27 (1996).
4. Michael DeBow, The Road Back from “Tort Hell”: The Alabama Supreme Court,
1994-2004, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY WHITE PAPERS, at 3-4
(Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20070325_alabama2004.pdf.
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extremely rare.5 However, that rule did not hold true for Alabama where
between 1991 and 1994 there were 60 punitive damage verdicts equal to or
greater than $1 million.6 Individual verdicts reached magnitudes of $25
million, $33.5 million, $45 million and $65 million.7 A study conducted by
George Priest, a professor of law and economics at Yale Law School,8
indicated that Alabama juries awarded over $767 million in punitive
damages between 1989 and 1996 and that civil awards in Alabama
increased by 400% from 1985 to 1994.9 Priest commented that Alabama’s
punitive damage awards were “unparalleled in the history of American
jurisprudence.”10
The refusal of the appellate courts to interfere with these verdicts also
facilitated the unusual trend. Between the years 1987 and 1994 the
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed $53.2 million in punitive damage
awards.11 According to Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, a law firm that studied
the punitive damages issue on behalf of an insurance company, the amount
of punitive damages upheld in Alabama for those years was three times the
amount upheld by its three neighboring states combined (Georgia,
Mississippi and Tennessee).12 These excessive punitive damage verdicts
during the 1980s and early 1990s would soon be charged with having
deleterious consequences to Alabama’s populace, and especially to its
business community.
III. IMPACT OF TORT HELL ON BUSINESS IN ALABAMA
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the largest criticism of punitive
damage law in Alabama was that it was driving businesses to leave the
state.13 During the 1994 gubernatorial election, the spokesman for
gubernatorial candidate Fob James, stated that, “Alabama has gained a very
unfortunate reputation as being a place where you can get sued out of
business.”14 The result of the business community’s fear and anxiety over
5. Priest, supra note 3, at 827.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Yale
Law
School
Faculty
http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/GPriest.htm (last visited Nov. 15,, 2007).
9. Stewart, supra note 2, at 213-14.
10. Prater, supra note 1, at 1016.
11. Priest, supra note 3, at 829.
12. Himelstein, supra note 1, at 84.
13. Prater, supra note 1, at 1016.
14. Id.

Biographies,
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large punitive damage verdicts was particularly felt by Alabama’s
insurance industry. In the early 1990s, as many as ten insurance companies
announced plans to no longer write new business in Alabama, eliminate
plans to invest further in the state, or cease operating in Alabama
altogether.15 One example occurred in 1995 when State Farm, an insurance
company, was considering Birmingham as a site for its life and health
insurance operations.16 A spokeswoman for the insurer cited the state’s
“unfriendly reputation for big-money verdicts against insurers” as one of
the main reasons why the company ultimately decided to forego a location
in Birmingham.17 The insurance industry was dealt such a blow from
Alabama’s runaway juries that even the state’s insurance regulatory arm
spoke up. By late 1994, Alabama insurance regulators spoke out against
the disproportionate verdicts and their impact on business at the post trial
proceedings of as many as 13 cases.18
The large punitive damage verdicts were not the only reason why
insurers and other corporate defendants were fleeing Alabama. The impact
that these verdicts had on the cost of settlement also impacted the bottom
line for these corporations. As citizens repeatedly witnessed multi-million
dollar punitive damage verdicts, they became more comfortable granting
such awards when on sitting on juries themselves.19 These awards in turn
drove up the cost a corporate defendant would have to pay to settle a case.20
If a plaintiff anticipated a large punitive damage award they would be less
likely to settle their case for a lower sum. As a result, legal costs began to
eat into profits and Alabama became a less and less attractive jurisdiction
in which to do business.
IV. THE TORT OF BAD FAITH & ITS ORIGINS IN ALABAMA
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TORT OF BAD FAITH
One reason why Alabama’s civil justice system and its position on
punitive damages impacted the insurance industry so greatly was because
of the tort of bad faith. The insurance business revolves around the
insurance contract and as a result many lawsuits brought against insurance
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.; Himelstein, supra note 1, at 83.
Underwood, supra note 1, at 6D.
Id.
Himelstein, supra note 1, at 84.
Id.
Id.
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companies are based on the tenets of contract law. However, the amount
one can recover from a contract-based cause of action is not comparable to
that which is recoverable in tort.21 This is because punitive damages are
not recoverable for breach of contract or other contract-based actions.22
Thus, the tort of bad faith became an important avenue through which a
plaintiff could seek punitive damages in a lawsuit against an insurance
company.23
Historically, the tort of bad faith originated from liability insurance and
the insurer’s duty to defend its insured.24 In the early 1900s courts began to
hold insurers liable when they “unreasonably” refused to settle a lawsuit
within the policy limits.25 The rationale behind the imposition of liability
in this context was that the insurer controlled the litigation on behalf of its
insured and could pursue its own interests by refusing a settlement offer
within the policy limits in hopes of being found not liable at trial.26 This
left the insured “at the mercy” of the insurance company because if the trial
resulted in damages greater than the policy limit the insured would be
responsible for the excess.27 The courts reacted by imposing a duty on the
insurer to acknowledge its insured’s interests when faced with the
opportunity for settlement.28 If the insurer breached that duty by
unreasonably refusing to settle within the policy limits it would be liable
for any excess judgment that resulted.29
The above concept was then imported into the first party insurance
context in the California case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company.30
In Gruenberg the California Supreme Court identified a similar duty not to
unreasonably withhold benefits due under an insurance policy in the first
party context.31 The court held that breach of this duty would give rise to a
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
22. Id.
23. It should be noted that the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that “the tort of bad
faith is only available in the insurance context” thereby making insurance companies the
sole defendants in bad faith actions. See Stephen D. Heninger & Nicholas W. Woodfield, A
Practitioner’s Guide to Alabama’s Tort of Bad Faith, 57 ALA. LAW. 277, 282 (1996).
24. John H. Bauman, Insurance Law Annual: Emotional Distress Damages and the
Tort of Insurance Bad Faith, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 717, 733 (1998).
25. Id. at 734.
26. Id. at 734-35.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 735.
29. Id.
30. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
31. Id. at 1037.
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tort action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.32
Many other courts followed the California Supreme Court’s lead in
imposing tort liability for bad faith in the first party insurance context.33
One of these courts was the Alabama Supreme Court.
B. THE BEGINNINGS OF BAD FAITH IN ALABAMA
The Alabama Supreme Court adopted the first party bad faith cause of
action in 1981 in Chavers v. National Security Fire and Casualty
Company.34 In doing so, the court adopted the following standard of proof
which the plaintiff must meet to recover on a claim for bad faith:
[A]n actionable tort arises for an insurer’s intentional refusal to
settle a direct claim where there is either ‘(1) no lawful basis for
the refusal coupled with actual knowledge of that fact or (2)
intentional failure to determine whether or not there was any
lawful basis for such refusal.’35
Shortly thereafter, in Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Barnes,36 the court
clarified the two tier test for bad faith which it articulated in Chavers. As
to the first tier of the test, the court defined “no lawful basis” to mean
lacking “a legitimate or arguable reason for failing to pay the claim.”37 The
court further noted that, “when the claim is not fairly debatable, refusal to
pay will be bad faith” and that “bad faith…is not simply bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose and means breach of known
duty…through some motive of self interest or ill will.”38 As to the second
tier the court indicated that the critical question before the jury was
“whether a claim was properly investigated and whether the results of the
investigation were subjected to a cognitive evaluation and review.”39 The
court also stated that “reckless indifference to facts or to proof submitted
by the insured” on the part of the insurer would establish the inference
needed to meet the second tier of the test.40
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Bauman, supra note 24, at 741.
405 So.2d 1, 6 (Ala. 1981).
Id. at 7.
405 So.2d 916 (Ala. 1981).
Id. at 924.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The following year, in National Security Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Bowen, the Alabama Supreme Court defined the elements of a prima facie
bad faith case.41 Under Bowen the plaintiff had the burden of proving the
following:
(a) an insurance contract between the parties and a breach
thereof by the defendant;
(b) an intentional refusal to pay the insured’s claim;
(c) the absence of any reasonably legitimate or arguable
reason for that refusal (the absence of a debatable reason);
(d) the insurer’s actual knowledge of the absence of any
legitimate or arguable reason;
(e) if the intentional failure to determine the existence of a
lawful basis is relied upon, the plaintiff must prove the
insurer’s intentional failure to determine whether there is
a legitimate or arguable reason to refuse to pay the
claim.42
Plaintiff’s burden in bad faith cases was subsequently characterized as
“heavy.”43 Yet under this heavy burden plaintiffs were able to capitalize on
the new cause of action to the tune of millions of dollars in punitive
damages. In Nationwide Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Clay the plaintiff
brought suit for bad faith failure to pay an insurance claim under his
disability insurance policy and was awarded $1.25 million in damages on
the bad faith count.44 On appeal the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the
award stating that the actions of Nationwide constituted the type of
behavior that the bad faith cause of action was intended to eliminate.45 The
court conceded that the award was large, but concluded it was not the result
of jury bias or prejudice, and accordingly, must stand.46
A similar verdict was upheld in United American Insurance Co. v.
Brumley.47 In Brumley the plaintiff asserted claims of breach of contract
41. 417 So.2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982).
42. Id.
43. Nat’l Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 1357, 1362 (Ala. 1982).
44. 469 So.2d 533, 534, 541 (Ala. 1985). It should be noted that the same jury only
awarded $46,165 on the breach of contract claim. Id. at 541.
45. Id. at 546.
46. Id.
47. 542 So.2d 1231, 1239 (Ala. 1989).
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and bad faith failure to pay benefits under his Medicare Supplement
policy.48 The jury returned a verdict of $5,000 in compensatory damages
and $1 million in punitive damages which was upheld on appeal by the
Alabama Supreme Court.49
Similarly, in United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Wade the insurer
brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its liability under the
plaintiff’s homeowner’s policy.50 The plaintiffs counterclaimed seeking to
recover under the policy for the loss of their house and the personal
property contained therein, as well as punitive damages for USAA’s bad
faith failure to pay.51 The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and
awarded $166,795 plus interest on the contract claim and $3.5 million in
damages on the bad faith claim.52 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court
deemed the punitive damages excessive, but only reduced the award by $1
million, leaving a total of $2.5 million in punitive damages to be paid by
the defendant.53
The substantial punitive damage awards levied against insurers in these
early bad faith cases are exemplary of how this newly established cause of
action provided plaintiffs with a vehicle for capitalizing on Alabama’s propunitive damage climate in the first party insurance context.
V. DEVELOPMENTS IN ALABAMA’S CIVIL JUSTICE
CLIMATE
Several developments have occurred in Alabama since the “tort hell” of
the late 1980s and early 1990s that led to a change in Alabama’s civil
justice climate. The combination of a dramatic change in the Alabama
Supreme Court bench, efforts at tort reform, punitive damage reform and
subsequent developments in the law of bad faith has contributed
significantly to a less hostile legal climate for insurance companies.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1233-34.
Id. at 1235, 1239.
544 So.2d 906, 907 (Ala. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 907-08.
Id. at 917.
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A. THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT
From 1989 to 1994, the Alabama Supreme Court was led by Chief
Justice “Sonny” Hornsby.54 The “Hornsby Court,” as it was called, was
largely identified with the hostile litigation climate towards corporate
defendants that existed during Hornsby’s tenure.55 This was likely due not
only to the upsurge of large punitive damage verdicts awarded during those
years, but also to the court’s dismantling of early attempts at tort reform.56
In 1987 the Alabama Legislature passed a tort reform package that included
among its provisions a cap on punitive damages.57 Since 1987 the
Alabama Supreme Court has struck down most of the provisions of the
1987 Tort Reform Legislation,58 with the punitive damage caps being
declared unconstitutional by the Hornsby Court.59
The entirely Democratic bench of the Alabama Supreme Court began
to change in 1994.60 In that year supporters of civil justice reform,
including members of the defense bar and representatives of Alabama’s
business community, contributed to and campaigned for Republican Perry
Hooper Sr. in the election for the Supreme Court’s chief justice.61 One of
the major issues of the 1994 chief justice election was tort reform.62
During that election incumbent Sonny Hornsby was depicted as part of the
problem of litigation abuse in Alabama.63 By contrast Perry Hooper
communicated that he was in favor of tort reform and punitive damage caps
in particular.64 Perry Hooper was sworn in as the new chief justice of the
Alabama Supreme Court in 1995.65

54. Alabama Department of Archives and History - Supreme Court Justice
Biographies, http://www.archives.state.al.us/judicial/hornsby.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2007); DeBow, supra note 4, at 2.
55. DeBow, supra note 4, at 1-2.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Prater, supra note 1, at 1025-26.
58. Id. at 1026.
59. Henderson ex. rel. Hartsfield v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878, 893-94 (Ala.
1993); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156, 173 (Ala. 1991); DeBow, supra
note 4, at 4.
60. DeBow, supra note 4, at 1, 2.
61. Prater, supra note 1, at 1029.
62. Id. at 1029-30.
63. Id. at 1030.
64. Stewart, supra note 2, at 228.
65. DeBow, supra note 4, at 3.
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In the election of 1996 another Republican, Harold See Jr., was added
to the Alabama Supreme Court bench.66 Harold See was known as an
“outspoken critic” of the Hornsby Court,67 as well as a supporter of the
business community and tort reform.68 After the 1998 elections a
Republican majority presided over the Alabama Supreme Court for the
very first time since its establishment in 1820.69 In 2000 an additional four
Republicans were added to the bench and in 2004 the governor appointed
another, Drayton Nabers Jr., to succeed the former Chief Justice, Roy
Moore, when he was removed from office.70 Drayton Nabers is the former
chief executive officer of Protective Life Corporation, a financial services
company, and a former chairman of the American Council of Life
Insurers.71 Coming into the elections of 2007 the Alabama Supreme Court
bench remained entirely Republican with Drayton Nabers serving as Chief
Justice.72
The new conservative composition of the court and the pro-business
background of its chief justice illustrate the dramatic change that has taken
place in the judicial environment in Alabama since 1989. It is this new
court that is poised to re-evaluate various legal issues of great concern to
the business community, such as the constitutionality of punitive damage
caps and excessive punitive damage awards.
B. TORT REFORM – PUNITIVE DAMAGE CAPS
In the mid-1980s a growing trend of tort reform swept through 42
states.73 In 1987, the Alabama Legislature joined the majority of states and
enacted a tort reform package, chief among its provisions a set of

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Stewart, supra note 2, at 228.
69. A History of the Alabama Judicial System, Alabama Judicial System Online,
http://www.judicial.state.al.us/documents/judicial_history.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007);
DeBow, supra note 4, at 3.
70. DeBow, supra note 4, at 3.
71. Alabama Judicial System Online - Supreme Court Justice Biographies,
http://www.judicial.state.al.us/supreme.cfm?Member=118 (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
72. Alabama Judicial System Online - Members of the Alabama Supreme Court,
http://www.judicial.state.al.us/supreme.cfm, last visited (Jan. 10, 2007); DeBow, supra note
4, at 2.
73. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1587 (1987).
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legislatively imposed punitive damage caps.74 The 1987 punitive damage
caps imposed a limit of $250,000 on all forms of punitive damages unless
the damages were premised on one of the following:
(1) A pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct, even
though the damage or injury was inflicted only on the
plaintiff; or
(2) Conduct involving actual malice other than fraud or bad faith
not a part of a pattern or practice; or
(3) Libel, slander or defamation.75
It did not take long for the Alabama courts, known for taking a propunitive damages stance, to address the punitive damages provisions of the
tort reform package.76 In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n the Alabama
Supreme Court held that Alabama Code Section 6-5-544(b), which limited
the amount of non-economic damages recoverable in a medical malpractice
case to $400,000, violated the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the
Alabama Constitution.77 The court stated that courts should not interfere
with the damages awarded by a jury unless the jury’s assessment is “flawed
by bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive.”78 The
court further explained that the jury’s determination of damages is integral
to the right to trial by jury as provided by the Alabama Constitution and
that because Section 6-5-544(b) “caps the jury’s verdict automatically and
absolutely” it impinges on the jury’s function and in doing so violates the
right provided in the Alabama Constitution.79
Less than two years later, the Hornsby Court addressed the
constitutionality of Alabama Code Section 6-11-21 which capped punitive
damages at $250,000 unless premised on one of the three varying situations
noted earlier. In Henderson ex. rel. Hartsfield v. Alabama Power Co. the
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that Section 6-11-21 also violated the right
to trial by jury as provided in the Alabama Constitution.80 The court
explained that Moore was controlling precedent and because the limitations
74. Stewart, supra note 2, at 201.
75. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (LexisNexis 1997).
76. Henderson ex. rel. Hartsfield v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878, 885-86 (Ala.
1993); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1991).
77. 592 So.2d at 164.
78. Id. at 161.
79. Id. at 161, 164.
80. 627 So.2d at 893-94.
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imposed by Section 6-11-21, like those of Section 6-5-544(b), rendered the
jury’s function meaningless they also were unconstitutional as violative of
the right to trial by jury.81 Through Moore and Henderson, the Alabama
Supreme Court authoritatively stated that legislatively imposed punitive
damage caps violated the right to trial by jury and that the only means by
which to impose them was through a constitutional amendment.82
However, despite unmistakable precedent the Alabama Legislature
continued its efforts to institute punitive damage caps. After several
unsuccessful attempts in 1996 and 1997,83 in 1999 both the House of
Representatives and the Senate passed legislation to limit punitive damages
by votes of 98-0 and 33-2 respectively.84 The new legislation capped
punitive damages at three times the compensatory damages or $500,000,
whichever is greater.85 The outcome of the new legislation would
inevitably come before the high court again. However, optimists
speculated that the court that struck down previous damage caps was not
the one that would address the new legislation and therefore, the outcome
would likely be different this time.86
The Alabama Supreme Court has yet to address whether Henderson
was correctly decided in the civil context, but has questioned its
soundness.87 In the case of Oliver v. Towns the court stated:
Given the post-Henderson developments in the concept of due
process law and the forceful rationale of the dissents in Henderson
we question whether Henderson remains good law…However we
decline to address this issue before the trial court rules on the

81. Id. at 885-86.
82. Id. at 893.
83. Stewart, supra note 2, at 216-19.
84. David White, Punitive Damages Cap OK’d, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 2, 1999, at
1A. It should be noted that the Business Counsel of Alabama, a political group representing
over 5,000 Alabama businesses, “spearheaded” the repeated legislative attempts at
instituting punitive damage caps. Stewart, supra note 2, at 215-16.
85. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (LexisNexis 2005).
86. Stewart, supra note 2, at 227-28.
87. Oliver v. Towns, 738 So.2d 798, 804 n.7 (Ala. 1999). It is important to note that
in Ex Parte Apicella, the court held, in the context of a criminal case, that Henderson was
wrongly decided to the extent it held that the Alabama Constitution “restricted the
Legislature from removing from the jury the unbridled right to punish.” 809 So.2d 865, 87374 (Ala. 2001).
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applicability of §6-11-21 to the punitive damages award in this
case.88
The court also avoided addressing the issue of Henderson in 2004 in Alfa
Life Insurance Co. v. Jackson.89 The court specifically noted that it did not
need to address the issue of whether Henderson was correctly decided
because the damage caps contained in Alabama Code Section 6-11-21 did
not apply to the case.90
From the perspective of an insurance company, or any corporate
defendant, legislatively imposed punitive damage caps are a step in the
right direction. However, such restrictions have engendered significant
tension between the Alabama Legislature and the judiciary since the initial
decimation of the 1987 Tort Reform Package.91 Despite the earlier caps
being ruled unconstitutional a new set of caps is on the books and it is
possible that the new conservative Alabama Supreme Court, if given the
opportunity, will uphold them this time around.
C. PUNITIVE DAMAGE REFORM
Alabama has been described by its own legislators as “the worst state
in America for punitive damages.”92 Accordingly, it is not surprising that
many of the large awards imposed on corporate defendants in Alabama are
appealed. Therefore, it is critical to the defendant that the appellate courts
of the state have a framework in place that allows them to effectively
review the punitive awards for excessiveness. In the 1980s the Alabama
Supreme Court issued two opinions that assisted in establishing this
framework.93
In Hammond v. City of Gadsden the Alabama Supreme Court reached
two conclusions regarding the review of punitive damages. The first
holding was that trial courts must state, on the record, the reasons for
interference or non-interference with the jury verdict when the issue is the
excessiveness of the award.94 The rationale behind the court’s finding was
88. Oliver, 738 So.2d at 804 n.7 (citations omitted).
89. No. 1001854 & 1002002, 2004 Ala. LEXIS 118 (Ala. May 7, 2004).
90. Id. at *35.
91. Stewart, supra note 2, at 203-04, 216-220; DeBow, supra note 4, at 4.
92. Stewart, supra note 2, at 215.
93. Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989); Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).
94. Hammond, 493 So.2d at 1379.

2008]

BAD FAITH IN CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM

161

that appellate courts were increasingly being called upon to review the
excessiveness of punitive damage awards and the fact that trial courts often
did not articulate their reasons for interfering or not interfering with such
awards put the appellate courts at a distinct disadvantage as inevitably
numerous aspects of the trial were not included in the record.95 This
holding arguably benefited those defendants appealing punitive damage
verdicts as it gave the appellate courts a more complete understanding of
the trial court’s logic, or lack thereof.
The second holding of Hammond was that certain factors should be
considered by appellate courts when reviewing punitive damage awards for
excessiveness.96 These factors included the culpability of the defendant’s
conduct, the desirability of discouraging similar conduct by others, the
impact upon the parties, and the impact on innocent third parties.97 These
four factors were the beginning of a larger list of factors that would be
compiled over time and would be used by the Alabama Supreme Court to
evaluate the excessiveness of punitive damage awards.
In Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby the Alabama Supreme Court expanded the
list of factors for consideration in punitive damage appeals to seven.98 The
factors as described by the court are the following:
(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the
harm that is likely to occur from the defendant’s conduct as
well as to the harm that actually has occurred. If the actual or
likely harm is slight, the damages should be relatively small.
If grievous, the damages should be much greater.
(2) The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct
should be considered. The duration of this conduct, the
degree of the defendant’s awareness of any hazard which his
conduct has caused or is likely to cause, and any concealment
or ‘cover up’ of that hazard, and the existence and frequency
of similar past conduct should all be relevant in determining
this degree of reprehensibility.
(3) If the wrongful conduct was profitable to the defendant, the
punitive damages should remove the profit and should be in
excess of the profit, so that the defendant recognizes a loss.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
539 So.2d 218, 223-24.
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(4) The financial position of the defendant would be relevant.
(5) All the costs of litigation should be included so as to
encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to trial.
(6) If criminal sanctions have been imposed on the defendant for
his conduct, this should be taken into account in mitigation of
the punitive damages award.
(7) If there have been other civil actions against the same
defendant, based on the same conduct, this should taken into
account in mitigation of the punitive damages award.99
This new list of factors, called the “Hammond-Green Oil” factors, was the
basis on which today’s more complicated review process for excessiveness
of punitive damages was built.
Despite initial approval from the United States Supreme Court,100
Alabama’s method of reviewing punitive damages was dealt a heavy blow
in 1996. In BMW of North America v. Gore the United States Supreme
Court reviewed an Alabama case on the issue of excessiveness of punitive
damages and ruled that the punitive damages awarded against the
defendant were so excessive as to violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.101 The Court held that “[e]lementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.”102 The Court then provided three “guideposts” to use in

99. Id.
100. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed the Hammond-Green Oil factors and determined that this method of “postverdict
review ensures that punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory
damages” and that the standards are a “sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the
discretion of Alabama factfinders in awarding punitive damages.” 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991).
101. 517 U.S. 559, 562, 585-86 (1996). The jury verdict in this case was $4,000
compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. Id. at 565. The trial court
denied BMW’s post trial motion and stated the award was not excessive. Id. at 566. The
Alabama Supreme Court remitted the punitive damage award to $2 million based on
findings that the jury incorrectly calculated punitive damages by taking into account the
amount of similar incidents in other states. Id. at 567. It should be noted that the $2 million
punitive damage awarded survived a Hammond-Green Oil analysis by the Alabama
Supreme Court. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 624-29 (Ala. 1994).
102. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
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evaluating whether a defendant was given the required fair notice.103 The
first guidepost was the “degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct.”104 The Court did not give specifics as to what level of
reprehensibility dictated a larger award of punitive damages, but did make
several observations as to what types of conduct were considered more
reprehensible than others.105 For example, violent crimes were considered
more serious than non-violent crimes and “trickery and deceit” was
considered more reprehensible than negligence.106 The second BMW
guidepost was the ratio of the punitive damage award to the “actual harm
inflicted on the plaintiff.”107 Again, the Court declined to draw a bright line
standard stating it would be impossible to draw a line that appropriately fit
all cases, but it did state that the ratio in this case, 500:1, was
“breathtaking” and warranted additional review.108 The final BMW
“guidepost” was the civil or criminal penalties available to punish similar
conduct.109 The Court noted that the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices
Act would impose a fine of $2,000 for similar conduct and accordingly, did
not give BMW fair notice that it may be subjecting itself to a multi-million
judgment.110 After considering the three guideposts together the Court
concluded that the $2 million punitive damage award was excessive and
unconstitutional and remanded the case to the Alabama Supreme Court.111
On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court remitted the punitive damages to
$50,000 and stated that when reviewing punitive damage awards
challenged as excessive Alabama courts should apply the Hammond-Green
Oil factors as well as the BMW guideposts and make their determinations
on a case-by-case basis.112
103. Id. at 574-75.
104. Id. at 575.
105. Id. at 575-77.
106. Id. at 575-76. Two additional observations made by the Court were that repeated
conduct was more reprehensible than one instance of misconduct and that causing financial
injury to a financially disadvantaged individual would warrant a higher award. Id. at 57677.
107. Id. at 580.
108. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582-83 (1996). The Court noted that it
was possible to have a case where a particularly deplorable act generated a small amount of
compensatory damages, but supported a large punitive award. Id. at 582.
109. Id. at 583.
110. Id. at 584.
111. Id. at 585-86.
112. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997). The Alabama
Supreme Court indicated in its interpretation that the first two of the BMW guideposts were
already included in the Hammond-Green Oil factors. Id. at 511.
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In the aftermath of the BMW decision, the United States Supreme Court
remanded four additional cases to the Alabama Supreme Court for review
under BMW.113 In each case the punitive damages award was substantially
reduced after being reviewed in light of the BMW guideposts and the
Hammond-Green Oil factors.114 In addition, after BMW the bad faith cases
that reached the Alabama Supreme Court, illustrated a new understanding
on the part of Alabama juries and courts that excessive punitive damage
awards would no longer be tolerated unless they could survive a demanding
review.115
This new legal framework used to review potentially excessive
punitive damage awards in Alabama is another development that makes the
litigation climate of Alabama less intimidating to corporate defendants as
113. Id. at 519 (Houston, J., concurring). The cases were: Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v.
Johnson, 519 U.S. 923 (1996); Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996); Union Sec.
Life Ins. Co. v. Crocker, 517 U.S. 1230 (1996); Am. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Williamson
517 U.S. 1231 (1996).
114. In Life Insurance Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, the jury awarded punitive damages
in the amount of $15 million which was reduced by the trial judge to $12.5 million and was
reduced again by the Alabama Supreme Court to $5 million. 701 So.2d 524, 526 (Ala.
1997). On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court
reduced the award again to $3 million. Id. In Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, the jury awarded
$6 million in punitive damages which was upheld by the trial court and the Alabama
Supreme Court. 708 So.2d 111, 114-15 (Ala. 1997). On remand from the United States
Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive damage award to
$1,792,000. Id. at 115. In Union Security Life Insurance Co. v. Crocker, the jury granted a
verdict of $5 million which was subsequently reduced to $2 million by the trial court and
then upheld by the Alabama Supreme Court. 667 So.2d 688, 690, 695 (Ala. 1995). On
remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the
award to $1 million. 709 So.2d 1118, 1123 (Ala. 1997). In American Pioneer Life
Insurance Co v. Williamson, the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of $3 million
which was reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court to $2 million. 704 So.2d 1361, 1361-62
(Ala. 1997). On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme
Court further reduced the punitive award to $750,000. Id. at 1362.
115. The initial jury verdicts in the post BMW bad faith cases were substantially lower
than earlier bad faith cases and the punitive damages were regularly remitted on appeal.
Compare Nat’l Ins. Ass’n v. Sockwell, 829 So.2d 111 (Ala. 2002); Acceptance Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 832 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2001); Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 792 So.2d 1069
(Ala. 2000); Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 738 So.2d 815 (Ala. 1999); Employees’
Benefit Ass’n v. Grissett, 732 So.2d 968 (Ala. 1998); Loyal Am. Ins. Co. v. Mattiace, 679
So.2d 229 (Ala. 1996), with Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Stephens Enter., 641 So.2d 780 (Ala.
1994); Thomas v. Principal Fin. Group, 566 So.2d 735 (Ala. 1990); Intercontinental Life
Ins. Co. v. Lindblom, 571 So.2d 1092 (Ala. 1990); United Serv. Auto. Ass’n v. Wade, 544
So.2d 906 (Ala. 1989); United Am. Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So.2d 1231 (Ala. 1989); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1987); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay, 469
So.2d 533 (Ala. 1985).
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they can be assured that excessive awards will be subjected to thorough and
exacting review on appeal.
D. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH
Alabama has become a less hostile environment for insurers, not only
due to the three factors previously discussed, but also due to several
developments in the law of first party bad faith. The bad faith cause of
action has developed over time to provide heightened protection to insureds
while simultaneously ensuring that not every refusal to pay an insurance
claim will land an insurance company in court.
In Alabama a plaintiff can prove bad faith by one of two approaches;
by establishing the elements of an ordinary/normal case or those of an
extraordinary/abnormal case.116 Under the normal case of bad faith failure
to pay an insurance claim the plaintiff has a heavy burden of proof and
must establish:
(1) The existence of an insurance contract;
(2) An intentional refusal to pay the claim; and
(3) The absence of any lawful basis for the refusal and the
insurer’s knowledge of that fact or the insurer’s intentional
failure to determine whether there is any lawful basis for its
refusal.117
The plaintiff has to show more than simple nonpayment on the part of the
insurance company.118 The plaintiff has to show the insurer refused to pay
without a reasonable ground for disputing the claim.119 In the normal case,
in order for the bad faith claim to stand, the plaintiff must also be entitled
to a directed verdict on his breach of contract claim.120 If evidence is
produced which creates a factual issue as to the contract claim, the bad
faith claim must be dismissed.121
A different standard is applied to certain cases that qualify as
“extraordinary” or abnormal.122 This is because of policy concerns
116. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 306 (Ala. 1999); Grissett,
732 So.2d at 976.
117. Brown, 832 So.2d at 16.
118. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bowen, 417 So.2d 179, 183 (Ala. 1982).
119. Id.
120. Nat’l Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 1357, 1362 (Ala. 1982).
121. Id.
122. Brown, 832 So.2d at 16.
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regarding the insured’s right to prompt and thorough claim evaluation and
payment.123 Under the abnormal case of bad faith failure to investigate an
insurance claim the plaintiff must prove:
(1) that the insurer failed to properly investigate the claim or to
subject the results of the investigation to a cognitive
evaluation and review; and
(2) that the insurer breached the contract for insurance coverage
with the insured when it refused to pay the insured’s claim.124
Abnormal or “extraordinary” cases have largely been restricted to
situations where the plaintiff is able to produce substantial evidence
demonstrating the insurer acted in one of the following four ways:
(3) Intentionally or recklessly failed to investigate the plaintiff’s
claim;
(4) Intentionally or recklessly failed to properly subject the
plaintiff’s claim to a cognitive evaluation or review;
(5) Created its own debatable reason for denying the plaintiff’s
claim; or
(6) Relied on an ambiguous portion of the policy as a lawful basis
to deny the plaintiff’s claim.125
In all bad faith cases the plaintiff must be able to show he was entitled to
benefits under the insurance policy in question.126
The development of these two distinct forms of bad faith illustrates the
differing policy concerns that the Alabama Supreme Court was grappling
with when molding the bad faith cause of action. On one hand, the court
saw the need to preserve the ability of insurance companies to effectively
review claims and refuse payment on those that were invalid.127 It did not
intend, nor would it tolerate, plaintiff’s abuse of this cause of action to sue
insurance companies for every denial of a claim. Justice Shores, writing
for the court, discussed this concern in Affiliated FM Insurance Co. v.
Stephens Enterprises when he stated:

123. Id.
124. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293, 318 (Ala. 1999).
125. Id. at 306-07.
126. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Brown, 832 So.2d 1, 16 (Ala. 2001).
127. Thomas v. Principal Fin. Group, 566 So.2d 735, 742 (Ala. 1990).
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The recognition of the tort of bad faith does not, as Affiliated
asserts, give a unilateral right to plaintiffs to pursue a claim for
punitive damages against an insurer for an alleged breach of
contract. The burden of proof in a bad faith case is such that
sufficient protection is afforded to defendants in these cases.128
The heavy burden of proof placed on plaintiffs in the normal bad faith case
functioned to preserve the insurers’ right to debate questionable claims.
However, the court was also concerned with enforcing the right of the
insured to have his claim adequately evaluated and paid in a timely
fashion.129 Accordingly, the court established a different standard for the
abnormal case of bad faith failure to investigate.130 The court noted in
these abnormal cases that the plaintiff was not required to be entitled to a
directed verdict on the contract claim because it was too great of a burden
and would often allow the insurer to avoid liability for bad faith where it
may be properly imposed.131 For example, in Jones v. Alabama Farm
Bureau Mutual Casualty Co. the plaintiff insureds had a homeowner’s
policy that covered damage caused directly by lightening, but did not cover
damage indirectly caused by power surges.132 The insurer and the plaintiffs
disagreed as to the cause of the damage.133 The adjuster for the insurance
company claimed that the plaintiff told him the damage was caused by a
tree that had fallen onto a power line and made his decision to deny the
claim based on that alleged conversation.134 The plaintiff denied stating the
tree was the cause of the damage.135 The insurer made the argument that
because there was a difference between the two accounts of the
conversation the plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict on the
contract claim and therefore, the bad faith claim could not stand.136 The
128. 641 So.2d 780, 784 (Ala. 1994).
129. Thomas, 566 So.2d at 742-43.
130. Id. at 743.
131. Jones v. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., 507 So.2d 396, 401 (Ala. 1986)
(“Precluding a plaintiff’s bad faith action by application of the ‘directed verdict on the
contract claim’ test when the disputed factual issue arises solely from a contradicted oral
conversation between the insurer and the insured or a third person puts too onerous a burden
on the plaintiff.”); Cont’l Assurance Co. v. Kountz, 461 So.2d 802, 806 (Ala. 1984) (“in an
extraordinary case like this the directed verdict standard is inapplicable.”).
132. 507 So.2d 396, 397 (Ala. 1986).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 400.
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Alabama Supreme Court held that this case was not the normal or ordinary
bad faith case and that the directed verdict standard was not applicable.137
In support of its holding the court reasoned that:
Although the plaintiff's burden of proof in a bad faith action is
great, it should not be insurmountable. Precluding a plaintiff's bad
faith action by application of the "directed verdict on the contract
claim" test when the disputed factual issue arises solely from a
contradicted oral conversation between the insurer and the insured
or a third person puts too onerous a burden on the plaintiff.
Moreover, it would frustrate the purpose of the bad faith action by
allowing an insurer simply to misrepresent the content of an oral
conversation to avoid liability.138
Therefore, the courts have allowed a less burdensome standard to prevail in
abnormal cases of bad faith failure to investigate. This lesser standard
functions to hold insurance companies to a higher standard of claims
investigation.
Despite the fact that plaintiffs have two means by which to establish
bad faith, it is clear that the courts were concerned about the impact the
cause of action would have on an insurer’s ability to deny invalid claims.
Accordingly the court saddled the plaintiff with a high burden of proof in
normal bad faith failure to pay situations. Additional protection is provided
for insurers by the imposition of the directed verdict standard in the normal
case. Therefore, the bad faith cause of action in the normal bad faith case
does not pose as much of a threat to an insurer as it could have had the law
developed in a different way.
It may appear as though the abnormal case of bad faith failure to
investigate would continue to pose a large risk to insurance companies in
Alabama. In many respects the abnormal case is more of a problem for
insurers in that the burden placed on the plaintiff is less arduous. However,
the Alabama Supreme Court has, through a number of cases, clearly laid
out some of the issues with which insurers need to be concerned under the
abnormal bad faith cause of action. 139 Well advised insurers are able to

137. Id. at 400-01.
138. Jones v. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., 507 So.2d 396, 401 (Ala. 1986).
139. See White v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 953 So.2d 340 (Ala. 2006); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So.2d 293 (Ala. 1999); United Serv. Auto. Ass’n v. Wade,
544 So.2d 906 (Ala. 1989); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay, 525 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1987);
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internalize these issues and modify their claims handling processes
accordingly. One of these issues involves the information an insurer has
before it when the claims decision is made. The only information that will
be taken into account by the court in determining whether the insurer was
justified in denying the claim is that which was before the insurer at the
time the claims decision was made.140 In court an insurance company
cannot rely on information discovered after the denial to justify its
decision.141 Knowing this, an insurer would be well advised to incorporate
standards of information gathering into its claims handling manuals and
provide training on the importance of gathering all relevant information
prior to adjudicating the claim.
Another issue brought to the attention of insurance companies by the
court addresses ambiguous policy provisions. An insurer cannot claim it
had a justifiable basis for denying the claim and point to ambiguity in its
own policy as that basis.142 This rule dovetails with the contra proferentem
principle of insurance law which states that when interpreting documents
ambiguity is construed against the drafter.143 As this principle is a general
tenet of insurance law all insurance companies should be aware that
reliance on ambiguity in their policies will not win the day for them in a
courtroom.
One final example of an issue to which the court has spoken in terms of
the abnormal case of bad faith is that of “reckless indifference to facts or
proof submitted by the insured.”144 In Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v.
Barnes the court stated, “knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a
legitimate or reasonable basis may be inferred or imputed to an insurance
company when there is a reckless indifference to facts or to proof
submitted by the insured.”145 The question remained, what did that mean
for insurance companies? The court has since provided examples of what
constitutes such reckless indifference. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie, the insurance company made its claim denial based on an
incomplete medical file (the file was missing the patient’s progress notes

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So.2d 1050 (Ala. 1987); Chavers v. Nat’l Sec. Fire &
Cas. Co., 405 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1981).
140. Lavoie, 505 So.2d at 1053.
141. Id.
142. White, 953 So.2d at 349..
143. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (8th ed. 2004).
144. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So.2d 916, 924 (Ala. 1981).
145. Id.
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and nurses’ notes from her hospitalization).146 The insurer’s witnesses
admitted documentation like that missing from the file in question was “of
critical importance” in the review of a claimant’s medical file.147 The
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that because the insurer denied the claim
while missing critical sections of the claimant’s medical file a jury could
find they acted with “reckless indifference to facts or proof.”148 Additional
guidance was provided by the Alabama Supreme Court in United Services
Automobile Ass’n v. Wade.149 In that case, the claimants were denied
coverage under their homeowner’s policy based on grounds of arson.150
The court ruled that the record established the investigation conducted by
the insurer was incomplete and therefore the insurer’s reliance on that
incomplete investigation constituted “reckless indifference to the facts.”151
Some of the problems with the investigation included the following: (1) the
insurer’s investigator did not examine the house’s electrical system to rule
out electrical issues as the cause of the fire; (2) the insurer’s investigator
did not move debris from the entire basement floor to determine whether a
trail left by flammable liquid was actually a trail or present throughout the
basement; (3) the insurer’s investigator did not ask the insureds if
flammable liquids were routinely kept in their basement; (4) the insurer
was aware of a second investigator’s opinion that the fire started in a
different area of the house from which the insurer’s investigator stated the
fire started; (5) the insurer was aware that the fire marshal did not suspect
the insureds of arson; and (6) the insurer relied largely on statements made
by the insured’s ex-wife as to his involvement in other fires when there was
clearly ill feelings present between the two.152 By examining the court’s
clear and detailed explanations of the problems involved in claims
investigations, such as those articulated in the two cases discussed above,
an insurer can educate itself and its claims handling departments on the
types of issues that will put the insurer at risk for suits based on a claim of
bad faith failure to investigate. By doing so, the insurer can insulate itself
against the more intimidating form of first party bad faith in Alabama.

146. 505 So.2d 1050, 1051 (Ala. 1987).
147. Id. at 1053.
148. Id.
149. 544 So.2d 906 (Ala. 1989).
150. Id. at 907-08.
151. Id. at 913-14.
152. Id. at 914-15.

2008]

BAD FAITH IN CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM

171

VI. CONCLUSION
The changes that have taken place within Alabama’s civil justice
system over the past 25 years have been remarkable. These changes have
made the jurisdiction one in which insurance companies should no longer
be fearful to write business.
Despite the fact that the bad faith cause of action is alive and well in
Alabama, it has been shaped into an even handed cause of action that
requires a heavy burden of plaintiffs and cannot be used as an unlimited
vehicle for obtaining punitive damages against insurance companies. This
ensures that bad faith cases brought by plaintiffs today meet a certain
standard of validity and protects insurers from being saddled with
unjustified lawsuits.
For those bad faith claims that are successfully
asserted, the magnitude of punitive damages is controlled through a system
of exacting appellate punitive damage review which has been increasingly
utilized to substantially remit large awards. The existence of such appellate
review affects a plaintiff’s ability and desire to bring a bad faith cause of
action as it is more difficult to prove and less profitable than it once was.
In addition, punitive damage caps, though previously ruled
unconstitutional, are back on the books and the newly conservative
Supreme Court bench has openly questioned whether holding such caps
unconstitutional remains good law.
The Legislature, the courts and the pro-business interests in Alabama
have worked hard to create meaningful change in its civil justice system.
In response to this change the insurance industry should take another look
at Alabama and reconsider whether it is more dangerous than profitable to
insure its citizens.
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It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Spiraling health care costs provide Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”)
with a convenient excuse not to offer affordable health care coverage for
their employees; forcing many of the working poor to turn to Medicaid.
One state tried, and failed, to put Wal-Mart’s benefit-shifting to an end. On
November 30, 2006, attorneys for the State of Maryland argued before the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to preserve the Fair Share Health Care
Fund Act (“the Fair Share Act” or “the Act”).2 The Act would help
legislatures force Wal-Mart to pay its fair share of health care costs and
stop overburdening states. The Act drew national attention amid mounting
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311(1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
2. Matthew Dolan & Andrew A. Green, Wal-Mart Bill Debated. As Appeals Court
Hears Case, Md. Politicians Look to Other Ways to Expand Health Care, THE BALTIMORE
SUN, Dec. 1, 2006.
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pressure for Wal-Mart to provide better employee benefits.3 The Act
required that companies with more than 10,000 workers devote at least
eight percent of their payroll to employee health care costs.4 If employers
failed to meet the eight percent requirement, they had to pay Maryland the
difference. The express purpose of the legislation was to support “the
operations of the [Medicaid] Program.”5
The Fair Share Act survived a veto from Maryland governor Robert L.
Ehrlich and was set to take effect on January 1, 2007.6 However, it was
struck down in RILA v. Maryland7 on the grounds that the federal
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),8 which
demands national uniformity in employer benefits regulation, preempted
it.9
This paper will explore the fight for the Fair Share Act, ERISA
preemption jurisprudence, and how legislatures may draft successful
legislation to stop big box retailers from over burdening states. Part II
provides background information on the factors that contributed to the
drafting of Maryland’s Fair Share Act, including Wal-Mart’s health care
policies and the high costs of Medicaid. Part III discusses RILA v. Fielder,
the case that found that Maryland’s Fair Share Act was preempted by
ERISA. Part IV discusses ERISA’s history and how it has become a major
barrier to local legislative innovation. Part V discusses the mistakes that
Maryland’s Fair Share Act made. Part VI discusses one successful Fair
Share Act. Part VII explains how legislatures may draft successful Fair
Share Acts and avoid the mishaps of the Maryland Fair Share Act.
II. WAL-MART’S HEALTH CARE POLICIES
A. CYNTHIA’S STORY
Cynthia Murray desperately needed the Fair Share Act. She is one of
17,000 Wal-Mart employees that work in Maryland.10 She was partially
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Fair Share Health Care Fund, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §15-142(c) (2006).
6. Id.
7. 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 (D. Md. 2006).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq (1974).
9. Id.
10. Mary Otto, For One Clerk, Fight for Wal-Mart Bill Is Personal, WASH. POST, Jan.
12 2006, at B05.
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disabled in a car accident, but she cannot afford the health care necessary to
rehabilitate her injuries.11 Despite her five-year tenure with the company,
her wages cannot cover the high cost of Wal-Mart health insurance.12 In the
wake of Maryland Governor Ehrlich’s veto of the Act, she wrote a letter to
Maryland legislatures urging them to override his veto. She said:
Big business and special interests want to kill Fair Share Health
Care, but I can tell you, personally, workers like me need this
bill. We can’t afford health care and this bill would go a long
way to make Wal-Mart spend a minimum amount of money to
provide health care for its workers.13
Cynthia Murray’s story is not unique. There are many more Wal-Mart
associates whose story will not ever be heard. They too are drowning in
health care costs.
B. WAL-MART’S HEALTH CARE BENEFITS
Wal-Mart intentionally evaded their responsibilities to their employees
by shifting health care costs to state and federal governments. A 2005
internal memo14 sent by Susan Chambers, then Wal-Mart’s Executive Vice
President of Risk Management and Benefits Administration,15 exposed the
grim realities of Wal-Mart’s inadequate health care coverage. 16 The
11. Cynthia Murray, Open Letter to the Maryland State Legislature from a Current
Wal-Mart Associate, WAL-MART WORKERS OF AMERICA, Jan. 11, 2006,
http://www.wakeupwalmart.com/wwa/fair-share.html.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways to
Cut Employee Benefit Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2005) (“A draft memo to Wal-Mart’s
board was obtained from Wal-Mart Watch, a nonprofit group, allied with labor unions, that
asserts that Wal-Mart’s pay and benefits are too low. Tracy Sefl, a spokeswoman for WalMart Watch, said someone mailed the document anonymously to her group last month.
When asked about the memo, Wal-Mart officials made available an updated copy that
actually went to the board.”).
15. Susan Chambers has since been promoted to Executive Vice President of People
Division.
16. Susan Chambers, Reviewing and Revising Wal-Mart’s Benefits Strategy,
Supplemental Benefits Documentation, BOARD OF DIRECTORS RETREAT FY06, WAL-MART
STORES,
INC.,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/business/26walmart.ready.html?ex=1287979200&en=
e9a0f5d466bb026e&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
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memo, which was sent to the Board of Directors, revealed that most WalMart associates spent eight percent of their income on health care, nearly
twice the national average.17 In 2004, thirty-eight percent of enrolled WalMart associates spent more than sixteen percent of their earnings18 on
health care.19
The high cost of health care compels significant portions of Wal-Mart’s
workforce to seek health insurance from public assistance programs.20 Five
percent of Wal-Mart associates are on Medicaid, or 1.2 million people.21
Forty-six percent of Wal-Mart associates’ children are either on Medicaid
or uninsured.22 These startling figures are not lost on Wal-Mart employees.
Wal-Mart associates rank health insurance as the most important benefit
that their employer offers, yet it is also the one benefit that they are most
disappointed with.23
C. WAL-MART DUMPS UNINSURED EMPLOYEES IN PUBLICLY
FUNDED PROGRAMS
Wal-Mart refuses to release a state by state report of the number of
their employees covered by Medicaid.24 However, according to an
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(“AFL-CIO”) report, Wal-Mart ranks high on the list of companies shifting
employees into state programs for the uninsured in nineteen out of the
twenty-three states surveyed.25 This is especially troubling considering that
“Medicaid is the fasted growing expense for most states, accounting for
sixteen percent of state budgets.”26 At the National Governors Association
17. Id. at 7.
18. See Greenhouse & Barbaro, supra note 14, at 2 (“Full time Wal-Mart
employees…earn on average around $17,500 a year.”).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Otto, supra note 10, at B05. (“[Maryland Speaker of the House, Michael e. Busch]
could not provide figures for how many of Maryland’s Wal-Mart workers are on Medicaid,
and the AFL-CIO sued unsuccessfully to get that information.”)
25. AFL-CIO REPORT, THE WAL-MART TAX: SHIFTING HEALTH-CARE COSTS TO
TAXPAYERS
1
(2006),
www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/walmart/upload/walmartreport_031406.pdf (Quantifies the
impact of Wal-Mart’s refusal to provide affordable employee health care insurance on
publicly funded state health care programs in twenty-three states).
26. Id.
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meeting held in Washington, DC, in February 2005, Medicaid was
identified as the number one problem facing state governments.27 Medicaid
accounts for twenty-two percent of total state spending and has become the
second largest item in most state budgets after elementary and secondary
education.28 Maryland’s Department of Budget and Management reported
that “Maryland’s Medicaid and Children’s Health Program spending has
increased by $1.25 billon since 2003.29 Due to Medicaid’s continued
growth, it is expected to absorb funding from other vital state funded
programs. Over the next five years, Medicaid costs are expected to rise
eight percent annually, while general fund revenues are forecast to grow at
only five percent. 30
The burden on states is only getting worse. During 2006, the federal
government required states to pay an additional $527 million for
Medicaid.31 Federal Medicaid spending also jumped by more than fifty
percent between 2000 and 2004.32
Wal-Mart also pays lower premiums than the national average. Most
national employers paid eighty-four percent of premiums for individual
coverage and seventy-three percent of premiums for family coverage in
2003.33 Sixty-six percent of employees at national companies receive health
benefits; only forty-one to forty-six percent of Wal-Mart employees enjoy
the same.34

27. James P. Baker, Can Maryland Make Wal-Mart Pay or Play?, 19 BENEFITS L.J.
84, 84-101 (2006) (discussing the affects of the Fair Share Act).
28. Id.
29. MARYLAND DEPT. OF BUDGET & MANAGEMENT, MARYLAND FY 2007 BUDGET
HIGHLIGHTS,
34-35
(2007),
available
at
www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbm_taxonomy/budget/publications/budget_highlights/fy07_budg
ethighlights.pdf.
30. ISSUE PAPERS, 2006 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, PRESENTATION TO THE MARYLAND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS,
ANNAPOLIS,
MARYLAND
113-117
(Dec.
2005),
mlis.state.md.us/Other/IssuePapers/2006/Issue%20Papers%202006%20Legislative%20Sess
ion.pdf .
31. FEDERAL FUNDS INFORMATION FOR STATES, ISSUE BRIEF 04-41: FY 2006 FMAPs,
September 28, 2004.
32. Id.
33. Everyday Low Wages: The Hidden Price We All Pay for Wal-Mart: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 108th Cong., 2d sess., (Feb. 2004).
http://www.agribusinessaccountability.org/pdfs/285_The%20Hidden%20Price%20We%20P
ay%20for%20Wal-Mart.pdf
34. Id. at 1.
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Wal-Mart’s relentless lobbying has helped it evade state laws
mandating minimum health care expenditures. In Maryland alone, the
company hired twelve top lobbyists to combat the Fair Share Act,35
including the highest paid lobbyists in the state.36 “‘They’ve hired the
largest cadre of lobbyists in recent history in Annapolis to try to influence
this legislation,’” said Maryland House Speaker Michael E. Busch. ‘It
really comes down to whether the legislature is going to succumb to the
money and the special interests.’”
Wal-Mart is willing to spend money on legislatures to avoid spending
money on health-care. It made a $10,000 “donation” to the Legislative
Black Caucus of Maryland to help pay for one of the organization’s
conferences. 37 The company admitted that the donation was a lobbying
effort designed to inform lawmakers about the bill.38 It also “contributed at
least $4,000 to Governor Ehrlich’s re-election campaign, prior to his veto
of the Fair Share Act. 39
D. THE MARYLAND FAIR SHARE ACT
Fourteen percent of Maryland residents, including over nine percent
children, have no health insurance of any kind.40 By 2004, providing
uninsured care cost Maryland more than half a billion dollars annually.41 In
reaction to these growing costs, a coalition of citizens’ groups, including
civic organizations, religious congregations, labor and business leaders,
public foundations, and medical organizations created the Maryland
35. John Wagner, Wal-Mart Girds for Battle on Md. Bill, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 17,
2005, at A01.
36. Id. (“Among the new recruits were Joseph A. Schwartz III and J. William Pitcher,
both among the ten highest-paid lobbyists in Annapolis last year, receiving more than
$500,000 each from clients.”)
37. Id.
38. Id. (Spokesman Nate Hurst said that “There are several legislators out there who
have requested that [Wal-Mart] continue to educate them.”)
39. Michael Barbaro, Maryland Sets a Health Cost for Wal-Mart, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 13,
2006.
40. Susan Sangree et al., Brief Amicus Curiae of The Maryland Citizens’ Health
Initiative Education Fund, Inc., in support of Secretary Fielder’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, and in Opposition to the Retail Industry Leader’s Association’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 13.
41. Health Services Cost Review Commission, Maryland Hospital Community Benefit
Report
2005-Final
Report,
available
at
http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/financial_data_reports/documents/CommunityBenefits/2004%
20Report.pdf.
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Citizens’ Health Initiative Education Fund, Inc. (the “Initiative”)42. The
organization’s goal was to research economically feasible, politically viable
solutions to address Maryland’s health care dilemma.43
The Fair Share Act was conceived and drafted by the Initiative in order
to secure a source of funding for state Medicaid. 44 The Fair Share Act
sought to lessen the burden some companies impose on other employers,
taxpayers, and the State treasury when they fail to pay their fair share of
health care costs.45 The Act addressed the issue by more equitably
distributing the cost of funding state Medicaid.46 Large employers, like big
box retailers, are better able to afford a payroll tax to support health care
for low-income residents than small employers.47 Numerous Maryland
businesses were eager for change. A large group of business, many of
which provide sufficient health care coverage for their employees, told
legislators that they were tired of subsidizing large corporations that did not
pay their fair share of health care benefits.48
Between 1999 and 2002, the Initiative led studies on Maryland’s
private and public health care infrastructure, compared different methods of
addressing heath care issues, and worked with local business and labor
leaders, government officials, and constituents while drafting the Fair Share
Act.49 The final product was a representation of the wants and needs of the
Maryland community and a weapon to combat health care disparities.
On January 12, 2006, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Fair
Share Act.50 Maryland was the first state to pass such legislation.51 The Act
applied to non-governmental employers of 10,000 or more employees.52
42. The Maryland Citizens’ Health Initiative Education Fund, Inc. (“the Initiative”),
was incorporated on March 15, 1999, and was recognized by IRS as exempt under Section
501(c)(3) of the Tax Code on August 14, 1999. The primary purpose of the Initiative is “To
educate the public with respect to the need for universal health coverage,” and “to engage in
voter education, and to attempt to influence passage of legislation in the public interest,
through all legitimate means, to secure universal health benefits or health insurance
coverage for all the residents of Maryland. See Article of Incorporation Third, §§ A. and B.
43. Sangree, supra note 40, at 17.
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Labor and employment Title 8.5. Health Care Payroll Assessment, MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-103(a)(1) (2006).
51. Baker, supra note 27, at 85.
52. See § 8.5-102.
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Maryland’s Fair Share Act was set to establish a Fair Share Health Care
Fund that would subject large employers to health care payroll assessments
to help support the state’s Medicaid program.53 It required for-profit
employers that failed to spend up to eight percent of total wages on
employee health insurance costs, to pay the Secretary “an amount equal to
the difference.”54 Covered employers would have to report their health care
expenditures to determine whether or not they satisfied the requirements
and pay the tax if there was a shortfall. 55
There were only four non-governmental employers of 10,000 or more
people in Maryland: Johns Hopkins University (“Johns Hopkins”), the
Northrop Grumman Corporation (“Northrop Grumman”), Giant Food Inc.
(“Giant Food”), and Wal-Mart.56 Johns Hopkins is a non-profit institution
that met the lower 6 percent standard the legislature set for such
institutions. Northrop Grumman successfully lobbied for a provision in the
Act that permitted employers to exclude, for purposes of calculating the
percentage of payroll spent on health care, compensation paid to its
employees above the median household income in Maryland.57 This
exclusion permitted Northrop Grumman to meet the requirement. Giant
Food, which actively lobbied for enactment of the legislation, consistently
spent more than eight percent of its total wages on employee health
insurance costs. Gregory Goggans, Wal-Mart’s Director of United States
Benefits Design, stated that “Wal-Mart has never [since July 2003] made
contributions to the health care plans offered to its Maryland employees
that were equal to or greater than eight percent of the ‘total compensation’
(as that term is defined in the Act) paid to Maryland employees.”58 Thus, in
practice, the Fair Share Act only affected Wal-Mart because the other
covered employers “already provided [health] benefits that cost them more
than 8 percent of payroll.”59

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Baker, supra note 27, at 84.
See § 8.5-104(b).
Sangree, supra note 40, at 23.
See RILA v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485 (D. Md. 2006).
See. § 8.5-103(b).
Goggans Decl. P 3, RILA Mot. for Summ. J. ex. D.
Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland’s “Wal-Mart”Act: Policy and Preemption, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 847, 849 (quoting Joanne Wojcik, “Wal-Mart Bill” Spurs Coverage
Mandates, Bus. Ins., Jan. 23, 2006, at 1.)
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III. RILA V. FIELDER
The Retail Industry Leaders Association (“RILA”), a trade association
of which Wal-Mart is a member, brought an action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against James Fielder, Jr. (“Fielder”), as Maryland
Secretary of Labor. RILA sought a declaration that the Fair Share Act was
preempted by ERISA and that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.60
The Court determined that RILA had standing to litigate Wal-Mart’s
interest because (1) Wal-Mart was an RILA member; (2) Wal-Mart was
affected by the Act’s spending requirement, (3) RILA was opposed to
health care mandates on its retail members, and (4) Wal-Mart’s direct
participation in the action was not required.
The Court found for RILA, holding that the Fair Share Act had referred
to an ERISA plan; thus had a “connection with” the plan and as such was
preempted.61 A state statute has a “reference to” ERISA where it “acts
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans” or “where the existence
of ERISA plans is essential to the law’s operation.”62
The Fair Share Act was scheduled to become effective January 1, 2007,
however by July 19, 2006, federal district Judge Frederick Motz struck it
down.63 In his opinion, Motz wrote:
The Act imposes legally cognizable injury upon Wal-Mart by
requiring it to make a report to the Secretary about the amount of its
payroll and health care contributions and by requiring it to track
and allocate benefits for its Maryland employees in a manner
different from that in which it tracks and allocates benefits for its
employees in other States. 64
Motz agreed that the Maryland law was preempted by ERISA, but held that
under existing law RILA’s equal protection challenge was unavailing.65
The Supreme Court made it clear that “equal protection is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”66
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See RILA, 435 F. Supp. at 484.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id.at 481.
Id. at 488.
RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 500.
Id.
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On appeal, Assistant Maryland Attorney General Steven Sullivan
argued that “Wal-Mart, like any other employer, had an option under the
new law to pay a tax to the state, estimated at $6 million a year, in lieu of
additional health care payments for employees.”67 The fact that Wal-Mart
had an alternative meant the Maryland statute would not conflict with
federal law.68 Attorneys for the RILA countered that there was no real
choice, because no rational employer would choose to pay Maryland a tax
rather than spend more on health care for its own employees.69 “That’s
really a Hobson's choice,” said the RILA’s attorney William J. Kilberg,
stating that Wal-Mart’s only viable option would be to increase health care
spending.70
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, head of the panel, expressed skepticism that
the Maryland law did not violate federal legislation protecting employers
from a nationwide patchwork of local laws on health care benefits. 71 Judge
M. Blane Michael, asked Wal-Mart’s lawyer why the state should be
stopped from making Wal-Mart pay for a part of its employees’ trips to the
emergency room instead of foisting those costs onto Maryland taxpayers.72
IV. ERISA
A. THE PURPOSE OF ERISA
In 1963, the Studebaker Automotive plant closed its doors forever,
leaving over ten thousand employees unemployed and unable to receive
pension plan benefits. 73 Studebaker terminated the pension plan for hourly
workers and defaulted on its obligations to the remaining workers because
the pension plan had not been adequately funded.74 “The plight of
Studebaker employees quickly emerged as a symbol of the need for
pension reform.”75
67. Dolan & Green, supra note 2, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. James A. Wooten, The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business: The
Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683 (2001)
(discussing the connection between the plant closing and the enactment of ERISA).
74. Id. at 684.
75. Id. at 683.
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Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to protect citizens from the
unexpected loss of promised benefits, like the Studebaker employees
suffered. ERISA was intended to guarantee that “American working men
and women receive private pension plan benefits which they have been led
to believe would be theirs upon retirement from working lives.”76 The Act
was drafted to mandate protective measures, and prescribe minimum
standards for promised benefits.77 Congress’s goal was to prescribe
legislative remedies for the various deficiencies existing in private pension
plan systems.78
B.

THE ERISA PREEMPTION

ERISA § 514(a) preempts any and all State laws that relate to any
employee benefit plan” covered by ERISA.79 “State law” is defined as “all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of
law, of any State.”80 A state law “relates to” an employee benefit plan if it
has either a “connection with” or a “reference to” such a plan.81 The
preemption clause states that “[ERISA] shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan.”82 These benefits
include health care.83 State reforms have often come into conflict with
ERISA because they relate, directly or indirectly, to employee benefits and
conflict with the federal law.84 States cannot mandate that employers pay
for health insurance, directly tax benefit plans, or require reports on cost or
use of the plans from employers.85 ERISA only allows states to “regulate
the business of insurance.”86
ERISA’s preemption provision is intended to promote uniformity
among the states. It ensures that plans and plan sponsors will be subject to a
uniform body of benefits law. Congress’s goal was to minimize the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

PUB. L. NO. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting
directives among states, thereby maximizing the efficiency of the plans.87
Since enactment, ERISA has confounded both state regulators and the
courts concerning the appropriate extent of its preemption of state law.88
“Questions of the extent of federal preemption under ERISA necessarily
implicate larger issues concerning the proper relationship between state and
federal law.”89 Where Congress explicitly states that the law is preempted,
courts must still examine the statute’s structure and history to determine the
precise boundaries of the preempted field. 90 The result is that preemption
decisions have an ad hoc quality.
Congress anticipated that ERISA may be litigious and would require
clarification. Senator Javits, a principal drafter of ERISA, proposed a
Congressional Pension Task Force that would study and evaluate the
preemption in connection with state authorities and report its findings to
Congress.91 If the task force determined that the preemption policy was
problematic at either the State or Federal level, appropriate modifications
would be made.92
The patchwork of Court interpretations of § 514(a) undermines the
section’s application as a general rule.93 Courts must balance ERISA,
Supreme Court interpretations, and the specific facts of the case at bar to
determine ERISA challenges. This is the only method of analysis until
Congress decides to assist the courts by amending the language of this
confusing section.
C. THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF THE ERISA
PREEMPTION
Following the Supreme Court’s first ERISA preemption decision in
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,94 it has handed down an average of
87. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
88. Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sound of Silence: The Libertarian
Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000).
89. James D. Hutchinson & David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 23 (1978).
90. Id. at 36.
91. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in III Legislative History, supra note 1,
at 4771.
92. Id.
93. See Jay Conison, ERISA and The Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L. Q.
619, 668 (1994).
94. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
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one opinion on the subject per year.95 The flux of litigation is an
inadvertent consequence of § 514(a)’s broad language. 96 That provision is
framed as a general standard, however it can only attain definiteness
through the case decision process.97 ERISA demands the very litigation
over “the validity of state action” that it supposedly was designed to
avoid.98 While there have been numerous Supreme Court preemption cases,
three illustrate where the court has been and where they are heading in
ERISA preemption rulings.
D. SHAW
In Shaw v. Delta Airlines,99 the Supreme Court held that New York’s
Disability Benefits Law (“NYDBL”) was preempted because it “related to”
employee benefit plans under § 514(a) of ERISA by connecting with or
referring to such plans.100 NYDBL required employers to pay sick-leave
benefits to employees unable to work because of pregnancy or other nonoccupational disabilities. § 514(a) pre-empts “any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered
by ERISA.101
Shaw offers a two-pronged preemption test. The first prong preempts
state laws that make reference to ERISA plans or that single out ERISA
plans.102 The second prong is the “relate to” test. It preempts state laws that
have a sufficient connection with ERISA plans, even if the statute does not

95. See Conison, supra note 93 at 620 (“The cases following Alessi that deal with
preemption are: Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1
(1983); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v.
Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S.
356 (1990); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); District of Columbia v.
Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993)”).
96. Id. at 621.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
100. Id. at 88.
101. Id. at 91-92.
102. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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expressly refer to ERISA plans.103 A state law that “relates to” ERISA
plans is preempted even if the law is consistent with ERISA’s policies and
substantive requirements.104 Employing this definition, the Court found that
a law which prohibits employers from structuring their employee benefit
plans in a manner that requires employers to pay employees specific
benefits, clearly “relate to” benefit plans.105 “We must give effect to this
plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the
language to have some more restrictive meaning.”106 Shaw demonstrates
that state laws attempting to regulate the terms of ERISA plan benefits are
preempted because, under the Shaw test, such laws have a “connection” to
ERISA plans.
Under Shaw and its progeny, the Supreme Court preempted a host of
state laws under § 514(a) on the grounds that such state laws had “a
connection with or reference to” ERISA-governed pension or welfare
plans.107 “Under this expansive approach to § 514(a) and its ‘relate to’
terminology, ERISA preemption was nearly automatic whenever a state
law touched an ERISA-regulated plan.”108
E. MACKEY

Shaw and its progeny had an impressive run, however the Supreme
Court has subsequently narrowed the broad scope of § 514(a). In Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc.,109 the Court found that a state law
did not “relate to” an ERISA plan, thus overcoming preemption under the
second prong of the Shaw test. In Mackey, a creditor of several ERISA plan
beneficiaries sought to garnish money that an ERISA plan owed to those
beneficiaries. 110 Two Georgia statutes were implicated.111 The first statute
was preempted because it expressly referred to and solely applied to
ERISA plans.112 However, Georgia’s general garnishment statute, which
allowed ERISA funds to be garnished, was found not to be preempted.113
103. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
104. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Zelinsky, supra note 59, at 851.
108. Id.
109. 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988)
110. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 831-32.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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The Court reasoned that ‘the garnishment statute was merely a procedural
mechanism for enforcing judgments and found that Congress did not intend
to forbid such mechanisms.’”114 The Court held that “state-law methods for
collecting money judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed
by ERISA .”115 The Court reasoned that because the ERISA plans
ultimately owed the same amount of money whether they paid it to the
beneficiaries or to the beneficiaries’ creditors, Georgia’s garnishment
statute did not have a sufficient connection with ERISA plans for the
purposes of preemption under the second prong of the Shaw test.116
F. TRAVELERS
The Supreme Court further delineated the boundaries encompassed by
the phrase “relate to” in New York Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co. Before its decision in Travelers the Supreme Court had defined “relates
to” as a “connection with or reference to ERISA plans.” In Travelers, the
Court reversed and remanded because the provisions for surcharges did not
relate to employee benefit plans within the meaning of the preemption
provision and accordingly suffered no preemption. While § 514(a) provides
that ERISA “shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they . . . relate
to any employee benefit plan” covered by the statute, the preemption does
not apply to “any law of any State which regulates insurance.”117
“Travelers and its progeny represent an important effort by the Court to
reform the overly-expansive Shaw-based approach to ERISA
preemption.”118
The Court in Travelers reasoned that “if a law authorizing an indirect
source of economic cost is not [subject to] preemp[tion], it should follow
that a law operating as an indirect source of . . . economic influence on
administrative decisions . . . should not [be enough] to trigger preemption
either.”119

114. Id. at 831-32.
115. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 834.
116. Id.
117. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). (This exception for insurance
regulation is itself limited, however, by the provision that an employee welfare benefit plan
may not “be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the
business of insurance”); See also, § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
118. See Zelinsky, supra note 59, at 867.
119. Id.
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G. THE SUPREME COURT’S GENERAL ERISA PREEMPTION
APPROACH

The Supreme Court will consider the following factors in any
preemption analysis under § 514(a). First, courts ask whether the state law
makes reference to a covered employee benefit plan by (a) directly
referring to an ERISA covered plan or (b) relying on the existence of
ERISA plans to take effect.120 Second, courts ask whether the state law has
a “connection with” a covered employee benefit plan by (a) belonging to a
field not typically regulated by the state and intended to be field-preempted
by ERISA,121 (b) affecting the structure or administration of employee
benefit plans covered by ERISA,122 (c) providing alternative enforcement
mechanisms to ERISA plans,123 or (d) offering no means by which the
effects of the state law on ERISA benefit plans are optional or avoidable.124
V. WHERE MARYLAND’S FAIR SHARE ACT WENT WRONG
The primary errors that the Maryland Fair Share Act made were that it
(1) relates to an ERISA covered plan and (2) it targets Wal-Mart. Future
Fair Share Acts must have a broader application and cannot refer to ERISA
plans if they want to survive.
A. THE FAIR SHARE ACT RELATES TO AN ERISA COVERED PLAN
According to the Initiative, which drafted the Act, “as a tax on payroll,
the Fair Share Act neither explicitly mentions ERISA, nor requires the
existence of an ERISA plan for its operation.”125 Even under the more
relaxed preemption standards announced in Travelers, the Fair Share Act
unacceptably coerces covered employers to provide a certain amount of

120. Maureen McOwen, Through the Eye of the Needle: How the New York City
Health Care Security Act Will Escape ERISA Preemption, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
37, 59 (2006); See also, Mackey 486 U.S. at 828-29.
121. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 519
U.S. 316, 325 (1997).
122. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657-58.
123. See Id. at 658; Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 144-45.
124. See, e.g., Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000,
1009 (2d Cir. 1997).
125. Sangree, supra note 40, at 5.
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health care coverage and regulate how employers report on the process.126
Any regulation of ERISA covered plans is expressly preempted.
The Fair Share Act is targeted specifically at employer-provided
medical plans, not at a broad class of health care consumers or providers.
127
The Act is much more than an “indirect economic influence.”128 The
evident purpose of the Act is “a direct, focused financial impact on the
covered employer and its ERISA-regulated medical plan, i.e., to force an
increase in medical outlays to an eight percent minimum of payroll.”129
Fair Share Acts cannot regulate ERISA covered plans in anyway.
Maryland’s Act does just that. Legislatures must carefully draft their Fair
Share Acts so that they do not have any bearing on how plan administrators
run their health care plans.
B. THE FAIR SHARE ACT DIRECTLY TARGETS WAL-MART
The Initiative claims that the Fair Share Act “applies equally to every
employer with 10,000 or more employees without restriction.”130 However
the other covered employers either already satisfy the plan’s eight percent
health care spending requirement or they have been afforded special
loopholes. John’s Hopkins only had to make six percent contributions to
health care because it was a non-profit. Northrop Grumman successfully
lobbied for a provision in the Act that permits employers to exclude, for
purposes of calculating the percentage of payroll spent on health care,
compensation paid to its employees above the median household income in
Maryland.131
Successful Fair Share Acts must be generally applicable if they have
any hopes of surviving. Maryland’s Fair Share Act is a thinly veiled attack
on Wal-Mart. Legislatures will never be able to ensure that Wal-Mart pays
adequate health care benefits, if they draft legislation that appears to target
just Wal-Mart. The best way to attack big box health care disparities is to
enact Fair Share Acts that apply to large businesses uniformly.

126. Id. at 866.
127. See Zelinsky, supra note 59, at 863.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Sangree, supra note 40, at 23.
131. See RILA, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (quoting § 8.5-103(b)).

2008]

BREAKING THE CHAIN

191

VI. LOCAL INNOVATION—FAIR SHARE ACTS IN OTHER
STATES
Since the death of the Clinton Administration’s Health Security Act of
1993 (“HSA”),132 there has been a gross lack of Congressional dialogue on
health care reform. 133 In the wake of HSA’s demise, Congress has failed to
consider other system-wide reforms. 134 “A decade of incremental change
has left the United States with large numbers of uninsured, increasing costs,
questions about quality, and dissatisfaction with managed care.”135
Congress’s silence has compelled states and localities to begin discussions
themselves.136 The Fair Share Act was one such initiative bore from these
discussions. The Act was a significant test case that served as a catalyst for
similar bills in more than thirty states.137 Twenty-three such bills have
already been defeated by legislators, and none has been passed into law.138
The 2005 resurgence of state interest in Fair Share Acts is attributable
to meager state budgets,139 booming Medicaid costs, and growing numbers
of uninsured workers. States are desperate to guarantee worker health
benefits without dipping into their dwindling coffers. Across the country,
these initiatives comprise a national effort to push local policy innovation
despite Federal policy stagnation. Even though there have been many failed
attempts, local legislators are still at the forefront of providing health care
solutions for Americans.
A. STATE HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION
Few Fair Share Acts have survived ERISA preemption challenges
because they are never able to mount the many hurdles of § 514. The first
hurdle under § 514 is to determine whether the particular state law “relates
132. Proposed Legislation: The Health Security Act of 1993. Washington, DC: US
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, HOUSE DOCUMENT 103-174; 1993.
133. See Peter P. Budetti, 10 Years Beyond the Health Security Act Failure, Subsequent
Developments and Persistent Problems, 292 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 16, 2000 Oct. 27, 2004.
See also Maureen McOwen, supra note 120, at 51-52.
134. Budetti, supra note 133, at 2000.
135. Id.
136. McOwen, supra note 120, at 52.
137. National Conference of State Legislatures. 2006 ‘Pay or Play’ Bills. Can States
Mandate
Employer
Health
Insurance
Benefits?
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/payorplay2006.htm.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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to” ERISA plans.140 The Act will survive if it does not relate or falls under
another exemption category.141 The four protected categories are banking,
securities, insurance, and general criminal laws.142 The Act will also fail if
it is “connected with” an ERISA plan.
The “relate to” and “connected with” standards as applied under Shaw,
Mackey, and Travelers will often defeat tradition Fair Share Acts, however
New York City’s modified Fair Share Act exhibit the positive results from
such legislation and offer a model for other states. The New York City
Health Care Security Act (“HCSA”) is an exemplary piece of legislation
that States would be wise to model themselves after because it conquers the
hurdles of ERISA preemption. Both Acts successfully ensure that
employers carry the burden of their employees’ health care needs.
New York City legislators developed their own version of the Fair
Share Act, which may be the most effective legislation to date. HCSA took
effect in July 2006.143 HCSA applies to “grocery employers” that (1)
operate one or more retail stores in New York City with at least 50
employees at any one store, or (2) contain 12,500 square feet of retail space
devoted to groceries, such as a “big box” retail store.144
HSCA further stipulates that such employers must meet the required
health care expenditure for its employees. Employers are not required to
demonstrate minimum expenditure per employee. “Instead, the employer’s
total health care expenditure is calculated as the sum of all health care
expenditures made on behalf of employees or the public.”145 Employers
calculate their “‘required health care expenditure’ by multiplying the
‘prevailing health care expenditure rate’ by the total number of hours
worked by their employees.”146 The “prevailing health care expenditure
rate” is “set by the administering agency, based on collective bargaining
agreements in the industry.”147 Further, employers never have to contribute
any funds towards an ERISA benefit plan.148
“Health care expenditures” include contributions to health savings
accounts, reimbursements to employees and their families, and
140. See § 514(b)(2)(B)
141. Id.
142. See §§ 514(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4), 29 U. S. C., §§ 1144(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4), §§
514(d), and 29 U. S. C. 1144(d); see also, Zelinsky, supra note 59, at 870.
143. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 22-506(c)(1) (2006).
144. Id. § 22-506(b)(12).
145. McOwen, supra, note 120 at 56 (quoting § 22-506(b)(13)).
146. Id. (quoting § 22-506(c)(3) (2006)).
147. Id.(quoting § 22-506(c)(2)).
148. Id.
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contributions to local public hospitals and community health care clinics.149
The proportion of the employer’s contribution to each, qualified health care
expenditure vehicle is unimportant as long as the employer’s total
contributions equal the “required health care expenditure” specified under
HCSA.150
An employer who fails to make the required health care expenditures
during the fiscal year is liable for a civil penalty equal to the amount of the
shortfall.151 If the offending employer fails to pay the difference within
ninety days, they will be fined an additional $500 per day until the
employer meets the required health care expenditure.152 Unlike other
traditional “pay or play” legislation, fines for non-compliance can exceed
the original health care burdens.153 The civil penalties are deposited into
New York City’s general treasury, as opposed to investments into a public
health care fund, like other “pay or play” legislation.154
The New York City HCSA is perfectly suited to survive an ERISA
challenge under Shaw and Travelers. The Act never refers to ERISA
covered plans, nor relies on ERISA plans to be effective. The Act does not
require employers to provide certain specific types of benefits. The Act is
generally applicable. The Act does not have a connection with, or reference
to, covered employee benefit plans within the meaning of the preemption
provision of ERISA § 514(a). Most importantly, the Act never dictates how
employers administer their ERISA covered plans.
The Shaw Court’s strict interpretation of § 514(a), preempts “‘any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan covered by ERISA.”155 A law “relates to” an employee benefit
plan, if it has a “connection with” or reference to such a plan.156 While the
149. See id. (quoting § 22-506(b)(13)).
150. See § 22-506(c).
151. Id. § 22-506(e)(1).
152. Id. § 22-506(e)(2).
153. See McOwen, supra note 120, at 56. (“There is a subtle flexibility in the New
York City HCSA with respect to the “pay or play” analysis. The law is drafted such that
section 22-506(e)(1) provides a classic “pay or play” option: the non-complying employer
“shall be liable for a civil penalty equal to the amount of the shortfall.” Id. § 22-506(e)(1).
The subsequent paragraph, however, subjects the non-complying employer to an additional
penalty of $ 500 per day, destroying the “pay or play” parity. Id. § 22-506(e)(2). The law is
therefore structured so that section 22-506(e)(2) could be severed from the local law under
an ERISA preemption challenge, leaving a “pay or play” type statute in its place.”)
154. Id.
155. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91; see also, 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a)
156. Id. at 96-97 (U.S. 1983).
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Supreme Court has since moved away from this severe, two prong
approach, HCSA would still survive it. The language of the Act is careful
never to directly or indirectly refer to ERISA covered plans; however this
measure is not mere semantic trickery. HCSA legitimately avoids “relating
to” or “connecting with” ERISA plans because it never mandates how
covered plans are to be run. Instead it remains within its legislative sphere
of authority; health regulation.
Under Travelers, ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated
employee benefit structures or their administration.157 The New York City
HCSA requires only that covered employers meet a health expenditure
minimum. Employers are free to meet these requirements in numerous
ways. While HCSA does require that covered employers report their health
expenditures, it is to an administering agency, not the City.
Unlike most Fair Share Acts, the New York City HCSA provides
covered employers with a plethora of ways to meet the required health care
expenditure without creating or contributing to health benefit plans covered
by ERISA.158 Covered employers can also comply by funding ERISA
benefit plans for its employees, however “because this connection is
optional or ancillary to the operation of the local law, the courts should find
that the laws do not have a ‘connection with’ ERISA plans for the purpose
of § 514(a).”159
Covered ERISA employee benefit plans are those “established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization.”160 As noted
above, health care expenditures include contributions to health savings
accounts, reimbursements to employees and their families, and
contributions to local public hospitals and community health care clinics.
The term “health savings account” means “a trust created or organized in
the United States as a health savings account exclusively for the purpose of
paying the qualified medical expenses of the account beneficiary.”161
Notably, there is no requirement that such accounts are maintained or run
by employers. Reimbursements to employees and to their families can only
be made for “incurred health care expenses where such recipients had no
entitlement to have expenses reimbursed under any plan, fund or program
maintained by such employer.”162 Contributions to local hospitals and
157. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
158. McOwen, supra note 120, at 68.
159. Id.
160. See ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
161. See IRC § 223
162. See § 22-506(b)(13)(ii).
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community health care clinics cannot include “payments made directly or
indirectly for worker’s compensation, Medicare benefits, or any other
health care costs, taxes or assessments that such employer is required to
pay pursuant to any federal, state or local law.”163 HCSA specifically bars
any payment type that would relate to an ERISA covered plan. None of
HCSA three alternative forms of health care contributions are “established
or maintained by an employer.” Thus none of the options qualify as an
ERISA covered plan.
HSCA also avoids challenges to whether it is a fee in tax clothing
by imposing a civil fine instead fees like traditional Fair Share Acts.164 The
law avoids the pitfalls of Fair Share Acts by carefully tailoring itself to both
ERISA exemption and ERISA jurisprudence. HSCA ensures that covered
employers spend a minimum amount on health care equal to the rates set by
an industry administering agency and imposes civil fines on violating
employers equal to the amount of the shortfall.165 This careful structuring
shows that HSCA is cognizant of the mistakes of its predecessors while
still maintaining the failed Fair Share Act’s ultimate goal; more health care
coverage for employees.
VII. HOW TO DRAFT SUCCESSFUL HEALTH CARE
LEGISLATION
A. FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL PAY OR PLAY PLANS
Since Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Maryland, similar bills
have been struck down across the country. The high failure rate is primarily
due legislatures’ failure to draft bills that (1) are applicable to a broad class
of large employers and (2) do not relate to ERISA. For Fair Share Acts to
succeed ERISA preemptions, they must be broadly applicable. If they
appear to target Wal-Mart or hinder ERISA regulation, they will never
survive.
Legislators should establish health care programs that tax a broad base
of employers. However, the Act should never regulate or mandate
employee health care coverage.166Legislators should never expressly refer

163. See § 22-506(b)(13)(iii).
164. See § 22-506(b)
165. See §§ 22-506(b), 22-506 (2005)(e)(1)
166. Id.
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to ERISA plans.167 State laws are easily invalidated if they refer
specifically to private-sector, employer covered health plans.168 Further,
Fair Share Acts must be imposed directly upon employers not on the
employer-sponsored plan.169
Fair Share Acts must maintain neutral language regarding whether
employers offer health coverage or contribute to the health care fund.170
The legislative objective should be to provide universal coverage.
Neutrality must be maintained regarding whether an employer pays the tax
or pays employee health benefits.171 Failure to do so may result in the Act
being deemed a mandate.
Fair Share Acts should not impose any standards on qualifications to
satisfy the health care expenditure, except in the broadest terms.
“Conditioning the tax credit on meeting certain state qualifications will
affect ERISA plan benefits and structure and therefore raise preemption
problems.”172
B. MODEL FAIR SHARE ACT LEGISLATION—MODELED AFTER
NEW YORK CITY’S HCSA
(1) Employers of fifty employees or more shall make required health
care expenditures on behalf of their employees and or the families
of their employees each fiscal year.
(2) “Health care expenditures” means any amount paid by a covered
employer to its employees or to another party on behalf of its
employees and or the families of its employees for the purpose of
providing health care services or reimbursing the cost of such
services for its employees including, but not limited to, (i)
contributions by such employer to a health savings account; (ii)
reimbursement by such employer to its employees and or the
families of its employees for incurred health care expenses where
such recipients had no entitlement to have expenses reimbursed
under any plan, fund or program maintained by such employer; (iii)
contributions to a federally qualified hospital or health care facility
where a majority of the employer’s employees reside or near the
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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employer’s place of business provided that such contributions shall
not be designated for a particular individual or group of
individuals; provided that no payment be made directly or
indirectly for worker’s compensation, Medicare benefits or any
other health care costs, taxes, or assessments that such employer is
required to pay pursuant to any federal, state or local law other than
this section, or any amount deducted from an employee’s wages
and not reimbursed by such employer.
An Administering agency shall annually determine the prevailing
health care expenditure rate for employees; provided that where
thirty percent or more of covered employees are covered by a valid
collective bargaining agreement, the prevailing health care
expenditure rate for such employees shall be equal to the health
care expenditure rate for full-time employees as provided under
such collective bargaining agreement.
Any covered employer found to be in violation of this section by
failing to make health care expenditures during the fiscal year at
least equal to the required health care expenditure for such
employer shall correct such violation within ninety days of such
determination. The administering agency shall serve notice to
correct such violation. Failure to correct such violation pursuant to
this paragraph shall subject a covered employer to a civil penalty of
not less than five hundred dollars for each day such violation
continues.
Any covered employer found to be in violation of this section by
failing to make health care expenditures during the fiscal year at
least equal to the required health care expenditure for such
employer shall be liable for a civil penalty equal to the amount of
the shortfall.
The administering agency shall take appropriate action to enforce
this section, including but not limited to, periodically auditing
covered employers to monitor compliance with this section.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Legislatures across the country are eager to enact Fair Share Acts
because they know how deadly being uninsured is. The uninsured receive
less preventive care, are diagnosed at more advanced disease stages, and
once diagnosed, tend to receive less therapeutic care (drugs and surgical
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interventions). 173 Uninsured women are more likely to have poor outcomes
during pregnancy and delivery than are women with insurance, and the
same is true for uninsured newborns.174 Uninsured children are at higher
risk for hospitalization for conditions amenable to timely outpatient care
and for missed diagnoses of serious and even life threatening conditions.175
Having health insurance would reduce mortality rates for the uninsured by
ten to fifteen percent.176
Unfortunately, ERISA greatly impedes local legislatures’ ability to
draft Acts that will address health care benefit disparities. ERISA’s
preemption clause intended to minimize employer-sponsored plan’s
administrative and financial burdens of complying with varying state
laws.177 In doing so, it has allowed national employers to shift huge health
care related administrative and financial burdens to states. States cannot
cover all their uninsured residents without additional revenue sources.178
The statutory hurdles created by ERISA place restraints on states that
reflect deep federalism concerns and Congressional ambivalence about
governmental regulation on the health care market. Local innovation is
stifled and Congressional apathy is ubiquitous. The only way for states to
ensure that big box retailers, like Wal-Mart, pay their fair share of health
care costs is to walk the maze of ERISA preemption jurisprudence. In
doing so, legislatures must strike a balance between protecting the
uninsured and avoiding the pitfalls of ERISA preemption. Modeling
legislation after New York City’s HCSA will satisfy both goals.

173. Jack Hadley, Sicker and Poorer: The Consequences of Being Uninsured (Kaiser
Commission
on
Medicaid
and
the
Uninsured
2002);
available
at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/Full-Report.pdf.
174. Institute OF MEDICINE, COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE,
Health Insurance is a Family Matter (Nat’l Academy Press, 2002).
175. Id.
176. Hadley, supra note 173.
177. Id.
178. Id.

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE
LAW JOURNAL
The Connecticut Insurance Law Journal is published at least twice per year.
Domestic subscriptions are $28.00 per year, international subscriptions are
$32.00 per year. Back issues and back volumes are available (for any
volume up to and including Volume 13) for $15.00 per issue or $25.00 per
volume; international orders add $3.00 per issue or $5.00 per volume.
Absent timely notice of termination, subscriptions are renewed
automatically. To subscribe to the Insurance Journal or order back issues
online, please visit our website located at www.insurancejournal.org, or
you may fill out the form below and mail to:
Pat Carbray, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 65 Elizabeth Street,
Hartford, CT 06105; subscriptions@insurancejournal.org.
Please Print below and complete reverse:
Contact Name: _______________________________________
Contact Title: ________________________________________
Organization: ________________________________________
Department: _________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________

____________________________________________
City: _________________ State: _____ Zip Code: ________
Phone: __________________ Fax: ______________________
E-Mail: ____________________________________________
Additional Comments:

Check all that apply:
I would like to order (number) __________ subscriptions at $28.00
per subscription ($32.00 for international orders).
I would like to order (number) __________ complete set(s) of back
issues (Volumes 1-13) at $150.00 per set ($165.00 for international
orders).
I would like to order the following back volumes or back issues at
$15.00 per issue, $25.00 per volume (international orders are
$18.00 per issue and $30.00 per volume). Please list volume, issue
and quantity for each.
Examples: 4 copies, Volume 3, Issue 2
2 copies - Volume 3
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________

